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Economic news of recent years have been full of signs that a new division of
business is emerging between entrepreneurs and politicians in some of the old
industrialized countries: While entrepreneurs with proprietary rights over some
technology continue to worry, as they have always done, about product sales and
their share in particular markets, politicians increasingly seem to worry about
their country's share of particular technologies. Indeed, it is now a widely held
belief that there are certain technologies which hold the key to economic growth
and prosperity for the country that masters them best. These technologies are
generally thought to be distinguished by having the greatest potential for future
innovations and the widest range of possible practical applications. Many of
today's politicians seem to think that it is part of their job to identify these tech-
nologies and to make sure their home economy gets its fair share in each of
them.
This theme was swiftly taken up by economic theorists who have since the
mid-1980s devised various new approaches to modelling the notion that na-
tional leadership in high-technologies may result in a lasting lead of a country's
productivity growth. These new approaches surely help to identify the theo-
retical conditions that would have to be met before targeted technology policies
should be seriously considered in practice. Yet, empirical studies able to either
substantiate or dismiss the theoretical possibilities for growth enhancing target-
ing of key technologies are so far largely lacking. It is for this reason that the
present study empirically examines the impact of technology on the dynamics of
technological and industrial specialization in OECD countries. It is hoped that
the results of this empirical exploration will prove to be informative for poli-
ticians and economists alike.
This study would not have been doable without generous financial support
granted by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, which is greatly appreciated.
I have further benefited from numerous discussions with fellow economists at
the Kiel Institute of World Economics and at the University of Kiel's Institute
for Research in Innovation Management. In particular, I would like to thank
Prof. Dr. Horst Siebert, the Kiel Institute's President, Prof. Dr. Klaus Brockhoff,
Director of the Institute for Research in Innovation Management, and Privat-
dozent Dr. habil. Karl-Heinz Paque, head of the Kiel Institute's division forIV
research on economic growth, structural policy and the international division of
labour. Computational assistance was provided by Dr. Deok Ryong Yoon.
Thanks are also due to Frank-Joachim Ballke, Dietmar Gebert and Itta Schulte
for their editorial work. — To my parents, I am grateful for giving me the right
kind of attention and guidance to foster my natural curiosity in the earlier years
of my life. Lastly, but by no means least, I would like to thank my beloved wife,
Ute, who shared both the pain and the joy of writing this study.
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I. Aim and Scope of the Study
The dynamics of industrial specialization in open economies pose an unmet
challenge for economic research. As proposals for targeted industrial and tech-
nology policies have come to the forefront_pf the public policy debate in recent
years> the challenge to understand the forces behind economic and technological
specialization is no longer of academic interest only. Yet, it remains primarily a
challenge for the economic theorist and for the researcher in applied economics
to provide a comprehensive assessment of old and new arguments for and
against targeted policies, and to communicate the relevant results to the public.
Some recent theoretical models of endogenous economic growth and in-
dustrial specialization have attracted considerable attention for the support they
appear to lend to selective industrial policies. In particular, the focus has been
on government support to selected high-technology industries, whose growth is
suspected of being constrained by insufficient market incentives due to strong
external economies from research and development. The purpose of the research
reported in this study is to explore various implications of these models, notably
those that are essential to the argument for selectively targeted industrial and
technology policies.
In essence, this study has two objectives, one empirical and one policy-
oriented. Empirically, it is to critically examine the relevance of the hypothesis
of path-dependence in the sectoral technological development of open econ-
omies — an hypothesis which has been derived from the supposedly localized
nature of external economies from knowledge creation in recent models of en-
dogenous technological change, specialization and growth. As to policy, the
study seeks to identify the informational requirements that would have to be
fulfilled to make targeted industrial and technology policies a recommendable
course of government action in a concrete situation, if path-dependence was
generally found to be empirically relevant.
The structure of the study is as follows. Chapter B will review some of the
models of endogenous technological change in open economies which have
been influential in the recent debate among economists about growth policies,
and will discuss how these models might be adapted to serve as a framework for
an empirical investigation of path-dependence in the dynamics of countries'
specialization in technology-intensive industries. This review will focus on
methodological issues and will point out the gaps in the existing empiricalliterature which the present study intends to close. The review will thus provide
a case for the particular methodology chosen in the present study.
At the same time, the opening chapter will address a number of theoretical
questions which have motivated the recent rise in economists' work on tech-
nology and growth: Why does growth of per capita income in today's advanced
economies seem to depend so much on technological innovation? Since not any
kind of innovation will do, since innovation per se — a mere change of what
is — seems unlikely to be beneficial to growth, one is then led to ask how the
right kinds of innovation are selected in growing economies. In particular, how
does the market, which historically appears to have been the most successful
selection device, actually select the innovations that turn out to be not merely
profitable for private entrepreneurs at a particular place and time but also con-
ducive for overall productivity growth in the long term? Can we trust that the
market is an efficient selection process in the sense that it enables the economy
to grow at the optimal rate given consumers' time preferences and attitudes to-
wards risk?.
A fundamental question — and one considered extensively by new growth
theory — is the following one: What prevents the stream of innovations, which
raise productivity, yet make each innovator a temporary monopolist, from
running dry in the course of time? It seems doubtful that the answer to this can
be fully understood looking at innovation as a purely microscopic phenomenon
only, involving individual enterprises in isolation. Instead, it seems to be
necessary to look as well at the macroscopic level of innovating economies, at
the potentially complex interdependencies between all decentralized entre-
preneurial activities which are probably exacerbated by the systemic nature of
many modern technologies.
Put as a question for methodology: Does marginalism, one of the premises of
neoclassical economics, still provide the adequate tools to analyze innovation,
specialization and growth in today's world? Is there, perhaps, a need to supple-
ment or replace marginalism by something else — in order to avoid the pitfalls
of applying marginalism to optimization over non-convex sets? A related policy
question being: Is a continually beneficial stream of technological innovations
conceivable without some supplementary process of organizational and insti-
tutional innovations in the economy at large?
Chapter C will discuss how models of hysteresis in industrial specialization
can be formalized in terms of mathematical probability theory, in a way which
takes feedbacks from macropatterns to microdynamics properly into account. In
particular, the discussion will ask how these models can be embedded in
Markov processes. Computer simulations will be used to exhibit the likely long-
term trends of specialization derived from selected model specifications. These
should help to understand what conditions actually make path-dependence orhysteresis a likely feature in historical processes of specialization in technology-
intensive economies.
Interpretation of the computer simulations will be based on the ensemble
view, which will also serve as the guiding principle in the subsequent empirical
investigation in Chapter E. The ensemble view is a simplified and restricted
version of the ideal model in terms of Markov random fields which would take
into account all important interdependencies between individual industries
within and across countries as well as across time, yet presently remains
analytically intractable. The ensemble view instead takes the simulated or ob-
served sequences of individual industries' states of specialization in different
countries as members of a statistical population, so that inferences can be drawn
from the variation in the data.
Chapters D and E will report the results of several different approaches to
examine the actual determinants and the actual dynamics of specialization in
OECD countries. First, in Chapter D, conventional regressions will be discussed
which attempt to identify the specific sets of determinants for particular in-
dustries' research and development activities to be relatively strongly or weakly
represented in an economy. These exploratory regressions are intended to assess
the empirical relevance of the notion of comparative advantage for the allo-
cation of R&D activities across countries and across industries.
In Chapter E, the observed dynamics of technological and production special-
ization will be explored by means of nonparametric estimation of Markov chain
transition probabilities. At issue is here persistence and the hypothesis of
hysteresis in national patterns of industrial specialization, often claimed to be an
implication of strong path-dependence in the evolution of high technologies
specific to certain industries. A crude, preliminary attempt will be made to take
changes in countries' relative factor endowments into account.
Chapter F will evaluate and discuss, on the background of the various em-
pirical findings, the implications of new growth theory for industrial and tech-
nology policies in advanced open economies. This chapter will suggest the out-
lines of a unified interpretation of present knowledge in the field. Importantly, it
will point out a number of crucial questions which would have to be answered
before any targeted industrial and technology policies could be recommended
for use in practice. Reasons will be given why many of these questions still can-
not be satisfactorily answered given the analytical restrictions of the tools which
are today available for theoretical and empirical research in economics.
Chapter G concludes.II. Preliminaries on Methodology and Terminology
It may be useful to emphasize at the outset that the empirical research reported
in this study is exploratory in several directions which have hitherto received
little attention in the literature. This work is based on particular choices of
theoretical models and empirical methodology. It will become clear in the sub-
sequent chapters why these choices were made. Some preliminary thoughts on
their appropriateness, as well as some basic definitions, are offered in the re-
mainder of this introduction.
Targeted technology policies can often be considered as targeted industrial
policies in disguise. This correspondence in terms of the motivation to adopt
such policies has a factual basis because industries are often defined by the
typical technologies they use. A good example is telecommunications, but a
counter-example is provided by hydraulics, a technology applied in many in-
dustries as different as aircraft, electric power generation and medical engineer-
ing. To be sure, technology policies targeted at key technologies, defined as
those with immediate applications in virtually all industries, cannot be con-
sidered industrial policies; conversely, industrial policies not aimed at im-
proving a particular industry's technological basis cannot count as technology
policy. Finally, there is yet another class of technology policies which are not
targeted, but aim at improving the creation and diffusion of new technologies in
general.
The present study does not consider distributional objectives as a motivation
for policy, but only the potential failure of markets to ensure an efficient allo-
cation of resources. Inasmuch as industrial (or technology) policy pursues the
goal of correcting or compensating for market failures, these are generally
attributed to external effects or increasing returns to scale. External effects,
broadly defined, arise when the activities of one economic agent have a positive
or negative impact on the activities of others without the former having an in-
centive to include this in his decision calculus, because these effects are not at
all, or not fully, compensated by counter-transactions. External effects thus may
imply that the conditions for efficient production and consumption are not met
in market equilibrium. Under the assumption of differentiability, these con-
ditions require that the marginal rates of substitution between any two inputs be
equal in all production (or consumption) activities and that the marginal rates of
transformation between any two goods be equal to the marginal rates of sub-
stitution in using these goods. These conditions though may not be sufficient if
there are non-convexities in an economy's production technology.
One case of non-convexities are increasing returns to scale, which a pro-
duction process is said to exhibit when output can be increased over-pro-portionally by a simultaneous increase of all inputs at a constant ratio. In-
creasing returns to the scale of the individual firm represent a market failure in-
sofar as they must eventually lead to a monopoly of the largest producer, who
can produce at lower average costs than any of the competitors. The monopolist
will then seek to maximize profits by setting prices above marginal costs, a
situation which has long been known to be suboptimal from a social point of
view (Marshall 1922). The reason is that this divergence of price from marginal
costs violates the efficiency condition that marginal rates of transformation be
equal to the marginal rates-of substitution. By lowering price a given monopolist
would create a kind of external effect benefiting his customers who would then
use greater quantities of the monopoly good at lower unit costs; but an opti-
mizing monopolist would of course avert such a move in a static equilibrium.
Not every compensation for, or correction of, market failures can, however,
be called industrial policy. The provision of public goods, for example of the
(natural) monopoly product of national security, is normally not classified as in-
dustrial policy, although here surely is a case of market failure. The correction
of, or compensation for, market failures can reasonably be called industrial pol-
icy only when the market failure affects the different industries in an economy
to a differing degree and when the market failure therefore leads to an inef-
ficient allocation of resources across the different industries. This is the case,
e.g., when investments in research and development in one industry yield
positive technological external effects for research in other industries, while the
former industry does not benefit from equivalent reciprocal external effects it-
self. But inefficiency of resource allocation across industries might also be a
problem because one industry suffers distortions in the form of monopolistic
price setting while other industries operate under perfect competition.
Scitovsky (1954) suggested to distinguish between technological and pecuni-
ary external effects. External effects which directly influence the level of pro-
duction of the recipient firm or the level of utility of the recipient consumer are
called technological; they are generally an indication of incomplete property
rights. Siebert (1992a) points out that the analysis of technological externalities
can usually be enriched by explicitly considering the technological system
through which they are communicated. Pecuniary external effects on the other
hand do not presuppose a technological system other than the market
mechanism. They are indirectly propagated via a change in market prices, and
influence the profit level of other firms. If they occur in a dynamic equilibrium,
they can imply aggregate-level distortions which may be observationally similar
to those of technological external effects.
While the introduction of a new good often comes with a negative pecuniary
externality for the direct competitors, who lose sales or face lower prices, it may
also give rise to positive technological external effects, when the invention re-veals new technical possibilities which competitors can incorporate into the next
generation of their own products without paying a fee to the original inventor.
On the other hand, also pecuniary externalities may be positive, so for instance
when they involve upstream or downstream linkages between vertically not in-
tegrated firms within an industry. After all, an innovator lowers the price of his
new good from infinity to some finite value. Because the different external ef-
fects associated with innovation are partly positive and partly negative in their
impact, it is generally difficult to evaluate whether the world is economically
improved or made worse by the introduction of some particular new good or by
an ongoing process of innovation in a particular technological direction.
The well-known criterion to compare allocative equilibria of production and
consumption in terms of efficiency, due to Pareto (1919) who extended an idea
previously used by Edgeworth ([1881] 1932) in the context of pure exchange
economies, states that an allocation is optimal if it cannot be changed in favour
of any one person or firm without lowering the well-being of at least one other
economic agent. Welfare economics, which inquires into the conditions to en-
sure that resource allocation is efficient, i.e. Pareto-optimal, has in the past
strictly distinguished between technological and pecuniary external effects in its
use of comparative statics to analyze perfectly competitive markets: While tech-
nological external effects were accepted as a theoretical justification for cor-
recting government intervention, pecuniary external effects were implicitly ex-
cluded from equilibrium by the assumption that all consumers and firms are
price takers and that all profits are zero. Pecuniary effects were merely seen as
an unavoidable part of the adjustment to a new Pareto-optimal allocation after
an exogenous parameter or price change has destroyed a given equilibrium allo-
cation.
That only technological externalities are considered a potential economic
justification of government intervention is thus an implicit result of a tradi-
tional, static approach to the analysis of external effects in the context of
general equilibrium on perfectly competitive markets for a given set of goods
(Scitovsky 1954). New growth theory has recognized that perfect competition is
rarely relevant in actual growing economies, and has reasserted the insight that
a strict dichotomy between the welfare relevance of technological versus pecu-
niary external effects is often neither practical nor useful within a dynamic
context (Krugman 1992: 425). Ongoing and endogenous, yet often intrinsically
unpredictable parameter and price changes are, after all, the essence of eco-
nomic growth, which is hardly conceivable without price setting by temporary
monopolists and without pecuniary external effects occurring all the time. New
growth theory has managed to include some of those endogenous parameter and
price changes in its dynamic definition of equilibrium, and to model steady-state
growth with pecuniary as well as technological external effects.Where genuinely new goods and services enter the world, the allocation
problem cannot be simply reduced to one of static equilibrium in perfect com-
petition by devising a complete set of future markets, as in Arrow and Debreu
(1954). Nor can institutions to internalize externalities, which may solve part of
the incentive problem as envisaged by Coase (1960), always be relied on to
emerge at the right place and time, because the irregular, unstable and un-
predictable nature of innovations may imply that such institutions would have to
change their rules continuously, and would have to deal with ever-changing
groups of originators, beneficiaries and burden bearers. Software and genetic
engineering, for example, have raised the issue of extending intellectual prop-
erty rights to cover hitherto unpatentable technologies. Yet, where such in-
stitutions do emerge they may actually tend to increase the degree of monopoly
in the economy, and may thus create additional distortions from optimality.
It is therefore a premise of much of new growth theory that neither pecuniary
nor technological external effects from the creation of new technical knowledge
should be a priori disregarded in assessing whether economic growth in a par-
ticular place and time is optimal, and in deciding what might need to be done in
a given suboptimal situation to make growth more efficient. With respect to
pecuniary externalities associated with indivisibilities (a case of local non-con-
vexities) like bridges and other infrastructure services, a similar point was al-
ready noted by Dupuit ([1844] 1952), and has since been re-emphasized by
Scitovsky (1954) and Romer (1994). Any economically useful piece of new
technical knowledge can be analyzed as an extreme case of an indivisibility,
namely one without a capacity constraint on the number of potential users,
which really introduces a global non-convexity, i.e. increasing returns to scale
(Romer 1990).
It is in this sense that the present study cannot be fully appreciated without
acknowledging the coexistence of pecuniary and technological externalities.
Both kinds of externalities may be the source of positive feedbacks and path-
dependence in the dynamics of specialization in open economies. To examine
these hypothetical macroscopic consequences of external effects from innovation
and from the adoption of new technologies, the present study necessarily pur-
sues a macroapproach based on aggregate observations for individual industries.
But this is, of course, a level of aggregation at which the impacts of pecuniary
and technological externalities on patterns of specialization are empirically in-
distinguishable. A proper distinction between these impacts could only be ex-
pected from a detailed and comprehensive examination at the level of individual
firms of the origin, direction and transmission mechanisms of the different
kinds of external effects.
As Chapter F will argue, a clear distinction between technological and
pecuniary external effects from innovation would be a precondition for an ef-ficient choice of targets and instruments in the implementation of a consistent
set of industrial and technology policies in practice. The reason is that the diag-
nosis of pecuniary externalities may call for the use of instruments which would
be ineffective or inefficient in the case of technological externalities, and vice
versa. Hence, the difficulties of empirically discriminating between the different
kinds of externalities in the context of technological innovation, which for lack
of sufficiently disaggregated data and of appropriate methodology appear in-
surmountable for the time being, are closely related to, and indeed constitute an
important part of, the information problem for any benevolent government,
which was first spelled out by Hayek (1945). Ultimately, it is only by acknow-
ledging the potential of pecuniary (as well as technological) external effects to
cause deviations from Pareto optimality that the full extent of the information
problem in the design of targeted industrial and technology policies can be ap-
preciated.More can be less. Much of mathematical economics
in the 1950s gained in elegance over poor old Pareto
and Edward Chamberlain. But the fine garments
sometimes achieved fit only by chopping off some
real arms and legs. The theory of cones, polyhedra,
and convex sets made possible "elementary" theo-
rems and lemmas. But they seduced economists away
from the phenomena of increasing returns to scale and
non-convex technology that lie at the heart of oli-
gopoly problems and many real-world maximising
assignments. Easy victories over a science's wrong
opponents are hollow victories — at least almost al-
ways.
— Paul Samuelson (1983: xix)
B. The Theory of Endogenous Growth,
Technological Change and Hysteresis
in Open Economies
I. What Makes Growth an Endogenous Process?
The common fundamental point of many different approaches within new
growth theory is that government policy can actually have a sustained influence
on the long-term speed of economic growth in a country. This is the reason why
new growth theory is also often referred to as a theory of endogenous growth, in
contrast to the theory of exogenous long-term growth developed by Solow
(1956, 1957), which has since become the orthodoxy. A central objective of new
growth theory has been to explain how different policy measures affect the rate
of long-term growth and the welfare of an economy.
In the model devised and popularized by Solow, which originally goes back
to Tinbergen (1942) and later became the neoclassical paradigm of postwar re-
construction, the rate of growth depends only temporarily on the preferences of
consumers, i.e. on people's propensity to save, and on economic policy
measures. In the long term, it is solely the rate of technical progress, assumed to
be exogenous, which determines the growth rate of productivity. Without ex-
ogenous technical progress the growth rate of output per employee would be
zero in the long term. Full determination of long-term growth by exogenous
productivity progress results from the underlying assumptions about the econ-
omy's production technology. In the Solow model, production technology is re-
presented by a substitutional production function — for the sake of simplicity10
formalized as a Cobb-Douglas function
1 — with constant returns to scale,
whose arguments are labour and capital. Since capital's partial elasticity of pro-
duction
2 is taken to be smaller than one, the real rate of return on investment,
and thus the percentage increase in the per capita capital stock which can be
achieved with a constant rate of investment, necessarily shrinks in the course of
the accumulation process. Hence, over time the private incentives to invest into
the further accumulation of capital deteriorate, and the economy approaches,
asymptotically, its long-term (steady-state) equilibrium in which neither the per
capita capital stock nor per capita income grow any further.
To make this point more formally, as e.g. in Sala-i-Martin (1990a), assume
that output in each period t is related to the aggregate inputs labour, L, and




Capital is the factor which can be accumulated; aggregate net investment per
period being denoted by K' - dK/dt. Labour, by contrast, cannot be ac-
cumulated, but is assumed to grow at the exogenous rate n. To simplify the
analysis, one may initially dispense with setting up the problem in terms of a
model of intertemporal utility maximization in the spirit of Ramsey (1928), and
may instead follow Solow (1956) in assuming a constant rate of saving, s, and
of capital depreciation, 5, so that net investment takes the following form in
each period:
[2] Kt' = sL
atK?-dKt.
This implies the accumulation equation of per capita capital, where k denotes
the capital intensity, KjL :
In a Cobb-Douglas production function the individual inputs are linked in a multi-
plicative manner to determine the output. This production function is substitutional
because the output can be kept constant when the amount of any one input is re-
duced by appropriately increasing the amounts of other inputs. Constant returns to
scale mean that the output is increased proportionally to a simultaneous increase of
all inputs in equal proportions. Technically speaking: A Cobb-Douglas production
function has constant returns to scale when the sum of all partial production
elasticities is one. For an explanation of the term 'partial production elasticities' see
the next footnote. Constant returns to scale are generally formalized by linear-
homogeneous functions of production.
A partial production elasticity measures the percentage increase of output which
results from a percentage increase in the amount of one individual production input.
A partial production elasticity is — just like any elasticity — the ratio of two
percentage values.11




The per capita capital stock, i.e. the capital intensity, thus grows at the rate:




For the steady state, in which yk is constant by definition, the expression
can be simplified by taking logarithms. Differentiation with respect to time then
leads to the steady-state equation:
[5] (p
Assuming constant returns to scale, oc+ /?= 1, the equation reduces to:
[6] 03-1)7* =0.
Clearly, the orthodox assumption of decreasing marginal returns to capital,
i.e. /3< 1, implies that the steady-state growth rate yk equals zero. This is the
crucial result of neoclassical growth theory as developed by Solow (1956, 1957),
which can accommodate long-term growth of per capita income only with ref-
erence to exogenous technical progress, but which does not offer any real ex-
planation itself.
This analysis makes clear that sustained growth is only possible when the
average return on investment does not continuously decrease in the course of the
accumulation process until it falls below a certain critical level which depends
positively on the growth rate of the population and negatively on people's
savings rate. Technically speaking, and assuming instead of a constant savings
rate a representative consumer who maximizes a time-additive
3 utility function
with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
4, per capita income can
A utility function is time-additive if total utility realized over a period of time is just
a weighted sum of the utility levels in each period. This means that the instan-
taneous utility a consumer realizes in a particular period only depends on the level
of consumption in this period and not on the levels of consumption in any other
period. Time-additivity is assumed merely for analytical tractability.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a measure of how 'substitutable' con-
sumption tomorrow is for consumption today. It is defined as the percentage change
in the ratio of consumption in one period over consumption in the next period due to
a percentage change in the ratio of prices for consumption in each period. Changes
in the relative prices of consumption in different periods may result from changes in
the real rate of interest; when the rate of interest rises, the price of future consump-
tion decreases, and vice versa. The larger this intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, the larger the rate of growth for a given positive difference between the12
only grow as long as the real rate of interest, i.e. the marginal product of capital
net of the growth rate of employed labour (or population for convenience) is
higher than the subjective rate of time preference for consumption.
This condition for endogenous growth can be formally interpreted as a
characteristic of the production function which ensures that the marginal prod-
uct of the accumulating factor does not decrease in the long term. This con-
dition, however, cannot be fulfilled if an economy's production apparatus is ap-
propriately described by a Cobb-Douglas function with physical capital and
labour as the only inputs and with constant returns to scale. Nondecreasing
marginal returns presuppose a partial elasticity of production for capital of at
least one. So, if labour is taken into account as a nonaccumulating factor of pro-
duction with a positive partial production elasticity, the sum of both partial pro-
duction elasticities will necessarily be larger than one. This implies that the
economy must have increasing returns to scale — a feature which can hardly be
justified on economic grounds in a model which only takes into account pure
labour and physical capital of uniform qualities.
One way out
5 of this difficulty of formally depicting economic production
technology with the flexibility required for endogenous growth
6 is provided by
the simple observation that physical capital is obviously not the only production
factor whose accumulation can account for economic growth. In fact, variants of
human capital appear to be much more important for processes of accumulation
and growth in the long term, at least in the advanced industrialized economies.
Starting from this observation, a central objective of new growth theory has
been to explain why the average return on investment need not decrease in the
marginal product of capital (net of population growth) and the rate of time pref-
erence (Blanchard and Fischer 1989: 43).
Another way out would be to assume that all inputs are in fact variants of capital
and can be accumulated, as in Rebelo (1991). The Rebelo model has the simple
production function Y = AK and always fulfills the general condition for endogenous
steady-state growth, which requires constant returns to scale in all inputs that can be
accumulated.
Some theoreticians, like Scott (1989), reject any mathematical formalization of an
economy's production function to explain long-term growth as entirely misleading.
Scott instead sees growth as the aggregate manifestation of entrepreneurs' unco-
ordinated responses to temporary investment opportunities, of which a dynamic
economy offers new ones at every point in time. Because these investment oppor-
tunities are largely created by previous investments, via learning and demand exter-
nalities of a primarily pecuniary kind, there is no reason, in Scott's theory, to be-
lieve that investment as such is subject to diminishing returns over time, or in the
course of capital accumulation, as it would be under an intertemporally fixed sub-
stitutional production function. Scott only thinks it appropriate to assume the
existence of decreasing marginal returns to investment at any given point in time, at
which the set of investment opportunities is predetermined.13
course of time when human capital in its different variants is taken into account
as an accumulating factor of production.
The new literature on economic growth distinguishes between human capital
as an endowment of individuals, i.e. the skills as well as technical and pro-
fessional qualifications people have acquired, and knowledge capital, as the
economically relevant part of technical knowledge is often termed. Knowledge
capital is either currently used in production or is available for future use in the
economy. A large part of technical knowledge is contained in product features,
materials and design forms used in production, or is documented in patents, and
can be used more or less freely by competitors or other unrelated firms in their
own research and development work. Another part of knowledge capital, how-
ever, is at least temporarily specific to the firm where it is used. This seems to
be so particularly in the case of process technologies and of technical in-
novations whose control requires extremely large initial investments or highly
specialized complementary skills for the operators.
Presumably, a significant part of this knowledge capital which is not revealed
by selling products in which it is incorporated is nevertheless not firm-specific
since qualified employees may carry it to other firms when changing jobs, and
in fact often do so with only a short delay after an innovation has taken place.
This part of knowledge capital can, however, in many cases be considered
region-specific or country-specific, because many labour markets are not inte-
grated at all, or only poorly, at an interregional level, let alone internationally.
The accumulation of technical knowledge in different firms can be connected
via a number of channels other than geographical proximity, i.e. for example
via common research programmes, institutes and conferences or via strategic
alliances. In these cases one can talk of network-specific knowledge capital that
need not be specific to a region,or country.
The reason why proponents of new growth theory invoke knowledge capital
as an explanation of how the drag placed on productivity growth by non-ac-
cumulating inputs may be overcome, lies in the special combination of eco-
nomic features which distinguish knowledge capital from other inputs: non-
rivalry and at least partial non-excludability in use. Rivalry means that one
person can get full utility from a certain good only if he prevents other persons
from using the good instead or simultaneously; excludability means that the
owner of a good can actually prevent others from using it. Perfect rivalry and
perfect excludability are features which define private goods, like food items,
and most other tangibles. Perfect non-rivalry and perfect non-excludability, by
contrast, define pure public goods, of which public safety is an example. Table 1
presents possible combinations of the two basic economic features of goods,
gives examples, and indicates whether the respective case creates problems for
allocational efficiency (according to economic theory). Furthermore, the table14
indicates whether these goods can serve as a building block for an explanation
of endogenous growth if they are accumulated as inputs of production in the
presence of other, non-accumulating inputs.












Degree of rivalry in use (a technological feature)
Full rivalry Partial rivalry No rivalry
Private goods: Club goods: Secret technical
efficient market allo- efficient market information:
cation, no long-term allocation, no long- inefficient market
growth effects term growth effects allocation, no long-
term growth effects
Common pool goods: Ideas, designs,
inefficient market software (intellectual
allocation, no long- property which is










The environment or Public goods with Pure public goods
randomly allocated crowding (e.g. (e.g. basic research
goods: infrastructure): results):
inefficient market inefficient market inefficient market
allocation, no long- allocation, allocation,
term growth effects endogenous growth endogenous growth
effects possible effects possible
(Barro and Sala-i- (Barro 1990; Romer
Martin 1992b) 1986)
Non-rivalry implies increasing returns to scale, i.e. global non-convexities,
and may indeed prevent the decline of the physical marginal product in the
course of capital accumulation. But non-rivalry alone cannot prevent the decline15
of the marginal value product of capital accumulation, which would be the
proximate cause of diminishing incentives to invest in new capital in models
without positive externalities: The accumulation of non-rival inputs, from which
other firms can be perfectly excluded, would create private monopolies whose
growth would ultimately be constrained by declining schedules of demand. En-
dogenous growth is thus not feasible without at least partial non-excludability of
the non-rival input whose accumulation drives growth. Positive external effects
are therefore crucial in preventing the monopolization of production and knowl-
edge creation in spite of increasing returns to scale from technical knowledge.
External effects may achieve this by raising the marginal value product of other
firms' activities, by thus reinforcing other firms' investment incentives, pro-
vided the positive external effects are of sufficient strength and sufficiently
symmetric so that all firms get their turn to be beneficiaries.
There may be both legal and technological reasons that new technical knowl-
edge is partly non-excludable. Patent protection is always limited in breadth and
duration, and may not be fully enforceable even during the officially granted
protection period. Innovative ideas are frequently copied or re-used in slightly
altered form, and it is rarely possible to even keep track of all this. Often it is
the mere information that someone has succeeded in achieving a certain in-
vention that provides a valuable stimulus and research focus for competing
firms that try to come up with a similar invention or directly seek to imitate a
first mover.
In the following sections, several approaches of new growth theory, each of
which is based on the accumulation of a different variant of human capital, are
examined with respect to the implications they have for industrial policy,
especially in open economies. In this context, the central role of human capital
will become clear: much can be said for the hypothesis that human-capital ac-
cumulation holds the key to answering the question of why the return on in-
vestment, and thus the incentive for private capital accumulation, does not
decrease, or at least need not decrease, over time. Diverse types of human capi-
tal have lent themselves to equally diverse approaches to modelling endogenous
growth.
In the following discussion, the main interest will be whether, and to what
extent, external effects in the allocation and accumulation of human capital play
an essential part in these models, and what economic policy measures are sug-
gested as appropriate to help the economy get on a Pareto-optimal growth path.
In order to assess proposals for targeted industrial policy, it will be necessary to
look at growth models with multiple sectors. In these, the primary concern will
be what kind of market imperfections in the allocation and accumulation of
human capital might prevent promising industries from developing, and from16
growing at a rate which would be optimal from a welfare-theoretic point of
view.
II. Models of Endogenous Technological Change
1. Industry-Specific Dynamic Returns to Scale Based on Learning by
Doing
The first model of Romer (1986) is generally regarded as the beginning of new
growth theory. This model analyzes endogenous growth based on the assump-
tion that private investments do not only yield a physical return but also a
knowledge return which, in contrast to the physical return, cannot be privately
appropriated (Romer 1986). In fact, an important feature of this model is that
the knowledge return from private investment activities is available to all firms
as an external learning effect, and increases the productivity of all future in-
vestments in the economy. This idea goes back to Arrow (1962) and is desig-
nated as 'learning by doing'. Already in his model, external learning effects are
invoked to explain that private investment activity might not only augment a
physical capital stock but also a stock of knowledge capital with features of a
public input in private production.
7 However, Arrow's model cannot yet be
deemed a theory of endogenous growth since the productivity gains due to ex-
ternal learning effects are too weak to admit of a self-sustaining growth process,
which would have to be based on non-decreasing returns on investment over
time.
8
A public input in production is an example of a public good, defined by its con-
stituent features of non-rivalry and non-excludability in use.
Arrow (1962) assumes that each individual firm i produces according to
Yi = KrLj~^K^ , where K(t) = j l(v)dv is an index of experience from cumu-
lated past investments / of all firms in the economy. Holding K fixed, the pro-
duction function has constant returns to scale, but taking changes of K into account
it has increasing returns to scale. These changes in K are, however, external to the
individual firm's investment decision, which is therefore suboptimal. The model
fails to generate endogenous growth, though, because, in order to preserve steady-
state dynamics accessible to the analytical techniques then available for optimizing
models, Arrow did not consider increasing returns of sufficient strength to overcome
the drag placed on growth by the non-accumulating input, labour. Instead, he added
exogenous population growth to explain why investment incentives would be main-17
Romer (1986) is the first to assume that the partial production elasticities of
private capital and of public knowledge capital add up to one. The incentives for
private investment thus remain unchanged over time, and the economy grows in
the long term at a steady-state rate which depends on the characteristics of tech-
nology and preference parameters of the representative consumer as well as on
economic policies. In Romer's model the long-term rate of growth is larger, the
more efficient the economy's technologies are on the one hand, and the lower
the rate of time preference of the consumers and the lower the taxation of
capital income are on the other.
The sum of the partial production elasticities of labour, private capital and
public knowledge capital is actually larger than one in Romer's model, the pro-
duction function hence assumes increasing returns to scale. Monopolistic
tendencies are nevertheless excluded because, as in Arrow (1962), the presence
of external effects makes sure that increasing returns to scale arise only at the
level of the economy as a whole. Each individual firm still bases its investment
decisions on the assumption of constant returns to scale and acts as a price taker
in perfectly competitive markets. The presence of positive external learning ef-
fects from private investments implies that the rate of accumulation and growth
is suboptimal. A subsidy for private investment therefore has the potential to
improve the allocation in the model economy.
The formal description of Romer's model is again based on the Cobb-
Douglas function, this time augmented by a third factor Z, which represents the
total capital accumulated in the economy. The individual firm deals with:
[7] Yi{t) = ALi{t)
l^Ki{tfz{t)f,
where AT,- denotes the private capital of the individual firm i, and / the partial
production elasticity of the economy-wide capital stock Z, which captures the
external returns to capital accumulation. These external returns are not taken
into account by the individual firm, which simply takes Z to be exogenous and
solves its (concave) intertemporal profit maximization problem in direct ap-
plication of the standard Kuhn-Tucker theorem. In the aggregate of the econ-
omy there is, of course, nd difference between the sum of all private capital and
the economy's total capital stock. Aggregate output is thus determined by:
tained over time. The growth rate of per capita income is in steady state pro-
portional to the growth rate of population, and invariant with respect to policy. An-
other drawback of Arrow's model is the implausible implication that countries with
a larger labour force are richer in steady state, which stems from the external effects
being related to the aggregate capital stock, and not to the average, per capita
capital stock.18
[8] Yt
Romer (1986) shows that this model admits of positive steady-state growth
without any exogenous driving force behind it, when the decreasing private re-
turns to capital are augmented by external returns of appropriate strength, so
that the total social returns to capital remain constant over time.
9
To make the approach of Romer (1986) relevant for industrial policy, it has
to be framed in a model with several sectors of which some show only weak or,
perhaps, no external learning effects at all, while in other sectors learning ef-
fects contribute considerably to the dynamic performance of the returns to pri-
vate investments over time. In this case, the government can use industrial
policies to encourage private investment in the industries with the strongest ex-
ternal learning effects to achieve an efficient allocation of private investment.
Lucas (1988: 27-31), shows this for a closed economy in a stylized model of
multi-sectoral endogenous growth based on learning by doing.
To make this point, Lucas introduces a model stripped down to the essentials:
two consumption goods, ct and c2, and human capital, ht, which is specialized
in the production of either consumption good; and for simplicity there is no
physical capital. Each good is produced according to
[9] Cj(f) = ^(0«/(0^(0, i = l,2 A ut > 0 A u1+u2=l,
where ut is the fraction of the constant labour force N(t) devoted to producing
good /. The accumulation of specialized human capital is entirely due to
learning by doing in the form of positive external effects:
[10] hi{t) = hi{t)8iui{t),
where the high-technology good, Cj, is assumed to be associated with higher
learning rates, implying 5^> 52. Productivity and human capital accumulation
in each industry depend on the respective average endowment with specialized
human capital. Lucas suggests to interpret this formalization to stand for the
continued introduction of new goods, in which human capital accumulated by
learning on old goods is inherited by new goods, so that learning by doing may
He does not, however, explain what mechanism might ensure that the social pro-
duction elasticity of capital actually equals one and remains at this value over time.
In the case of p + f> 1, there also would be endogenous growth, albeit without a
steady state; instead with growth rates increasing over time. Although some authors,
Romer (1989) and Kremer (1993) in particular, have attempted to corroborate the
idea of historically, i.e. over centuries, increasing rates of growth, it seems to be at
odds with the experience of Western industrialized countries since World War II.19
be bounded on each individual good, but need not be bounded for the industry as
a whole.
As the model abstracts from all intertemporal decisions, only the current-
period utility function of the representative consumer, assumed to have a con-
stant elasticity of substitution
1
0 between the two goods, bears on the efficient
allocation of the labour force across the two industries. Specifying the current-
period utility function to be
r-1-ll »»/ \ / .—— n . —n\ <r
where ax > 0, a^ + a2 = 1, p > -1, and where cr = 1/(1 + p) is the elasticity of
substitution, closes the model so that it can be solved. The first-order condition
is:
[12] i^ =
where q is the equilibrium price ratio in terms of good 1 as a numeraire. This
condition determines the allocation of the labour force for each date t, since the
initial endowments of human capital /^(O) and h2(0) dictate relative prices ac-
cording to q(t) = h1(t)/h2(t) , which follows from utility and profit maxi-
mization.
Lucas then discusses three cases for different assumptions about the elasticity
of substitution between the two goods. First, if these are good substitutes
(<7 > 1), the economy will even in autarky converge to complete specialization
in one of the two goods, namely in the one favoured by the initial allocation of
the labour force. Second, if o - 1 , the initial labour force allocation does not
change over time, although relative prices may change, depending on the
relative size of the preference and learning parameters at and 5t. Third, if the
goods are poor substitutes (a < 1), the labour force allocation converges to a
stable stationary point where the strength of the learning effects in the two in-
dustries is equalized (<Si«i = 52u2).
Because the learning effects take the form of externalities in the model, none
of the equilibrium paths is efficient, unless (for a > 1) initial conditions, by
chance, select the path leading to complete specialization in the high-tech good,
where learning effects are strongest. The model therefore calls for a subsidy to
the high-tech industry, that is for an industrial policy to take advantage of that
The elasticity of substitution in consumption is defined as the percentage change in
the quantity ratio of the two goods in consumption induced by a relative price
change.20
industry's higher growth potential, assuming that this industry can be identified
ex ante.
Yet, of greater relevance for the industrial policy debate are inefficiencies
which might be implied by multi-sectoral endogenous growth processes based
on external learning effects in open economies.
1
1 In such models the assump-
tion of external learning effects, which are constrained to benefit only firms in
their country of origin, may give rise to a conflict over exports because under
appropriate assumptions about preferences every country may want to specialize
in producing the good with the greatest learning and productivity growth
potential.
Lucas extends the above model by introducing free international trade in two
goods among a continuum of small countries, so that the world market price
ratio is the exogenous determinant of each country's domestic price ratio. At a
given world market price ratio p countries either specialize in the production of
good 1, if their ratio of specialized human capital endowments is /11/A2 > P »
 o
r
they specialize in the production of good 2, if h1/h2 < p . The equilibrium
world price ratio p is uniquely determined when all countries' consumers have
the same homothetic preferences as above.
1
2 Since all countries are completely
specialized, they will grow either slowly, if they are specialized in good 2 (with
low learning rates) or they will grow fast, if they are specialized in good 1 (the
high-tech good). In each country, only the type of human capital specialized on
the good actually produced by the country is accumulated through learning by
doing; initial comparative advantages are thus continuously reinforced.
But the endogenous changes in countries' relative human capital endow-
ments will also change the equilibrium world price ratio/?. Lucas points out that
these endogenous price changes may cause some countries to lose their com-
parative advantage in the high-tech good, whose world market supplies grow
faster and whose terms of trade therefore deteriorate. However, that marginal
countries lose their comparative advantage in the high-tech good is a possibility
only given if the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, a, is suf-
ficiently low. Even if that possibility is ruled out by assuming a > 1 - 52/8i,
there remain two qualitatively distinct cases: only for a > 1 will countries
specialized in the high-tech good enjoy faster real income growth, and Lucas
thinks this to be the empirically more relevant case. But for a < 1 the model
1
1 A detailed analysis of such processes can be found in Young (1991), who pays
particular attention to the problem how an industry may overcome the bounds on
learning by doing which is specific to individual goods, and how the industry as a
whole may benefit and increase productivity as a continuous process.
Preferences are called homothetic when changes in the size of the budget, over
which a consumer has command, do not by themselves lead to changes in the
relative shares of the budget spent on individual goods.21
has the possibility that adverse terms-of-trade effects dominate the productivity
gains of learning by doing in countries specialized in high-tech, which would
cause these countries to experience slower real income growth than the coun-
tries specialized in low-tech production.
Although considerable external learning effects can never imply that some
economies gradually lose their comparative advantage in all industries and
finally remain without any foreign trade at all, Lucas (1988) has shown that
certain model variants are at least not entirely implausible in which individual
countries have the potential to succeed by means of targeted industrial policies
in getting an artificial productivity advantage over competing countries in those
industries which have the strongest external economies and whose growth
prospects are particularly favourable. Some countries may thus be able to in-
crease the rewards to their internationally immobile factors — albeit at the ex-
pense of other countries. Insofar as external learning effects are effective only in
their respective country of origin, total factor productivity may differ from
country to country, even in a direct comparison for the same industry, for the
sole reason that countries have arrived at different levels of learning by doing.
Consequently, the patterns of specialization of open economies linked by inter-
national trade cannot be fully explained with reference to the traditional theory
of comparative advantages based on countries' relative endowments with
elementary factors of production, which are exogenously provided by nature.
1
3
Instead, the actual patterns of specialization may reflect historical, perhaps
even arbitrary, leads and lags in the development of individual industries or
sectors as well as advantages or disadvantages in market size which an economy
has vis-a-vis its trade partners. Positive external learning effects tend to
strengthen a given trade pattern and existing differentials in the productivity of
immobile factors over time. Thus, even countries with identical elementary fac-
tor endowments may, over time, come to specialize in the production and export
of completely different sets of products, and may thus realize rather distinct
growth paths of income for their immobile factors.
1
3 Here, the 'traditional' theory of international trade refers to the exclusive thinking
in terms of relative factor endowments, which is embodied in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson theory and its subsequent refinements. This theory admits of inter-
national differentials of the marginal productivities of individual factors of produc-
tion in one and the same industry only insofar as equilibrium trade between coun-
tries with rather distinct factor endowments does not lead to the full equalization of
factor prices. But the theory generally assumes equal total factor productivities for
all countries. One should note that the earlier theory of trade associated with the
name of David Ricardo did, in fact, recognize international productivity differentials
of factors of production as a source of comparative advantage. These Ricardian pro-
ductivity differentials are often interpreted as being due to technological differences
between countries.22
Of course, such a development cannot continue forever, a fact to which
Krugman (1987) draws attention in the context of a two-country analysis with
labour as the only internationally immobile factor. This model of dynamic com-
parative advantage due to learning by doing actually preceded, and inspired, the
analysis of Lucas (1988) discussed above. Krugman's model is more primitive
on the demand side where he does not specify a utility function, but simply as-
sumes that of all income in each country a constant share s is spent on non-
traded goods and an equal share, (1 - s)/n, on each of n traded goods. The
dynamics of specialization are thus entirely determined by countries' differential
accumulation of learning effects in the production of each good. Learning ex-
periences are different as long as cross-country spill-overs are less strong than
those within countries. Since the model is Ricardian, with labour as the only
factor that is mobile across industries in each country (but immobile across
countries), each tradeable good is at any point in time produced by one country
only. Both countries are always completely specialized in the subset of goods in
which they hold a comparative productivity advantage, which can only arise
from differential learning effects in the two countries.
Krugman's model has two equilibrium conditions: On the production side,
equilibrium requires that the ratio of wage rates in the two countries equals the
ratio of productivities in the marginal industry, which separates the industries
for which either one or the other country has a clear comparative advantage. On
the demand side, equilibrium requires, in the absence of any credit markets, that
the balance of payments be in equilibrium, i.e. that the ratio of total wage in-
comes paid equals the ratio of the number of industries located in the two coun-
tries. Because comparative advantage is 'created' over time by the dynamics of
learning, the model allows for the possibility that one country conquers a
marginal industry located in the foreign country by protecting it temporarily
from international trade until the home country has accumulated sufficient
learning, which gives this country a permanent productivity advantage in the
protected industry. Temporary protection can then shift to the new marginal in-
dustry, so that one country may, within limits, 'slice off one industry after the
other, provided the other country remains passive.
As a result of successful targeting, labour in one country may enjoy higher
real wages for some time. But if the wage differential vis-a-vis the foreign
country, which contests the 'marginal' industries with external learning effects,
becomes 'too large', the home country will begin to lose its cost advantage from
a productivity lead due to external learning. The country with the higher real
wages will then begin to lose at least part of production in at least one of the
'marginal' industries which will shift abroad.
The industrial policy conclusion that Krugman (1987) draws from this two-
country model with industry-specific dynamic external effects is of more general23
significance: in order to establish a permanent productivity advantage at home,
the subsidies or trade policy measures a country seizes upon to encourage an in-
dustry with particularly strong external effects — bounded in their range to the
country of origin — may need to be only temporary, provided of course that the
foreign countries remain passive.
1
4 Yet, even if foreign countries do not react to
unilateral industrial policy measures, these may nevertheless fail to bring about
an increase in welfare in the country actively pursuing the industrial policy,
since this country may suffer terms-of-trade losses as a result of export ex-
pansion in the targeted industries which might over-compensate any productiv-
ity gains. Only if terms-of-trade effects are relatively weak can overall welfare
be expected to increase for a country initiating an active industrial policy.
1
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Recall that Lucas (1988) discusses these questions in the context of a two-
goods model with many countries none of which is large enough to have a sub-
stantial influence on relative world market prices, in order to clarify the in-
fluence of the demand side on the development of country-specific patterns of
production and export specialization in a growing world economy with dynamic
external effects. The crucial parameter in this analysis is the elasticity of sub-
stitution in consumption on the world market. If this is low for the two products,
the terms-of-trade changes resulting from an overproportional supply expansion
of the high-tech product can be so strong that some countries despite being
specialized in high-tech production and having accumulated external learning
effects in this area, give up their specialization and transfer production to the
traditional sector.
Even if such a restructuring of individual economies back to the traditional
sector were not to be the outcome, an elasticity of substitution smaller than
one
1
6 would imply that high-tech countries realize lower real income growth
than other countries. Only if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, i.e.
if the model's two products are good substitutes in consumption, are initial
1
4 A further caveat Krugman (1987) notes is that the domestic market of a small
country may not provide sufficient learning experience to overtake the foreign
country in terms of productivity. Krugman speculates that the use of protection to
shift comparative advantage may merely be an attractive choice for a country with a
large labour force and low wages.
1
5 The terms-of-trade losses as a consequence of export expansion may be weak when
the demand for the exported goods on the world market is very price-elastic or when
the country's exports only make up so small a part of the world market that they
have no substantial influence on the price level anyway.
1
6 In the case of an elasticity of substitution smaller than one, each good is used for
special purposes and can thus only poorly be substituted for by any other good. Con-
sequently, if one set of goods becomes more expensive, its share in total expen-
diture after adjustments to the new utility-maximizing consumption mix is larger
than before the observed changes in relative prices took place.24
patterns of specialization reinforced for all countries in the course of develop-
ment, and do people in those countries which have specialized in the production
and export of high-tech goods realize above-average real income growth.
It seems likely that for high-tech products the case of a relatively large
elasticity of substitution vis-a-vis traditional goods is empirically more relevant
besides being, naturally, more interesting for the discussion of industrial pol-
icies. In both the two-country model of Krugman (1987) and the multi-country
model of Lucas (1988), certain industrial policy measures, aimed at creating a
comparative advantage in the production of high-tech goods, may turn out to be
advantageous for a country, even if these measures are applied only temporarily,
provided the high-tech sector has an above-average growth potential in the
world market.
One further insight from the analysis of these models is noteworthy: Stability
of once established patterns of trade and specialization as well as of productivity
growth differentials between countries over time can be expected despite
(modest) changes in relative factor endowments only when the world market
demand functions can be traced back to homothetic preferences, i.e. when the
relative expenditure shares of the individual types of goods are not changed as a
result of world-wide income growth alone. Empirical examinations since Engel
(1895), however, have shown consistently that this condition does not hold for
any type of goods in reality (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). Different income
elasticities of demand for different types of goods are, in fact, an important
reason for the actually observed long-term changes in patterns of trade and spe-
cialization of open economies in a growing world economy.
Critiques of the learning by doing model point to the fact that all firms of one
industry are assumed to benefit from the external learning effects automatically
without any effort on their own part, even without wanting to, or without
knowing about it. In reality, by contrast, many companies invest huge sums in
research and development specifically directed at selected technological ob-
jectives. Models that do better justice to this reality facilitate a more detailed
analysis of how and why different industrial policy instruments, such as for ex-
ample subsidies for production or research and development, trade policy
measures and the design of patent laws, are effective under certain circum-
stances. These models are discussed next.
2. Endogenous Technical Progress Based on a Process
of Self-Sustaining Industrial Innovation
Explicit modelling of the contribution of private profit-seeking research and de-
velopment investments to the accumulation of technical knowledge as the25
driving force of economic growth is the approach of the theory of endogenous
technical change developed by Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991) — initially for the closed economy. Following
Schumpeter's idea of economic development as a 'process of creative destruc-
tion' (Schumpeter 1942), technical progress in the form of product and process
innovations is interpreted as the consequence of research and development
undertaken by private firms with a view to maximizing their profits under
certain constraints determined by the relative scarcities of resources and by a
country's institutional framework, including the extent and enforceability of
intellectual property rights. A long-term, self-sustaining process of growth is
possible if the incentives for the accumulation of technical knowledge are large
enough and do not weaken over time.
For this condition to be fulfilled in the models, it is assumed that the creation
of new technical knowledge through private research and development yields
positive external effects, because at least part of new technical knowledge is
freely accessible to other firms and of use in their own respective innovative
activities. If there were no external effects from new knowledge at all, the
pioneers of any new technology would establish themselves as permanent
monopolies which would be able to defend themselves without further research
efforts. The private incentives for the creation of new knowledge would thus be
lost and per capita income would sooner or later cease to grow.
Other modelling approaches, like those of Romer (1987) and of Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992b), can do without the assumption of technological external
effects, because they instead place positive pecuniary externalities at the centre
of their analysis. In these models of monopolistic competition between manu-
facturers of^ investment goods, positive pecuniary externalities arise when a
firm's demand for a larger diversity of specialized capital goods, which will in-
crease its own productivity, leads to the innovation of more differentiated and
specialized investment goods, which are then offered not only to the original
customer firm but also to its competitors, who thus can raise their own pro-
ductivity as well. Since a clear distinction is necessary in view of the rather dif-
ferent economic policy implications, the approaches of Romer (1987) as well as
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 b) are in this paper not subsumed under the
models of endogenous technical progress, but are put in a class of their own:
'models of monopolistic competition and increasing specialization in capital
goods'.
The models of endogenous technical progress, which are the focus of this
subsection, differ from the models of 'learning by doing' at least in two respects.
First, positive external effects do not arise from all investments but only from
the invention and development of new products and services. Second, the tech-
nological external effects of new knowledge do not directly affect an economy's26
production function by directly increasing the productivity of elementary factors
of production, but they only bring about a reduction in the costs of future R&D
for all firms.
There are two basic approaches to modelling endogenous technological
change, both of which are described in the seminal book of Grossman and
Helpman (1991). One of these approaches interprets technological progress as
an increase in the variety of goods which are consumed, or alternatively of
goods which are used as intermediate inputs in final production for consump-
tion. The other approach "interprets technological progress as an ongoing
process of increases in the quality of a fixed set of different goods, which are
again used either as intermediates or for consumption.
1
7 Both approaches can
explain endogenous steady-state growth provided the stock of technical knowl-
edge can grow without bound. In both types of models, non-rivalry of knowl-
edge implies that there are increasing physical returns to scale and that the
marginal product of capital need not decline to zero. And partial non-ex-
cludability of knowledge makes sure that neither a technology leader in the case
of quality ladders nor an established monopolist producer of a differentiated
product in the case of expanding variety can hold on to his full market power
without making further innovations. Partial non-excludability thus ensures that
the private incentives to invest in the creation of new knowledge through R&D
need not vanish over time.
In the model of rising product quality, it is obvious that utility-maximizing
consumers, or'profit-maximizing firms, will demand consumption goods, or
capital inputs, of higher quality as they become available. To explain demand
for ever more differentiated goods in the model of expanding product variety,
Grossman and Helpman (1991) invoke the so-called love-of-variety function
originally proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This function with constant
elasticity of substitution between input varieties can be interpreted either as an
index of consumption or as an index of efficiency in final production, as
proposed by Ethier (1982):
[13] D
where x(j) denotes the quantity of variety ; of n goods available at a particular
point in time, either as capital inputs in final production or directly for con-
sumption. The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods is 1/(1 - a),
which is larger than one given the restrictions imposed on a. The parameter a
The process of technological change described by the second approach is often
referred to as a quality ladder.27
can be interpreted as a measure of consumers' preference for variety, which for
the admitted values is positive and increasing as a declines. Alternatively, if D
is interpreted as an efficiency index in production, the function implies that
total factor productivity is an increasing function of the total number n of dif-
ferent input varieties used and that the technology has constant returns to scale
for a given number of input varieties.
To model economic growth, the love-of-variety function is built into a dy-
namic model of monopolistic competition among the suppliers of inputs or con-
sumption goods along the lines first explored by Judd (1985). Each profit-
maximizing firm attains some price-setting monopoly power by bringing a new
variety of capital input, or consumption good, to market, but faces the economy-
wide resource constraint set by a fixed supply of labour. When this constraint
binds, the representative firm can increase the volume of manufacturing or the
rate of innovation, but not both at the same time. Furthermore, individual
profits are constrained by the capital market, where equilibrium requires that
there are no profitable opportunities of arbitrage in ownership of the various
firms, and by the product market, where new firms can freely enter and compete
away all excess profits.
It follows that entrepreneurs invest in the development of new product
varieties until the expected reward on each R&D effort, i.e. the present value of
firms' profits, is competed down to the level of development costs, which are as-
sumed to decline as the stock of available knowledge capital in the economy
rises. Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that for a constant stock of knowl-
edge capital both the flow of new goods and the total volume of manufacturing
are bounded by the economy's resource constraint. The rate of innovation and
the growth rate of real consumption, equal to the index D in equilibrium, con-
verge to zero, because an increase in the total number of goods implies that for
each one of them less and less labour is available for manufacturing. Eventually,
R&D outlays, which are a fixed cost for each new good, can no longer be re-
covered through sales revenue unless labour is reallocated from the research
sector to manufacturing, which slows the rate of innovation down.
Endogenous steady-state growth becomes feasible only when knowledge
capital is assumed to be augmented by positive learning externalities from each
innovation. It is necessary that knowledge capital, a public input into private
R&D, accumulates over time, so that the productivity of private resources in
R&D steadily increases, and the costs of innovation decline. Steady-state growth
is then determined by two equations which represent labour market and capital
market equilibrium (Helpman 1992: 93):
ag+X = L ,28
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These steady-state conditions can be depicted graphically, as in Figure 1,
whose axes are labelled g for the innovation rate and X for total manufacturing
output. The first equation is represented by the downward sloping line LL: the
economy's total labour has to be distributed between manufacturing and R&D
laboratories at any point in time; raising the rate of innovation thus carries the
opportunity cost of reducing manufacturing output. The second equation is re-
presented by the upward sloping line NN, which Grossman and Helpman (1991)
call the Schumpeter-line, because it highlights that innovation is driven by the
profit motive. The 'Schumpeter-line' slopes upward because an increase in the
rate of innovation raises the effective cost of capital to an entrepreneur by
raising the real rate of interest and by accelerating depreciation of the firm's
present value; higher costs of capital must be offset by a higher profit rate (i.e. a
lower price-earnings ratio) which can be attained only through the expansion of
manufacturing.
The two steady-state conditions can be solved to yield the explicit solution for
the rate of innovation (Helpman 1992: 94):
[15] g= , * ,
This solution makes clear that a positive rate of innovation cannot be taken
for granted, it rather requires L/a > ocp/Q. - a), i.e. that an economy's
resource base (L/a) is large enough, that its degree of monopoly power (l/a)
is large enough, and that the rate of time preference is low enough. If these
conditions were not met, the LL line in Figure 1 would be closer to the origin
and would not intersect the NN line in the first quadrant. Provided a positive
rate of innovation obtains, its size is seen to be positively related to the econ-
omy's resource base, to its degree of monopoly power and to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, but negatively related to the rate of time preference.
The impact of changing these parameters on the economy's steady-state rate of
innovation can be visualized in Figure 1, where the enlargement of the labour
force (L) would be represented as an outward shift of theLL line, whereas an in-
crease in the degree of monopoly power (l/a), an increase in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (v) and a reduction in the rate of time preference (p)
would all be represented by a downward shift of the NN line.
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Final output, which equals Xfr " , grows at the steady-state rate
g£> = g (1 - a)/a , which is always positively related to the rate of innovation, but29







Note: X denotes manufacturing output, g the rate of innovation, LL the resource
constraint, NN the capital market equilibrium; the steady-state equilibrium is at
point A.
Source: Helpman (1992: 93).
Figure 1 can also be used to depict the steady-state equilibrium conditions in
the model of quality ladders, whose reduced form in steady-state is very similar
to the model of horizontal product differentiation. The rate of innovation in the
quality ladder model is defined as the fraction of goods that are improved per
unit of time. The resource constraint again implies a trade-off between the equi-
librium rate of innovation and the volume of manufacturing, whereas capital
market equilibrium again requires that a higher rate of innovation (implying
higher R&D investments) be matched by a higher volume of output. And again,
steady-state growth is feasible only when the cost of innovation is continually
which may be lower or higher than the rate of innovation, depending on how large
the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods actually is. A
relatively small elasticity of substitution (a < 0.5) would imply that the growth
rate of final output is higher than the innovation rate, and vice versa. The reason
seems to be that a very large preference for variety (a < 0.5 ) places a higher
premium on a large number of different goods per aggregate unit of consumption.
Similar reasoning applies when the love-of-variety function is interpreted as ex-
plaining the productivity gains from using intermediates in final production.30
reduced by knowledge spill-overs from current to future innovators (Grossman
and Helpman 1991: Chapter 4).
The industrial policy analysis of the models must always keep four sources
for a potential market failure in mind (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1991: 339):
(i) Since the manufacturers of innovative products are in monopolistic com-
petition or have transitory monopoly power, depending on model variants, they
can keep prices above marginal costs of production. This distorts the allocation
particularly in relation to 'traditional' industries, in which no significant in-
novation takes place and in which prices equal marginal costs.
1
9 (ii) Finite price
elasticities of demand imply that most buyers' willingness to pay is higher than
the market price. The introduction of a new good — be it for consumption or as
an intermediate product — thus creates a buyer rent which is not taken into ac-
count by the manufacturer, (iii) At the same time, the introduction of a new
good destroys part of the producer rent of other firms whose products lose mar-
ket share or become completely obsolete. This again is left out of the innovator's
decision calculus, (iv) Finally, also the positive technological externalities as-
sociated with the increase in generally available technical knowledge due to
private innovations are not taken into account by the innovator.
The external effects of private research and development are on the one hand
pecuniary or technological in nature, on the other hand positive or negative in
their impact. Whether, on balance, the positive or the negative external effects
are stronger, that is whether the private incentives are too small or too large,
cannot be definitely decided on theoretical grounds alone. This follows from the
distinct welfare implications of the two different prototype models of en-
dogenous technical progress: the one which interprets the innovation process as
a process of increasing horizontal product differentiation, and the other which
sees it as a process of continuous vertical quality improvements with a stoch-
astic success rate of research and development investments.
2
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For the model of product differentiation in consumer goods, Grossman and
Helpman (1991: 82-83), can show that the increase in consumer rents and the
loss in producer rents, which result from the introduction of a new product, are
equal in size when the demand functions are derived from a representative con-




9 But even if all industries innovate, the extent of monopoly power may vary between
them. The volume of output will be too small in industries with particularly high
deviations of price from marginal costs.
2
0 This model originated in the work of Aghion and Howitt (1992).
CES is the abbreviation for Constant Elasticity of Substitution. Consumers whose
utility function possesses this characteristic respond to any change in the relative
prices of two goods by always changing the quantities consumed in a certain pro-
portion to the relative price change. In other words: the elasticity of substitution is31
Hence, in this case, the desirability of an innovation depends only on the wel-
fare effects of the increase in freely available technical knowledge and of a
possible intersectoral distortion of relative prices. Considering the industry in
which an innovation occurs in isolation, the incentives to innovate can thus be
shown to be clearly too small in the case of horizontal product differentiation,
assuming a CES utility function for the representative consumer. A subsidy for
research and development seems reasonable.
In the model of rising product quality, however, the welfare analysis cannot
be simplified by assuming a particular utility function. In this model, the in-
centives to innovate can be either too small or too large, even when disregard-
ing intersectoral distortions. Whether the incentives are in fact too small or too
large depends on how large the quality leap is which results from a certain
volume of R&D investment. Grossman and Helpman (1991: 104-105) show
that the market incentives are too large when the quality leap is very small or
very large. If, on the other hand, it is of medium size, the market incentives to
innovate are too small.
2
2 Economically, the possibility of excessive incentives
for R&D arises because the individual firm does not take into account that suc-
cessfully patenting a quality improvement for a particular product makes ob-
solete the competitors' R&D efforts aimed at improving the same type of
product,
2
3 and shortens the life cycle of the previous product generation which
is displaced by the innovation. In short, there is a 'business stealing' effect
which places a burden on established firms (Aghion and Howitt 1992). For this
reason, competition may turn into an inefficient patent race, in which each in-
dividual firm invests the more into its research and development for a particular
product improvement, the greater the effort of its competitors. Provided the size
independent of the consumer's income, the mix of goods consumed, and of relative
prices before the price change.
2
2 Formally, this contingency of the efficiency of the market incentives for research
and development results from the fact that the present value of the loss in producer
rents created by the introduction of a new product of higher quality is a linear
function, while the present value of the increase in consumer rent (inclusive of the
intertemporal transfer of knowledge) is a logarithmic function of the size of the
quality leap (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 110—111). The quality leap A is defined
as the factor that measures how many times as many services the new generation of
a product provides over the generation before it. The utility U of the representative
consumer is in equilibrium affected by a marginal quality raising innovation ac-
cording to: dl/(t)/dl = log A/p - A/(L/a + p) , where / is the number of quality im-
provements in a certain time interval, a a research input coefficient, L the labour
force, and p the rate of time preference.
By contrast, in the model of horizontal product differentiation, research and devel-
opment investments can never become completely obsolete as a result of the devel-
opment success of a competitor, because in these models each firm has a unique
R&D objective and programme, so that there cannot be ex post obsolescence of
research spending due to patent protection.32
of the quality leaps is exogenously set, and cannot be changed by policy, the
model of rising product quality calls for either a subsidy or a tax on R&D as a
second-best industrial policy measure to influence the frequency of innovations
in steady state.
However, when the size of the quality leaps is modelled as an endogenous
parameter, it cannot be influenced by a tax or a subsidy, because in this case it
depends on the characteristics of the research technology only. In the steady-
state growth equilibrium of the model, the quality leaps are the smaller, the
greater the elasticity of the resource requirement with respect to the size of any
one quality leap (Grossman and Helpman 1991:100).
The welfare analysis of Aghion and Howitt (1992: 342) reveals that the mar-
ket forces on their own render the endogenous size of the quality leap too
small.
2
4 In this case, patent legislation may be considered as a means to control
the size of quality leaps. For example, patent law could fix a minimum novelty
requirement for patent applications.
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III. Specialization and Growth in Open Economies
1. General Considerations and the Small-Country Model
Grossman and Helpman (1991) as well as Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a,
1991b) have elaborated and further developed the theory of endogenous tech-
nical progress to explain growth processes in open economies. In doing so, they
built on the factor proportions theory of international trade originally developed
by Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933) and Samuelson (1949). Comparative ad-
2
4 The reason seems to be that the private innovator, who neglects the displacement of
the existing product vintage, maximizes the expected arrival rate of innovations
times the quality leap A, i.e. the factor by which product service is qualitatively im-
proved, whereas the benevolent social planner would maximize the arrival rate
multiplied by the net size (A — 1) of innovations. The innovator's revenue depends
on customer's willingness to pay, and thus on the absolute quality of his new
product, but social benefits accrue only from the quality gain relative to the estab-
lished product generation.
2
5 It is worth noting that the first-best policy to decentralize the choice of optimal in-
novation frequency by means of an R&D tax or subsidy presupposes that the
problem of the optimal size of the quality leap has been solved. If this problem can-
not be solved with the available instruments, the first-best choice of innovation
frequency may no longer be appropriate, and a second-best rate of innovation should
be implemented, which may be higher or lower than the first-best rate (Grossman
and Helpman 1991: 109).33
vantages, which determine the direction and size of international trade flows,
are attributed to differences in countries' relative factor endowments, while the
factor qualities are assumed equal across countries. In the new theory of
dynamic comparative advantages, a country can change its relative factor
endowments over time not only by investing in physical capital but also by ac-
cumulating human capital in the form of vocational or academic training.
A country which has above-average success in training qualified scientific
personnel will, according to the theory, specialize in research and development
and in the production and export of technology-intensive products in the long
term.
2
6 If the external effects of knowledge creation, which continue to be a
conditio sine qua non for positive steady-state growth, are internationally as ef-
fective as they are in their country of origin, differences in technological devel-
opment between countries are ultimately irrelevant for resource allocation and
trade flows; instead, these tend to reflect the relative endowments of a country
with elementary factors of production, like land, labour, and human capital,
especially in the form of scientific personnel.
This heed not be so, however, if the external effects of new knowledge are
only effective within their country of origin. In this case, as in the model of
nationally bounded learning by doing, a country's development of trade,
patterns of specialization, and rate of innovation and growth depend not only on
resource endowments but also on historical leads or lags, which the country may
have in individual industries with differing technological potential vis-a-vis its
trade partners. Leads can then favour the accumulation of technical knowledge
in certain fields, even though the country's true comparative advantages may
not be in these fields.
If a country's government recognizes a certain industry as having a par-
ticularly promising potential, it may — under certain conditions — be success-
ful in establishing a corresponding technological lead by adopting well-
designed, strategically targeted industrial policies, at least within the framework
of a consistent model of hysteresis
2
7 in trade and growth. With some luck, and
2
6 Grossman (1990a) takes this as an explanation for the spectacular growth and
export performance of Japan after World War II.
2' The term hysteresis is borrowed from physics, where it describes the phenomenon
that temporary events can have permanent results. Hysteresis may be formally
defined as a system's response to a transitory change in an exogenous or a control
' variable where one or several endogenous variables do not return to their initial
value after the exogenous control variable has been switched back. In the theory of
economic growth, hysteresis means that the growth path and long-term growth rate
are not uniquely determined by the fundamental characteristics of an economy, but
are also influenced by temporary historical events like, for example, temporary eco-
nomic policy interventions. In this sense, dynamic processes in the economy are
often said to be path-dependent. Strictly speaking, hysteresis makes sense only in a34
at the expense of other countries, the intervening country may get onto a steeper
path of innovation and growth. Although these industrial policy conclusions
appear at first sight to be identical to those from multi-sectoral learning-by-do-
ing models, the theory of endogenous technical progress in fact facilitates a
much more detailed analysis of the comparative effectiveness of different in-
dustrial policy instruments than the theory of learning by doing.
A careful analysis of endogenous growth and specialization in open econ-
omies must distinguish a number of different cases: first, according to the tra-
ditional divide of trade theory between the small-country case and the case of
two large countries; second, according to the degree of similarity of countries in
terms of factor endowments; third, according to the intensity of competition
between R&D and manufacturing for common resources; and fourth, according
to the ease with which new technical knowledge and ideas flow across inter-
national borders relative to their mobility within countries.
2
8 These distinct
cases cover much of the ground relevant to the analysis of the comparative
merits and demerits of various industrial policy instruments that might be used
in practice to influence a country's pattern of specialization and its rate of in-
novation and growth.
The small-country case is based on the assumption that world market prices
and the world-wide rate of innovation and growth are all exogenous to the home
country considered. This assumption is useful to study the impact of world mar-
ket conditions on the incentives for innovation in the home country without
worrying about any repercussions reallocations in the home country might have
on resource allocation abroad.
Grossman and Helpman (1991: Chapter 6) have studied the equilibrium
patterns of trade and growth in a small country which, initially in autarky, pro-
duces two tradeable consumption goods, using a non-tradeable intermediate
product and either unskilled labour or human capital in the form of scientists
and engineers as inputs. New intermediate inputs are continuously generated by
an R&D sector using human capital of scientists and engineers as the only
private input, yet with continuous reductions in the input requirement due to
economy-wide knowledge spill-overs from other R&D laboratories (as described
stochastic model of the process of equilibrium selection. Hysteresis presupposes
random fluctuations and bifurcation, a point which will be discussed further in
Section D.I below.
Instead of treating the penetrability of international borders for knowledge as an
exogenously fixed parameter, it could be analyzed as an endogenous or a policy
variable. This would undermine some of the arguments in favour of targeted
industrial and technology policies in open economies which rely on borders being
barriers to communication. Ultimately, however, it remains an unresolved empirical
question how far, and on what time scale, the transmission of knowledge and ideas
across borders could actually be influenced by policies.35
above). The R&D sector sells the intermediate inputs at monopoly prices to the
two perfectly competitive consumption goods industries. To exhibit balanced
steady-state growth, the model assumes that production of both consumption
goods uses the intermediate inputs with the same intensity, for otherwise the
relative size of the two industries would diverge until one of them vanishes in
importance from the long-term equilibrium. Households maximize an inter-
temporal utility function, whose instantaneous utility is a non-decreasing,
strictly quasi-concave, linear-homogeneous function of the two consumption
goods.
The opening of international trade in consumption goods, but not in inter-
mediate goods, changes the pattern of specialization and the rate of growth in
this model. But exactly how international trade affects the home economy
depends on how the pre-trade world market price ratio for the two consumption
goods differs from the domestic price ratio in autarky equilibrium. The good
which is relatively more expensive in the world market will become the export
good of the small country, so that the corresponding industry expands, while the
other industry shrinks as relatively cheap imports capture part of its domestic
market. Factor price changes and resource reallocations ensue according to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem familiar from traditional trade theory: A rise in the
relative price of the labour-intensive consumption good causes the relative re-
ward to human capital to decline; but this reduces the cost of R&D so that the
rate of innovation and growth increase. Conversely, a rise in the price of the
human-capital-intensive consumption good raises the relative reward to human
capital so that the cost of R&D increases, and the rate of innovation and growth
declines; in this case the export sector expands at the expense of the R&D
sector.
The analysis of the small economy would be more complicated if production
of the two consumption goods used the non-traded intermediate goods with dif-
ferent intensities. In this case, expansion of one consumption good industry for
export would not only affect the relative reward to human capital but also the
price of intermediates. The profitability of R&D would therefore be increased
twofold if international trade benefited an industry which makes intensive use of
intermediates, but relatively little use of human capital; in this situation, the
price of intermediates would be raised and the reward to human capital reduced
so that innovation and growth would accelerate. On the other hand, the effects
of international trade via the price of intermediates and via the rewards to
human capital would tend to offset each other whenever the more human-
capital-intensive industry makes more intensive use of intermediate inputs as
well.
Further growth effects may be generated by the international integration of
capital markets (Grossman and Helpman 1991:162-165). After the external36
liberalization of a small country's domestic capital market, its interest rate will
be fully determined by the prevailing world market rate of interest. The liber-
alization of capital flows will tend to accelerate growth only if the domestic
interest rate has been higher than the world market rate prior to capital market
integration. In the reverse case, when a small country has enjoyed a lower rate
of interest, possibly due to a lower rate of time preference of domestic con-
sumers, the liberalization of capital flows will raise the domestic rate of interest
and will tend to reduce growth, because domestic investors will withdraw some
of their funds from domestic R&D and will invest these in the international
capital market instead.
A third mechanism by which the integration of a small economy into world
markets may affect the domestic rate of innovation and growth is through inter-
national flows of technical knowledge. This mechanism would, according to the
model, raise the productivity of human capital in the domestic R&D laboratories
by making more technical knowledge available as a public R&D input. To
analyze this possibility, Grossman and Helpman (1991: 165-170), assume that
the size of such knowledge flows is directly, and proportionally, related to the
size of international trade flows. They justify this assumption with the ob-
servation that technical knowledge is usually transmitted through personal
contacts between individuals and that many such contacts are facilitated through
trade in goods.
In such a model, the rate of innovation and growth in the small country is af-
fected by the direct impact of international knowledge spill-overs on R&D pro-
ductivity as well as by the indirect impact via the reallocation of human capital
between the R&D sector and manufacturing. The overall impact of trade on
growth therefore depends on prevailing circumstances, in particular on whether
the small country would have a comparative advantage in human-capital-
intensive manufacturing after the liberalization of trade. That the rate of in-
novation and growth would be lower without trade can unambiguously be said
only for a country which imports human-capital-intensive goods in free-trade
equilibrium; this country would in autarky withdraw human capital from the
R&D sector to manufacture substitutes for the otherwise imported consumption
goods.
This part of the analysis has assumed that the rate of innovation, expanding
the variety of intermediate goods, equals the growth rate of the trade volume in
the steady-state equilibrium. This, however, need not be the case. If the trade
volume, instead, grows more slowly, the relative importance of international
knowledge spill-overs will tend to decrease over time relative to knowledge
spill-overs emanating from national R&D activities. Then, the international
knowledge spill-overs will have no impact on the domestic rate of innovation
and growth in the long term. On the other hand, if the trade volume grows37
faster than the number of intermediate inputs expands, the relative importance
of international knowledge spill-overs may increase, and productivity in the
domestic R&D laboratories might theoretically increase without bound. As the
domestic rate of innovation and growth would accelerate, the small country
would sooner or later begin to have an impact on patterns of specialization and
growth abroad; the model of a small country would therefore cease to be
applicable to such a situation of unbounded growth (Grossman and Helpman
1991: 169).
2. Two-Country Models of Endogenous Growth
The situation of a large country is better understood within a two-country trade
model. Two-country models with endogenous growth are particularly useful for
analyzing'the distinct trade and growth implications of comparative advantages
due to factor endowments versus economies of scale due to market integration.
Moreover, compared with the small-country model, two-country models provide
a more satisfactory and more policy-relevant analysis of the role of international
knowledge spill-overs in endogenous specialization and growth. Related ap-
proaches, which nevertheless feature some important differences, have been
pursued by Grossman and Helpman (1991) on the one hand and by Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991a, 1991b) on the other.
Grossman and Helpman (1991: Chapter 7) seek to emphasize the impli-
cations of comparative advantages due to differential factor endowments, and
therefore assume two manufacturing sectors with distinct input requirements as
well as an R&D sector, which uses human capital to generate blueprints for new
varieties of a high-technology good. In contrast to the small country case, the
two consumer goods industries are now distinguished not only by the intensity
with which they use the primary inputs unskilled labour and human capital
(embodied in scientists and engineers) but also by the opportunities they afford
for technological progress: One industry produces traditional goods using only
unskilled labour and human capital according to a constant-returns-to-scale
technology. The other industry also uses a constant-returns-to-scale technology
to turn blueprints from the R&D sector into high-tech goods, which generate
utility either according to the love-of-variety function of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) or according to the quality ladder model.
It is initially assumed that due to communication problems the blueprints for
new high-tech goods can be used only in their country of origin. It is further as-
sumed that the three activities can be ranked according to the intensity with
which they use human capital: This intensity is highest in R&D, still high in
high-tech manufacturing and lowest in the traditional goods industry, which38
makes the most intensive use of unskilled labour. The analysis proceeds by ap-
plying the factor proportions theorem of comparative advantage due to
Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) to the case of open economies in a dynamic
setting. The result of this exercise is a dynamic theory of comparative ad-
vantages, which can explain the evolution of comparative advantages over time
on the basis of country-specific technological developments. The new theory of
dynamic comparative advantages thereby yields important new insights which
could not be obtained from any static theory of international trade.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) can show, disregarding the theoretical pos-
sibility of factor intensity reversals, that the two-country model implies the
equalization of factor prices if both trading economies are incompletely
specialized in steady-state equilibrium. This implies further that both countries
are active in all three activities, i.e. in R&D and both manufacturing industries.
Since the private costs of doing R&D are the same in both countries, they will
both generate blueprints for new high-tech goods at the same rate, but the
country with the relatively greater endowment of human capital will at any
point in time make a greater relative volume of high-tech goods because this
country will devote relatively more human capital to R&D.
In the case of horizontal product differentiation, this pattern of specialization
implies that the equilibrium entails interindustry trade in high-tech goods since
preferences are such that households in both countries devote constant budget
shares to each type of good. The more human-capital-rich country generates
relatively more blueprints, has a relatively larger high-tech industry and thus is
a net exporter of high-tech goods. Under the assumption of no international
trade in financial assets, the more labour-intensive country must balance its
trade deficit in high-tech goods by a corresponding surplus in the trade with
traditional goods.
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9 Although the rates of innovation are equal in the two coun-
tries, real rates of growth, a weighted average of sectoral rates of productivity
growth in the two manufacturing industries, will be higher in the human-
capital-rich country where a larger share of value added is generated in the
high-tech industry. Nevertheless, both countries' real consumption possibilities
grow at the same rate, because all consumers have access to the same set of
goods, and long-term interest rates are equalized.
Such an equilibrium with full equalization of factor prices, however, is only
feasible when countries' resource endowments do not differ too much. Other-
™ If there is international trade in financial assets, countries need to balance only the
present value of their trade flows. It is then a possibility even in steady state that
one country runs a deficit on trade account balanced by a surplus on service account.
In accordance with the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, a country's trade deficit
will be larger in the industry where this country has a comparative disadvantage due
to its relative factor endowments (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 188).39
wise, at least one of the two countries will lose at least one of the three activities
in steady-sate equilibrium. The human-capital-rich country may become un-
competitive in the traditional industry, the labour-rich country in the R&D sec-
tor; or one country may even lose two activities which are not at the extreme
end of the ranking in terms of factor intensity corresponding to the country's
own ranking in terms of relative factor endowments. In such equilibria without
factor price equalization, there may be incentives for innovators in the human-
capital-rich country to locate part of the production of high-tech goods in the
labour-intensive country. These incentives may result from cost considerations
in the case where innovation expands the variety of horizontally differentiated
products, or they may result from the quest to evade the higher competitive
pressure which prevails in the market of the human-capital-rich country for in-
novations in the quality ladder case (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 192-196).
In some of these cases, where there is an incentive to export or import R&D
services, multinational companies may contribute to the equalization of factor
prices by responding to these incentives. The human-capital-rich country may
then have a permanent trade deficit balanced by a surplus in services.
3
0
The upshot of the preceding two-country analysis is that a national advantage
in R&D can only be due to differences in factor costs, which may ultimately be
explained by different factor endowments of the two countries, provided that all
knowledge spill-overs from innovative activities augment a stock of technical
knowledge that is available world-wide as a public input for private R&D. By
contrast, if technical knowledge diffuses only within its country of origin,
patterns of specialization and the rates of innovation and growth in each country
will depend not only on factor endowments but also on relative country size and
on historical starting conditions, in particular on technological leads or lags
which an individual country may possess. This implies that a country which has
come to lag in technology will continue to do so and may experience a lower
rate of innovation than the leading country; the steady-state equilibrium may
well be characterized by concentration of all R&D in one country, and usually





0 As an alternative to direct foreign investments, international licences may be used
to transfer new technology provided the licence contracts are internationally en-
forceable (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 200-204).
3
1 Grossman and Helpman (1991: Chapter 8) restrict their analysis of national knowl-
edge diffusion to the case where the two countries have identical factor endowments
and differ only in size and in accumulated research experience. This case is useful
to highlight the possibility of multiple steady-state equilibria and the role of history
in determining outcomes, yet it neglects the interaction between comparative ad-
vantage and dynamic learning externalities bounded to their country of origin.40
However, such a model with nationally bounded learning by doing from
R&D entails the possibility that the government of a lagging country may alter
the national pattern of specialization by subsidizing domestic R&D, which
would put the domestic economy on a faster growth path. These models there-
fore formalize the theoretical possibility that subsidies, which may need to be
applied only temporarily, can have permanent effects — a possibility which can
be considered a case of policy hysteresis.
The economic reason that temporary R&D subsidies may turn a lagging
country into a technology leader is that the future costs of doing R&D in this
country will be reduced by the build-up of a sufficiently large national stock of
technical knowledge. In this way, targeted industrial and technology policy may
help a country to acquire a locational advantage for R&D even though relative
factor endowments on their own would render R&D in this country more costly
than abroad. As an important caveat, Grossman and Helpman (1991: 232) note
that success in raising a country's rate of innovation and growth does not neces-
sarily imply that such a policy also raises national welfare. Normally, they
argue, national welfare will be reduced because a larger share of world-wide
R&D is then done in the country which is less efficient in this activity, because
the world-wide rate of growth may thus fall and because the intervening country
has to bear the direct costs of the subsidy.
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which national welfare may be
raised by temporary R&D subsidies, strategically designed to push domestic
R&D at the expense of foreign R&D. So in particular if factor prices do not
equalize in free-trade equilibrium and if wages are higher in the country
specializing in R&D, or if returns to domestic investments can be raised by
subsidizing domestic R&D because capital is not fully mobile across national
borders (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 233).
While this discussion of the two-country model has emphasized the role of
international knowledge spill-overs in determining patterns of specialization
and growth in models in which knowledge spill-overs from innovation are
essential for endogenous steady-state growth, it is important to keep in mind
that there are alternative specifications of endogenous growth which do not rely
on positive technological externalities to sustain growth. Romer (1987) has
shown in his model of monopolistic competition and increasing specialization
in capital inputs that models of ongoing profit-driven innovation can in fact
dispense with external learning by doing in private R&D. Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991a) use a similar model to demonstrate that international economic
integration can speed up growth in all countries even when neither R&D nor
manufacturing benefit in any way from external knowledge spill-overs. In this
model, called the lab equipment specification of R&D, both R&D and manufac-
turing share the same technology and use the same inputs, including en-41
dogenously created varieties of differentiated capital goods. International trade
of these goods is then sufficient to generate welfare gains through faster growth
because it permits a better exploitation of the increasing returns to scale which
are associated with the fixed cost of designing a new capital good.
IV. The Role of Targeted Industrial and Technology Policies
in the Models
While targeted industrial and technology policies should ideally aim at en-
hancing welfare world-wide, or at least the welfare in the country whose gov-
ernment takes the initiative to intervene, such policies are in practice often
aimed at merely raising the rate of innovation and growth in a particular
industry. It is clear from the preceding discussion of endogenous growth models
that raising welfare and raising innovation and growth are in fact two distinct
objectives, which may even be in conflict under actual circumstances.
With regard to welfare, it is important to acknowledge that models of en-
dogenous technological change generally feature more than one distortion from
efficient resource allocation. This is important because an efficient intervention
requires at least as many instruments as there are policy targets, i.e. market
failures, which has been known since Tinbergen (1956). For example, in each
innovating industry, which generates productivity growth in final production by
continuously introducing new intermediate goods, there is a static distortion due
to monopoly pricing of the new capital inputs and a potential dynamic distortion
due to the imbalance of customer surplus, profit destruction and intertemporal
spill-over effects that emanate from each innovation.
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Open economies with nationally restricted spill-overs from R&D may have
an additional source of inefficiency because the world's R&D activities may, for
historical reasons, be concentrated in a country which does not have the most
appropriate mix of factor endowments. While this would constitute an inef-
ficiency from a world-wide point of view, it may well be in the partial interest of
the country which benefits from being the preferred location for R&D. Con-
versely, a national government may be justified to view any outcome of hyster-
esis in the dynamics of specialization as suboptimal in which its own country
has little or no R&D—even if that is in accordance with the home country
being relatively poorly endowed with human capital. In a world without inter-
In addition, multi-sectoral economies typically have also intersectoral distortions
because the degree of monopoly power may vary from industry to industry.42
national policy coordination and without the possibility of sharing welfare gains
among all countries, an individual country may indeed see a potential for inter-
vention to increase national welfare at the expense of other countries if there are
multiple equilibria with different welfare implications for different countries.
When a particular steady-state equilibrium has been recognized to be affected
by more than one type of market failure, policy making needs to search for an at
least equal number of policy instruments, and must solve the assignment
problem how to allocate these instruments to the various market failures. This
assignment involves both the selection of specific instruments for specific
targets and the dosing of each instrument; it is usually an interdependent prob-
lem in the sense that additions of a new instrument or marginal adjustments of
an already used instrument require re-adjustments of other instruments. In
particular, the assignment may become a problem of the second best
3
3 if policy
lacks an instrument that would be needed for a first-best solution, or if an
essential instrument cannot be appropriately dosed.
In the model of horizontal product differentiation, it is clear that the dynamic
inefficiency due to the intertemporal knowledge spill-over (assuming that con-
sumer surplus generation and profit destruction of each innovation cancel each
other out in equilibrium) can be appropriately addressed by a subsidy to R&D.
The static inefficiency due to monopoly pricing of intermediates would require a
second instrument, e.g. a subsidy to the purchasers of these intermediate inputs
for final production, so that the user cost of intermediates are equated with the
marginal cost of producing them (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 157-158).
But this assignment would often be too simple in the model of innovation
which raises the quality of intermediates. As seen above, such a quality ladder
may, in addition to instruments targeted at the frequency of innovation, require
the fine tuning of parameters of patent protection, such as novelty requirements.
This is because in quality ladders, deviations from dynamic optimality may take
the form of too small a size of the equilibrium quality leap as well as the form of
too high or too low a frequency of innovations. These two problems are ideally
solved simultaneously by adopting two separate instruments, including ap-
propriate novelty requirements for patent protection and either an R&D tax or
an R&D subsidy. Given that the first-best solution to patent law may often not
3
3 The theory of the second best, first formalized by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956),
states that one can often not argue that removing some distortions (which are in
conflict with the marginal conditions of Pareto optimality) will move the economy
closer to a Pareto-optimal allocation if other distortions are present. It follows that it
may be inefficient to use policy rules derived from a hypothetical first-best solution
if some distortions can in fact not be corrected with the instruments available.43
be found in practice,
3
4 the choice of innovation frequency has to be reconsidered
for the size of the quality leap as determined by the market. The second-best
R&D tax or R&D subsidy will generally differ quantitatively and may even
reverse the first-best policy choice qualitatively.
Grossman and Helpman (1991:158-159), also discuss the case of en-
dogenous innovation where the government cannot implement the first-best sub-
sidy on the use of intermediate inputs in final production.
3
5 Their model of a
small open economy has the feature that the first and second-best rates of in-
novations coincide in this situation. Then, the second-best R&D policy ought to
encourage R&D if the market rate falls short of the first-best rate of innovation,
and discourage R&D when the market rate exceeds the first-best rate, but the
second-best R&D policy would need a different dosage than the first-best policy.
This implies that the second-best R&D policy qualitatively remains a subsidy in
the model of expanding variety, but that the second-best R&D policy in the
quality ladder model may for some parameter values reverse a first-best tax on
R&D into a subsidy.
3
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When the analysis of targeted industrial and technology policy turns to the
two-country model, it has to cope with even more endogenous parameters,
which can make the comparison between different assignments of instruments
to specific distortions quite complicated. Part of these complications arise
because the governments of similarly endowed countries may get into conflict
over certain high-tech industries thought to have a supernormal growth
potential. Interaction between these governments may then turn into a strategic
game with uncertain outcome. Although such strategic interaction may be an
important part of reality, it remains useful to analyze policy instruments initially
as if strategic interaction was absent.
3
4 It would only be in a world where steady-state growth was a reality that one could
hope to find the appropriate parameters for patent law. In the real world, by con-
trast, it is more than doubtful that the appropriate novelty for ever new and unex-
pected inventions could be determined ex ante.
3
5 The reason for this inability may simply be that users cannot be identified em-
pirically without excessive information cost.
Recall that quality ladders in isolation may call either for a tax on R&D if the mar-
ket rate of innovation is too high, or for a subsidy if the rate is too low, disregarding
here the problem of optimal size of the quality leap of innovation. When subsidies
are granted to the users of quality-improved intermediates, to alleviate the static
distortion of monopoly pricing, this may operate like a subsidy for R&D at the same
time. But this subsidy may be too large if the market rate of innovation is only
slightly below the optimal rate, so that a tax on R&D is needed merely to correct the
unwanted side effects of compensating for the static inefficiency of monopoly
pricing.44
Some of the most important policy instruments to consider are output sub-
sidies, trade restrictions and R&D subsidies. The general equilibrium analysis of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) reveals that subsidies for the output of a high-
technology industry generally miss the aim of raising a country's rate of in-
novation and growth if expansion of production in the high-technology sector
requires additional highly qualified engineering personnel, much of which
would have to be removed from research and development. Consequently, while
the innovation rate in the home country may decrease, once output subsidies
take effect in such a model of resource competition between innovation and
manufacturing, the rate of innovation may even increase abroad where a
shrinking production sector releases scarce qualified personnel, which then be-
comes available for research. Similarly, the growth effect of tariffs, meant to
protect high-technology industries, can also be counterproductive for the home
country (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 275-276). The net growth effect here
again depends on whether factor price changes due to the introduction of export
subsidies or import tariffs tend to increase or decrease the cost of R&D in the
home economy.
In two-country models, it can be shown that measures which raise the re-
wards to scarce human capital, embodied in scientific personnel and used
intensively in research and development, tend to reduce R&D activities at home,
but may encourage the opposite development abroad. It is for this reason that
growth, let alone a country's welfare, may be harmed by targeted support for
high-tech industries, which make more intensive use than traditional industries
of the kind of human capital, i.e. scientists and engineers, that is also used
intensively in R&D. The general equilibrium analysis of two-country models
suggests that a country which imports more high-technology products than it
exports may indeed reduce its own innovative activities by adopting trade policy
measures for the protection of its own high-tech manufacturing, but may
indirectly contribute to an increase in the world-wide rate of innovation while
the same trade policy may lead to a reduction of the world-wide rate of inno-
vation, if it is carried out by a net-exporter of technology-intensive products.
However, the world-wide rate of innovation and growth can be increased as a
consequence of a country's protectionist measures only if the economies in-
volved are sufficiently distinct in terms of their factor endowments, or else work
with very different technologies, so that the introduction of trade barriers sets in
motion a considerable intersectoral resource reallocation. Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991b) show within a model similar to the Grossman-Helpman model
that symmetrical trade restrictions between trading partners, symmetrically
endowed with factors of production and technological potential (which may
apply to the United States, Japan and the European Union), necessarily reduce
the world-wide rate of innovation and growth.45
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) develop a method of separately analyzing
three different effects of trade restrictions on the world-wide rate of growth: they
use the term allocation effect to describe the resource reallocation which results
from the introduction of trade restrictions, in particular the reallocation of
human capital embodied in scientists and engineers between research and de-
velopment on the one hand and high-tech production on the other hand. They
use the term integration effect to describe the reduced scope for exploiting in-
creasing returns to scale, which are a consequence of positive external effects at
the level of individual industries. Finally, they use the term redundancy effect to
describe productivity losses in R&D, which are to be expected when the mutual
fertilization of research efforts by ideas from different countries is diminished as
a consequence of a reduced international exchange of goods and services. While
the integration and redundancy effects of trade restrictions are always negative,
the theory does not make a general prediction on the direction of the allocation
effect. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) argue that the allocation effects of trade
restrictions will be small in the case of trade partners which are similarly
endowed with factors of production and whose production technologies are not
very distinct from each other, and that therefore the allocation effect will almost
always be dominated by the integration and redundancy effects.
Thus, the main reasons for adverse growth effects of trade barriers appear to
be the reduced scope for exploiting increasing returns to scale in the application
of new technical knowledge, which is non-rival, and in the waste of resources
used in redundant research efforts: When trade is restricted some of the new
capital inputs may be developed twice, once in each country, and each new good
will generally find fewer buyers so that R&D is less profitable for private in-
vestors in fragmented markets.
3
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Finally, the most promising instrument of industrial policy intervention in
open economies is the massive subsidization of research and development in the
industry recognized as having the greatest productivity growth potential. Under
the assumption that the diffusion of new technical knowledge is limited to its
country of origin, and provided foreign countries do not react, the sub-
sidization
3
8 of R&D need only be temporary to establish a permanent tech-
One must caution that these conclusion for the rate of innovation and growth may
not necessarily be warranted in the case of quality ladders. While trade restrictions
indeed reduce the size of monopoly rents that reward successful innovators, they
also reduce competition which tends to reduce the monopolistic price mark-up for a
given market size, offsetting the previous effect.
The case for subsidies versus tariffs, given a certain level of support has been
decided, was convincingly argued by Baldwin (1969). And this case is particularly
strong with respect to R&D whenever there is an unambiguous presumption of
underinvestment because of positive external effects, as in the prototype model of
expanding variety.46
nological lead for the home industry — a lead which may indeed accelerate the
endogenous rate of innovation and productivity growth in the home economy.
Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether the intervening country is
really helped by this policy, because research in the supported industry is now
carried out to a larger extent in a country that is less efficient in this activity be-
cause of its relative factor endowments. The world-wide rate of innovation in
this industry may thus fall. And the intervening country will in any case have to
carry the direct cost of the subsidy, yet will never reap more than a fraction of
any potential benefits (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 232). However, as noted
above, there is a possibility for national welfare gains from temporary R&D
subsidies if the free trade equilibrium does not imply the international equali-
zation of factor prices and if the free trade wages are higher in the country in
which research and development of the most promising industry is con-
centrated, or if financial capital is not completely mobile internationally. The
reason for this possibility is that government support for R&D can in these cases
raise wages or the returns to private R&D investments, respectively.
Thus, the theory of endogenous technical progress can help to justify targeted
industrial policies only in those cases in which trade partners clearly differ with
regard to factor endowments or industrial production technologies and in which
positive external effects of R&D accrue overwhelmingly within their respective
countries of origin, because the diffusion of new technical knowledge is
nationally bounded.
3
9 In these well-defined cases, then, the most suitable mea-
sures are subsidies for R&D activities in the most promising growth industries.
Strategic counter-measures of foreign countries can, however, undermine the
intended positive growth effect or even reverse it.
4
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In view of this danger, two measures outside of industrial policies appear
particularly advantageous in the light of the theory of endogenous technical
progress: First, the liberalization of international capital movements gives
private individuals the opportunity to invest their savings in whatever home or
foreign company they expect to yield the highest returns in the future. Second,
investments in education, which improve individual incentives for the accu-
mulation of human capital and thus tend to increase a country's attractiveness
3
9 It may also suffice that there is a notable diffusion lag for technical information
across international borders, perhaps due to language problems and due to the lower
intensity of personal contacts.
4
0 To avoid confusion on this point, notice that strategic interaction cannot by itself be
a persuasive argument against selectively targeted industrial or strategic technology
policies. For if it was, for the sake of consistency, one should also warn private
firms in oligopolistic markets with strategic interaction never to take the initiative,
but always to remain passive until there comes an opportunity to react to someone
else's 'foolish' first move.47
as a site for R&D activities by gradually changing its relative factor endow-
ments, always strengthen economic growth in the long term (Grossman 1990a).
Investments in education can also help to make the relative factor endowments
of technologically lagging countries more similar to the world's technology
leader. And this makes it more likely that steady-state equilibrium with free
trade implies international factor price equalization, in which case the real con-
sumption possibilities grow at the same long-term rate in all countries,
4
1 al-
though the real growth rate of production may be higher in those countries that
are more abundantly endowed with human capital and thus 'naturally' special-
ize more strongly in high-technology sectors.
V. Empirical Studies of the Returns to Innovation, Patterns
of Specialization, and Economic Growth
To assess the reliability of industrial policy recommendations based on insights
of new growth theory, it is important to check whether this theory stands up to a
thorough empirical examination of its hypotheses. Since new growth theory is
only a few years old, not too much empirical work has yet been done to test the
relevant hypotheses; moreover, the methodology of some of the existing studies
has been criticized. The efforts have mainly concentrated on three issues: (i) the
convergence of the growth rates of different countries over time; (ii) the
existence, direction and strength of external effects and knowledge spill-overs
from R&D activities; and (iii) a possible acceleration of the international dif-
fusion of new technical knowledge due to the greater speed of new commu-
nication technologies and due to the increasing significance of multi-national
companies in international economic transactions.
1. Convergence
Many studies have attempted to test the hypothesis of the convergence of growth
rates of different countries, which is derived from the neoclassical growth theory
This conclusion may rest on the assumption which Grossman and Helpman (1991)
make about preferences, namely that constant budget shares are allocated to tra-
ditional and high-tech goods and that the elasticitiy of substitution between any pair
of high-tech goods is always greater than one. These assumptions effectively ex-
clude the possibility of immiserizing growth (cf. the discussion of the small-country
model of Lucas (1988) in Section B.II.l).48
of Solow (1956). In essence, it claims that countries with a relatively small per
capita capital stock in some base year subsequently grow faster than countries
which had a larger per capita capital stock in the base year. Many economists
believe that data on such a convergence of international growth rates can help to
discriminate empirically between the Solovian growth model and the competing
models of the new growth theory, because many of these allegedly contradict the
hypothesis of convergence and instead suggest the hypothesis of a random
walk
4
2 or of divergence of per capita income of different countries.
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But a random walk is really an implication only of stochastic versions of
linear models, e.g. the AK-model of Rebelo (1991), a point noted also by Romer
(1989: 105). And some endogenous growth models can be formulated so as to
accommodate periods of (incomplete) convergence that may lead to partial and
not to full equalization of growth rates in initially unequally endowed countries
(Jones and Manuelli 1990); other endogenous growth models have multiple
equilibria and may thus imply local convergence.
4
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While these caveats should caution the claim that empirical convergence
studies are testing new versus old growth theory, there are also a number of
conceptual traps in interpreting them as an application of old Solovian growth
theory. For example, a careful empirical examination of the convergence
question requires that the hypothesis must not be formulated in terms of ab-
solute convergence, but in terms of conditional convergence, taking into ac-
count the supposedly exogenous determinants of the different long-term relative
per capita income positions of different countries.
Some of the more careful empirical examinations, such as those Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992a) carried out for Europe and the United States and Mankiw
et al. (1992) for a larger group of countries, which take into account a country's
4
2 A time series of data is described as a random walk when, given the current ob-
servation, values of this series realized in the past do not help to predict future
realizations. A typical example is yt = yt_\ + et where et is assumed to be a zero-mean stationary process. Because the coefficient on yt-\ equals one, em-
pirical tests of the random walk hypothesis are commonly called unit root tests.
4
3 For a critical discussion see Amable et al. (1994). They argue that unit roots in
discrete processes and hysteresis are two distinct phenomena. Whereas unit roots
point to a continuum of equilibria, implying permanence of exogenous shocks,
hysteresis is strongly related to bifurcations. Bifurcations, however, occur when
there is local instability only at certain critical values of the control parameter, but
robustness of the model for values far from the critical ones. Hysteresis thus
typically implies the shifting of mean values in an otherwise fairly stationary
process, permanence only of exogenous shocks which lead to fluctuations around
the control parameter's critical value. Compare for the more detailed discussion of
this issue in Section E.I.I.
4
4 The hypothesis of local convergence is supported by recent empirical studies of
Ben-David (1994) and Durlauf and Johnson (1992).49
investment quota as the crucial determinant of its long-term per capita income,
cannot reject the hypothesis of conditional convergence. With reference to an
'augmented' Solow model, these studies claim to explain about 80 per cent of
the observed international variation in per capita income.
These studies estimate not only the contribution of physical capital accu-
mulation but also the contribution of the accumulation of human capital to the
observed growth in labour productivity, and thus refer to an 'augmented' Solow-
model. The results suggest that human capital accumulated in schools and in
vocational training is at least as important for growth as the accumulation of
physical capital. Both forms of capital together have an estimated partial
elasticity of production of 66 up to 80 per cent, which is indeed considerable, yet
still clearly below one, the value assumed by new growth theory for the sum of
the partial production elasticities of all accumulating factors.
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Once more, however, the new growth theory cannot thus be considered re-
jected because as a test of old versus new growth theory the convergence re-
gressions suffer from a number of conceptual and methodological shortcomings:
First, the regression equation is derived from a linear approximation around the
steady state, whereas the dynamics far from the steady state may be non-linear
even in simple growth models. Second, collapsing the growth dynamics over
several decades into a cross-section of countries may be grossly misleading if
the observation period is marked by structural breaks, like the oil shock of the
1970s. Such structural breaks may indeed put the notion of timeless steady
states seriously in doubt.
Third, conditioning on country characteristics can conceal that countries may
actually be moving towards different, and possibly diverging, steady states.
Fourth, the existence of transitory adjustment processes to a long-term growth
path, which would be consistent with a hypothesis of temporary but ultimately
incomplete convergence of international per capita income, is in fact compatible
with some models of the new growth theory. It may even be compatible with
multi-sectoral models in which the condition for endogenous growth — non-
decreasing average returns to investment — is fulfilled only in some of the in-
dustries of an economy (Rebelo 1991; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1993).
Notwithstanding these potential fallacies, attempts have been made to apply
the methodology of convergence regression at the level of individual industries.
Dollar and Wolff (1993: Chapter 4) have used regression analysis to test for
total factor productivity convergence at the level of twelve manufacturing in-
r Levine and Renelt (1992) give an excellent overview of empirical cross-country
growth studies.50
dustries in thirteen OECD countries
4
6 for the period 1963-1983. They find
what they call the catch-up hypothesis confirmed: Their results indicate a highly
significant inverse relation between the rate of total factor productivity conver-
gence and the corresponding initial level of total factor productivity for data
disaggregated by industry and country — relative to the United States. They
also use the regression to test, as a second hypothesis, the embodiment or
vintage effect, which would imply positive interactions between capital accu-
mulation and technological advance in an industry located in a particular
country, but find evidence for this only for the years prior to 1973.
4
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This analysis of total factor productivity convergence is part of Dollar and
Wolff's more general quest for the sources of aggregate labour productivity con-
vergence among the advanced industrialized countries. They argue that inter-
national trade has played a crucial role in the convergence process, having been
accompanied by increasing specialization rather than by a trend towards greater
similarity in trade patterns since the mid-1970s. But this increasing special-
ization has apparently not been of the mercantilist kind where some countries
succeed at the expense of others in moving their employment mix towards the
industries with the highest value added per employee. Instead, different coun-
tries seem to have chosen different industries for their main investment in new
technology. Dollar and Wolff (1993) take this as the main explanation why
labour and total factor productivity have continued to converge in the aggregate
after 1973, although their convergence within individual industries seems to
have slowed down, and even to have ceased in the case of total factor produc-
tivity.
These findings underscore the need for the kind of disaggregated empirical
work to be reported in the subsequent chapters of the present study. Noteworthy
is in particular that dispersion among countries of labour and total factor pro-
The industries are: basic metals, metal products, chemicals, minerals, machinery,
transport equipment, electricals, food (including beverages and tobacco), textiles
(including clothing, footwear and leather goods), paper and printing, rubber and
plastics, wood products, other manufacturing. The countries are: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Dollar and Wolff (1993)
have run their regression twice, on two different data sets. One of these, from the
OECD, covers the period 1970-1985, but excludes transport equipment as well as
rubber and plastics. The other data set, compiled by Dollar and Wolff from various
sources, covers the period 1963-1983, but excludes the Scandinavian countries,
Belgium and Australia.
The absence of a positive correlation after the mid-1970s, however, is not surprising
given that the measure of total factor productivity, which Dollar and Wolff (1993)
have computed for individual industries, shows convergence to the United States
reference level primarily up to the mid-1970s, and little or no convergence since
then. But convergence in capital intensity (per worker) seems to have continued.51
ductivity measures is generally greater within industries than in the aggregate.
Dollar and Wolff (1993: 63) point out that this finding is difficult to reconcile
with the traditional neoclassical trade theory of Heckscher, Ohlin and
Samuelson. As Deardorff (1984) has shown, labour productivity differences at
the industry level are implied by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory only if there is
no factor price equalization in equilibrium. But in this case, a relatively capital-
rich country should have a higher capital-labour ratio and a higher labour pro-
ductivity in every industry; and vice versa for a relatively labour-rich country.
Dollar and Wolff seem to think that since general technological capabilities
have converged, as a result of international technology diffusion, individual
countries have begun to develop idiosyncratic technological leads in different
industries — in line with the new theories of endogenous technological inno-
vation, economies of scale and learning by doing in R&D. They also suggest
that these emerging technology leads and lags at the industry level are now a
more important explanation of comparative advantage among industrialized




A number of recent studies have looked for detailed empirical evidence of static
and dynamic external effects. In this context, the major questions are whether
the external effects are specific to individual industries or equally effective
across all industries, whether they are limited in range to their respective region
or nation of origin, or whether they are equally effective across national borders,
and finally, whether they are sufficiently strong to justify the assumption of in-
creasing returns to scale at the aggregate level of entire industries or even
economies.
A good example is the recent study by Irwin and Klenow (1994) who find on
the basis of quarterly firm level data from the semiconductor industry (dynamic
random access memory semiconductors, to be precise) for the period 1974-1992
that there have been significant learning rates, but relatively small inter-
generational spill-overs, and importantly, that learning spill-overs seem to have
benefited firms in other countries just as much as firms in the country of spill-
In fact, Dollar and Wolff (1993: Chapter 3) report strong convergence of real wages
for individual industries as well as for total manufacturing among the sample coun-
tries and some convergence of profit rates within industries among countries. They
conclude (Dollar and Wolff 1993: 134) that unit cost differences between countries
were mainly due to real wage differences in the 1960s, but mainly due to inter-
country variation in total factor productivity in the early 1980s.52
over origin. In particular, they find that learning rates average 20 per cent and
accrue overwhelmingly to the own firm.
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Another interesting piece of work, concerned with interindustry spill-overs
rather than one industry in isolation, is offered by Glaeser et al. (1992), who
examine the sectoral employment growth in American cities, which differ in the
degree of structural diversification, over the period from 1956 to 1987. Their
findings suggest that employment growth tends to be larger in cities with a
strongly diversified economic structure than in cities whose economic structure
is dominated by one particular industry. Glaeser et al. (1992) conclude that
knowledge spill-overs within any particular industry, as assumed in models of
sectoral learning by doing and in some models of sectoral endogenous technical
progress, are apparently less important for growth than intersectoral knowledge
spill-overs.
Further results reported by Caballero and Lyons (1992) seem to confirm the
hypothesis of positive intersectoral external effects. These findings point to in-
creasing social returns to scale for total manufacturing in the U.S. and selected
European countries, while measuring constant returns to scale at the statistical
level of individual industries within the manufacturing sector. For example,
they estimate for West Germany that productivity in any industry whose own
inputs are held constant increases on average by approximately two and a half
per cent when all other manufacturing industries increase their output by ten per
cent. Their examination of input-output relationships between different in-
dustries, assumed to be the transmission paths for the intersectoral spill-over
effects, suggests that most of the external effects relevant in the long term are of
the pecuniary type and can be traced to increasing specialization and quality
improvements in intermediate products and capital inputs rather than to the ac-
cumulation of physical capital or of human capital, as assumed in the theories of
learning by doing and endogenous technical progress.
It is, however, doubtful that Caballero and Lyons (1992) do justice to the
problem of knowledge spill-overs in the form of technological external effects
from private R&D when they regard the intersectoral input-output relationships
as the relevant transmission path, and simply compute intersectoral coefficients
of correlation in the time series of sectoral value added. In order to trace knowl-
edge spill-overs from R&D, it may be unavoidable to start from observations of
inputs or outputs of research and development themselves.
Studies which estimate the impact of research and development expenditure
(or of patent applications as an output indicator) outside a particular industry on
the productivity in this industry have modelled the transmission paths in differ-
The authors also note that the learning rates of Japanese firms are not significantly
faster or slower than those of non-Japanese firms.53
ent ways. Many have not relied on input-output relations but instead, for ex-
ample, on the particular sequences of first applications of individual innovations
in different industries on the utilization frequency of patented technology in dif-
ferent industries or on the official classification of patents to different fields of
technology corresponding to different industries (Mohnen 1990). Generally,
these examinations appear to support the view that the degree to which produc-
tivity in a particular industry benefits from knowledge spill-overs originating
outside the industry depends a lot on which industry is considered. Griliches
(1992) reports from a number of independent studies by other authors who have
estimated social returns to investments with intersectoral spill-overs of between
10 and 80 per cent. The main sources of intersectoral spill-over effects have
been found in chemistry, mechanical engineering, electronics and in the devel-
opment of scientific instruments (Mohnen 1990).
Yet, even these studies of intersectoral spill-overs presumably do not distin-
guish in a reliable way between technological and pecuniary external effects of
research and development. Moreover, they might ignore part of the techno-
logical effects because they inevitably base their distinction of individual in-
dustries on a particular level of aggregation, and thus must exclude spill-overs
that are effective at lower or higher aggregation levels. In most cases, these
studies do not take into account the fact that spill-overs often have their impact
only after some time lag. Finally, they cannot capture that share of the pecuni-
ary external effects which accrues to consumers or to some of the commercial
buyers in the form of additional consumer rents due to quality improvements
and due to the introduction of entirely new products. The studies therefore fail
to deliver full estimates of the entire social returns to research and development.
In spite of these shortcomings, a fairly robust finding seems to be that inter-
sectoral spill-overs are incomplete, partly due to time lags. The time series
regularly show a strong positive correlation between the productivity growth of
an individual firm, or an individual industry, and its respective own research
and development investments. Lichtenberg (1993) shows that also the produc-
tivity growth of a number of industrialized countries is significantly positively
correlated with the corresponding private research and development ex-
penditures of these countries. Under the assumption that research and develop-
ment expenditures are not themselves influenced by productivity, the hypothesis
that technological external effects from research and development are not at all
inhibited by international borders therefore has to be rejected. Thus, an as-
sumption, which is crucial for the validity of hysteretic models of endogenous
technical progress appears to be confirmed empirically.
From this alone, however, can by no means be concluded that targeted gov-
ernment support for industrial research and development is advisable. At this
point, instead, the question arises of how high the social marginal product of54
government funded research capital actually is. In his recent study, Lichtenberg
(1993) estimates the social marginal product to be not significantly different
from zero; in some of his regressions it is even negative. Moreover, Lichten-
berg's results cannot lend support to a regime of selectively targeted industrial
policies, discriminating between industries, because his study does not measure
sectoral differences in the international effectiveness of spill-over effects at all;
the data used by Lichtenberg (1993) are far too aggregated.
Furthermore, his model does not specify the hypothetical transmission path
of external effects in any detail. But the hypothesis that the intensity of trade
relations between countries is a determinant of the magnitude of international
spill-overs from R&D finds some support in a recent empirical study by Coe and
Helpman (1993), who use trade-weighted foreign R&D capital stocks, in ad-
dition to national R&D capital stocks, to explain variations in the total factor
productivity growth of 21 OECD countries and Israel during the 1970s and
1980s.
For an assessment of the actual prospects of successfully promoting economic
growth by subsidizing selected areas of research and development, one should
also consider the results from a number of interesting case studies which
attempt to measure the social returns to selected individual technological in-
novations, whose application takes place in a clearly delimited area and is thus
easy to oversee for the purpose of data collection. For example, Trajtenberg
(1990a) examines the social returns in the form of consumer rents that can be
traced back to the continual quality improvements in computer tomographs
since their introduction in 1972. The social returns were apparently extremely
high at the start of product development. For innovations up until 1977,
Trajtenberg (1990a) estimates the social returns to be eighty times the sums in-
vested in research and development; for innovations between 1978 and 1982,
however, they are less than one and a half times the corresponding amount.
This result suggests the conclusion that at the beginning of product develop-
ment government aid might have been sensible, but later, when the technology
was already established, it might have been ineffective or even damaging. This
example illustrates the often underestimated industrial policy information
problem governments face: As soon as they recognize a promising new tech-
nology, the time of high social returns has probably passed. Moreover, results
from case studies are generally suspected of painting a far too rosy picture of the
social returns to research and development, because they tend to focus on suc-
cessful innovations and to neglect unsuccessful research efforts.
Future empirical research on the existence and nature of external effects in
industrialized economies promises to help discriminate between different ap-
proaches within the new growth theory. Nevertheless, it remains doubtful that
present methods of empirical research will suffice to make reliable and detailed55
recommendations for targeted industrial policy, which would fit particular cir-
cumstances in the near future and which would be based on an undisputed body
of knowledge about economic growth in the real world.
3. The International Diffusion of New Technical Knowledge and the
Role of Multinational Companies
The third empirical issue relevant to assessing industrial policy proposals comes
down to the question what impact the ongoing improvements of communication
and information storage technologies will have on the rate of diffusion and
speed of transfer of new knowledge and thus on the strength and range of tech-
nological externalities.
5
0 In this context, it is also of interest whether the in-
creasing importance of multinational companies and their strategic alliances has
led to a greater acceleration of the international diffusion than of the national
diffusion of knowledge (Chesnais 1988).
The convergence of national and international knowledge diffusion and
transfer processes would tend to make country-specific technological accu-
mulation processes, which do not reflect the true comparative advantages on the
basis of relative factor endowments, impossible to sustain. Such a convergence
would thus tend to make industrial policy measures to establish national tech-
nological leadership in promising industries ineffective. Some authors, however,
express concern that the international transfer of technology in all its various
forms could in the future be dominated even more than today by multinational
companies and that some kind of technological dualization of markets could
occur, excluding local firms from the latest developments in the field of high
technologies (Chesnais 1988).
The empirical evidence shows that the measurable share of international
technology transfer, i.e. the trade with patents, licences and technical know-
how, has been dominated by multinational companies for years, apparently with
an upward trend (Vickery 1986). At the same time, an increasing internation-
alization of the R&D activities of multinational enterprises is observed
(Mansfield et al. 1979; Wortmann 1990). Part of this trend is not only the in-
creasing number of strategic alliances between different multinational com-
panies but also their setting up of own R&D laboratories abroad, which seem to
follow the setting up of foreign production locations with some time lag
(Vickery 1986).
See Tassey (1992) and the various contributions in Casson (1991a) for related work
on these questions.56
Beneficiaries of these investments seem to be primarily countries which al-
ready have established a strong technological base in the corresponding in-
dustry. This is confirmed by the long-term trend towards the international ag-
glomeration of research and development activities observed by Cantwell
(1991). Taken together, the observed trends appear to confirm the hypothesis,
especially for research-intensive industries, that multinational companies do
contribute to an accelerated international transfer of knowledge. However, there
do not appear to exist any thorough empirical studies on the related question of
whether positive technological spill-over effects for local firms in the various
host countries of the multinational companies have increased or decreased over
time. Thus, the fear of a coming technological dualization between multi-
national and local companies is presently still unfounded.57
Like a river which digs its own bed deeper, a pattern
of specialization, once established, will induce
relative productivity changes which strengthen the
forces preserving that pattern. ... but eventually the
larger forces of tectonics will bury that history.
— Paul Krugman (1987: 47, 54)
C. Modelling the Complex Stochastic Dynamics of
Innovation and Specialization in Open Economies
I. The Stochastic Nature of Innovation, External Effects
and Hysteresis
Although people know from experience that a stream of technological inno-
vations will be part of economic life in the future, no single innovation can
normally be predicted with respect to the place and time of its occurrence, nor
with respect to the actual features of any new product or production process. If
all this could be predicted in advance, one would already know enough to make
the innovation today. The randomness of technological change is both an em-
pirical fact and a logical consequence of invention and innovation coming as
discrete events.
5
1 But an important question remains: Is the stochastic nature of
innovation really an objective reality or merely a reflection of subjective ex ante
ignorance about the precise laws of some deterministic dynamic which might
underlie technological change?
1. Objective Randomness and Emergence in the Sciences
If the randomness of technological change was merely subjective, then no
genuine newness could ever come into this world; everything would rather be
predetermined. Thus, one may argue that genuine innovation as an individual
event would be inconceivable if it did not contain a fundamental random
element. In particular, the irreversible character of the creation of new knowl-
edge could not be reconciled with a deterministic view of innovation. After the
event, it is never possible to return the world to its initial state, as it would be in
It is only after quantum mechanics introduced an irreducible random element into
physics that one can no longer maintain that nature does not make jumps.58
a deterministic world. Even if one took away all the blueprints, designs and
products that embody a particular invention, many people would still know how
to make the product anew. Although some parts of knowledge may indeed be
forgotten if they are not kept in constant use, it is hardly conceivable that an
economy could be returned to its initial state and thereby be deprived of all
technical knowledge that has been accumulated in the course of its develop-
ment. The growth and development of innovating economies takes place in irre-




Yet, even assuming innovation to be partly random still leaves the question
open whether this randomness also matters in the aggregate: Are we justified to
invoke the law of large numbers and to regard the aggregate sequence of in-
dividual innovations as a deterministic and predictable stream of variety in-
creases and productivity advances merely veiled by random measurement
errors? Or does the stochastic nature of innovation itself have implications for
the direction of technological specialization and the rate of productivity growth
in the economy at large, and thus ultimately for economic policy?
In the past, economists have been reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of
truly new things and new ideas coming into existence, let alone the conse-
quences of innovation being fundamentally stochastic. An important reason for
ignoring newness, it is argued by Romer (1994), has been the inability, only
recently overcome, of dealing with non-convexities in mathematical models of
general equilibrium in economic systems. In the past, only interior equilibria on
convex sets could be handled with the formal apparatus of general equilibrium
analysis. But, as Romer points out, an interior equilibrium is incompatible with
innovation. The fact that there are continual technological innovations implies
that the economy is always near or on the boundary of goods space.
Moreover, the introduction of any new good must be associated with a fixed
cost, for else there would be no reason why the good was not already available
in the market. Fixed costs, however, are incompatible with perfect competition.
They require some form of monopolistic competition which economists have
learned only recently to model within a consistent general equilibrium frame-
work. And the existence of fixed costs raises the question why the effort to bring
some particular new good to market seems to become profitable at a particular
place and time, and not before or elsewhere. In other words: what is it that
moves an economy out of an established equilibrium and puts it on the path to a
new equilibrium allocation which includes some particular new good?
Time is reversible in neoclassical growth theory because the models suggest that
simply by destroying the capital stock of an economy the process of accumulation
would start all over again and would be repeated in identical fashion.59
This involves the question how new goods are actually selected from the
wealth of inventions possible at any given time, from the many more inno-
vations conceivable than are on firms' drawing boards and from the many more
designs on firms' drawing boards than will eventually be brought to market.
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Is this selection entirely arbitrary, do all small perturbations accumulate to large
effects, as Romer (1994) seems to imply? Or does the ongoing selection of new
goods obey certain regular patterns with regard to the direction and frequency of
innovations? Does perhaps some kind of self-organized criticality play an im-
portant role?
A first selection takes place in the inventor's brain. Unfortunately, individual
creativity is still little understood. One can only guess what kind of mental
processes liberate the inventor's brain from the constraints of an ingrained set of
beliefs and prejudices about the world and enable him to perceive new technical
combinations for given ends or new uses for existing technologies.
5
4 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that people who are social or intellectual outsiders, for one
reason or another, are more likely to generate new ideas which lead to useful
inventions.
5
5 In brief, eccentric brains seem to possess a comparative, and often
5
3 Romer (1994) presents a combinatorial calculation which demonstrates that, of the
set of all possible computer programmes which would fit — one at a time — on a
low capacity floppy disk, only a very tiny fraction could be stored simultaneously in
this world, even if every elementary particle in the universe was used to code a dif-
ferent bit of information.
One such guess is discussed by Siebert (1969) who distinguishes between the ac-
quisition of new technical knowledge through processes of unanticipated learning
and through intentional search behaviour. He contrasts a Markov learning model
with a mathematical model of optimal search intensity. Both of these models are
stochastic and may imply path-dependence, as they rely on positive feedbacks.
Moreover, as Siebert (1969: 528) points out, the presence of external effects from
one learning experience or search effort to another may imply that a whole economy
need not be constrained by decreasing marginal returns even if these would be
relevant to each individual effort of searching for new technical knowledge in iso-
lation. At the same time, Siebert (1969: 535) recognizes that the path-dependent
nature of learning and searching for new knowledge may provide an argument for
infant industry protection.
5
5 For example, think of Leonardo da Vinci, an illegitimate child, Thomas Alva
Edison, who developed serious hearing problems as a young boy and was labelled a
misfit in elementary school, Rudolf Diesel, a German born in Paris and at the age of
twelve deported to England (following the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war), or
Werner (von) Siemens, who was pushed into inventing by financial need after the
death of his parents made him at the age of 24 responsible for the upbringing of
nine younger siblings. Apart from unusual individual circumstances, unusual social
conditions may favour the clustering of inventive activities in certain, relatively
brief historical periods. Mokyr (1991) notes that technologically creative societies
have been historical exceptions rather than the rule. He points out that for certain
limited periods of time some societies (e.g. the United States and Germany in the
late 19th century) have been able to generate such enormous bursts of technical60
even absolute, advantage for invention. This would be consistent with the
(phenomenological) theory of emergence in the natural world, the theory of




This theory claims that any new, and self-stabilizing, structure involves the
breaking of natural symmetries and can emerge only far from a system's equi-
librium, in the sense of maximum entropy as defined by thermodynamics.
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Since the pioneering paper of Prigogine (1969), the theory has been used in a
variety of contexts to explain the emergence of physical, chemical and bio-
logical structures out of the utter chaos which is supposed to have dominated the
universe at the beginning. It had long been recognized by scientists that the ob-
served degree of order and complexity, manifesting itself most remarkably in
human life on earth, cannot easily be reconciled with the second law of thermo-
dynamics, according to which the entropy of any closed system increases irre-
versibly until equilibrium is reached. Nor could the irreversible increase in
entropy be easily reconciled with the deterministic laws of classical dynamics,
derived by Newton to describe mechanical systems, which can be shown to be
fully reversible.
The physicists Paul and Tatjana Ehrenfest (1907), however, showed that
entropy could be understood within a simple model of a stochastic process.
Thermodynamic equilibrium has since then been viewed as a statistical concept
describing the macroscopic state which is most likely to be observed in a closed
system in the long term. In the Ehrenfest model, there are two balls of different
colour which are initially distributed in an arbitrary fashion between two urns.
Someone makes a random selection of balls from the urns at regular intervals,
one ball at a time, and these balls are moved from one urn to the other.
For this experiment, reported by Eigen (1989), it can be shown theoretically
that in the long term, regardless of the initial distribution of balls, convergence
of the relative distribution of the two types of balls in each urn to the relative
creativity and innovation that it would be difficult to consider these as mere random
fluctuations in the frequency of individual geniuses.
Compare for the views of Haken and Haken-Krell (1992) who attribute all qualities
and achievements of the human brain to the emergence of 'dissipative structure'. A
similar hypothesis has been held by Gestalt theory which claims that creative
thinking involves more than mere cognitive associations. By contrast, the neu-
rologist Eccles (1977) seems to see an independent spirit in control of the material
brain.
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7 Entropy is defined as the amount of randomness in the macroscopic state of a closed
system. This randomness of a macroscopic state (e.g. the density distribution of a
system's elements in space) is the greater, the more combinations of different allo-
cations of the microscopic elements of the system represent this particular macro-
scopic state.61
distribution in the totality of balls is to be expected, because there are clearly
more allocations of individual balls across the two urns that represent this
macroscopic 'equilibrium' distribution than there are allocations that would
represent any other particular distribution. This equilibrium, which corresponds
to a state of maximum entropy, is thus without any meaning at the level of a
system's individual elements. If each individual element was thought to move
on a deterministic trajectory, the system as a whole would eventually return to
any macroscopic state, given enough time even to the most improbable ones.
The system would thus be fluctuating around the most likely macroscopic state,
and any observed increase in entropy would not really constitute an irreversible
process but only part of a fluctuation with an extremely low frequency.
In recent research, however, it has been argued that true irreversibility is not
only possible, but indeed inevitable in complex systems in which entropy is
linked to a gradual loss of information about the system's initial conditions.
This argument builds on the concept of information introduced by Shannon
(1948) to develop a microscopic theory of irreversibility. Since the work of
Lorenz (1963) and Prigogine (1969, 1979), partly following Poincare (1893),
scientists have learned that the deterministic trajectories of the microscopic
elements in a system of sufficient complexity can easily turn out to be chaotic.
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) argue that, because the chaotic trajectories of any
two points in phase space, which may be arbitrarily close together initially, will
diverge at an exponential rate and because, according to quantum mechanics, an
infinitely precise localization is never feasible, the microscopic dynamics of
such a system are to be considered intrinsically random and unstable. In con-
trast to classical dynamics, the system therefore does not retain the information
about initial conditions, to which the system will thus never return. Prigogine
and Stengers (1984) conclude that sufficiently complex systems necessarily ex-
hibit irreversible dynamics in unidirectional, historical time.
The simple model proposed by P. and T. Ehrenfest can be adapted to illus-
trate irreversibility due to the loss of initial information. Suppose that the two
urns are each filled with the same number of balls of each of the two colours.
Again, balls are randomly selected from the two urns at regular intervals, but
now the selected ball is left in its urn and an additional ball of the same colour
is taken from an external reservoir and put in the other urn to replace a ball of
the other colour in that urn. Although there is no a priori preference for either
of the two colours, and there may thus be fluctuations around the initial distri-
bution of the two types of balls in the urns, eventually one of the two colours
will come to dominate both urns, and the other colour will 'die out'. The reason,
of course, is that the colour which has already gained a greater share of the total
number of balls is with increasing probability selected again and augmented
even further.62
In this model, it is a priori certain that the symmetry of the initial distri-
bution will sooner or later be broken irreversibly. But it is uncertain when this
will happen, and importantly, which colour will survive. There is thus a bifur-
cation point, before which the long-term development is fundamentally un-
predictable and after which it is fully deterministic. Moreover, the model
implies that information about the initial distribution will be lost so that the
system can never return to its initial state. This model illustrates that there are
potentially useful insights about the dynamics of complex systems which can
only be gained from probabilistic models implying irreversibility and uni-
directional time, as opposed to the reversible time of classical dynamics.
2. Emergence in Economics
It is from probabilistic models of open systems with irreversibility that the
hypothesis of intrinsically unstable equilibria in innovating economies can be
derived, provided these economies are sufficiently complex to render elementary
dynamics at the microscopic level chaotic, and thus intrinsically random. Much
anecdotal evidence in support of this hypothesis has recently been provided by
the technological revolution that led to the birth of the personal computer (PC)
industry.
When the first PCs came to market, many experts of computer technology
held that these small and fragile machines would never be able to compete with
the much more powerful mainframe computers, at least not outside of narrow
niche markets. What these experts failed to foresee was the enormous attraction
the PC has since generated for complementary innovations and quality improve-
ments in the areas of software, printers, communication and interface tech-
nologies as well as in the PC's core technologies, its processing and memory
chips. A rapidly growing market made product differentiation profitable,
especially in software and printing technology, which in turn generated sig-
nificant pecuniary externalities, by making every PC potentially more produc-
tive. Moreover, the demand for compatibility generated strong network ex-
ternalities in favour of PC adoption.
After only a few years, PC technology began to close the productivity gap vis-
a-vis mainframes so dramatically that the PC was able to gain market share
even in large scale business and sophisticated scientific applications, areas
which had been considered the reserve of mainframe computers. There are a
number of identifiable historical events which shaped the course of techno-
logical development in the PC industry. One of these stochastic events was
IBM's decision in the early 1980s to launch its own range of PCs with the
operating system and processing chip — two of the PC's key components —63
bought from external sources, yet without securing exclusive rights to use these
inputs and their specific quality and compatibility standards. Many think this to




The example of the PC demonstrates that some of the potentially important
consequences of the fact that innovation is an intrinsically unstable stochastic
process may arise at the macroscopic level of technological and economic de-
velopment, from the systemic interaction of individual innovations. These
macroscopic effects, in turn, may feed back onto the microscopic level by
changing the relevant supply and demand conditions and thus the economic
landscape in which entrepreneurs search for profitable innovation opportunities.
The market selection among competing innovations, superimposed on the
temporally preceding selection procedures in the brains of the inventors and in
the R&D departments of innovating firms, is thus a non-trivial stochastic
process with no obvious implication of optimality. In a sense, the path taken by
the market process may come to 'enslave'
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9 individual innovation behaviour by
making certain technological choices more attractive to the individual innovator
who operates within a highly interdependent technological and economic en-
vironment. Because the economy is a complex evolving system according to this
view, both chance and necessity, i.e. random events and positive feedbacks, are
thought to determine the course of development, which thus cannot be under-
stood with reference to a microeconomic theory of individual innovations alone.
That neoclassical theory has so far largely ignored these issues may have
been due to a lack of appropriate analytical tools to study the interaction of
stochastic processes in open systems and the implications of this interaction for
resource allocation in dynamic economies. By now, however, the natural
sciences have developed several complementary methodologies to formalize
explanations of how today's apparent order in the natural world may have
emerged out of the utter chaos supposed to have dominated the universe at its
beginning. Ebeling and Feistel (1994) distinguish five complementary ways of
modelling self-organizing processes:
(i) Kinetic models can be used to describe the observed sequence of relevant
events, either verbally or by graphical representation.
(ii) Thermodynamic models are used to analyze diffusion processes with the
implication of a monotonically increasing entropy in closed systems. Georgescu-
It remains to be seen whether a similarly productivity-enhancing software com-
ponents industry would emerge if software firms were helped, or forced, to agree
and implement compatible software standards, so that users could assemble dif-
ferent firms' components to meet their specific needs in the best possible way.
To use a terminology suggested by Haken (1983).64
Roegen (1971) has used this modelling approach for the flows of matter and
energy into and out of the open system that an economy constitutes within its
natural environment. A continuous export of entropy out of the economic
system is seen to be a precondition for its ongoing, self-organized evolution.
(Hi) Models of deterministic dynamics, represented by differential equations,
are used to analyze the often non-linear dynamics of certain key variables which
characterize a system's behaviour over time. Haken (1983) has called such vari-
ables the order parameters of a system. An example would be the share of a
certain technology in a particular product market, say, the share of Betamax in
the market for video cassette recorders (VCRs).
(iv) Stochastic dynamics are used to model the evolution of probability dis-
tributions for the order parameters of Markov processes.
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probability distributions is calculated either on the basis of the so-called Master
equation (in the case of discrete states) or on the basis of the so-called Fokker-
Planck equation (in the case of continuous states). These equations give a com-
plete account of discrete or continuous changes in the probability distribution of
a vector of random variables on a discrete or continuous state space, re-
spectively, over time. Because this method clearly reveals the stochastic nature
of newly emerging structures, it is often more appropriate, yet also more dif-
ficult, than the use of deterministic differential equation.
(v) Statistical physics, finally, attempts to formulate probabilistic models for
the microscopic states of a system, building on the sophisticated statistical
methodology developed by Boltzmann (1872a, 1872b) and Gibbs (1960). This
methodology, however, is too complicated and too demanding of detailed, often
unavailable, information about a system's elements to be used widely in the
analysis of self-organization even in the natural sciences, let alone in the social
sciences.
It is a question of current research in economics whether some of these
methods can usefully be transferred to explain how today's complex economies,
with their distinct patterns of agglomerations, and how today's sophisticated
technologies of an increasingly systemic nature have evolved from primitive
tools and rudimentary trading relationships at the beginning of human civili-
zation. Arthur (1990) and Krugman (1994) have used some of these tools to
model the emergence of spatial agglomerations of economic activity;
Scheinkman and Woodford (1994) as well as Hall (1991) have sought to explain
Markov processes are stochastic processes in which the probabilities of transition
from the present state to other states at some future date are independent of the
states realized in the past; the transition probabilities are contingent only on the
present state. For further discussions and for applications of Markov processes see
Section C.II and Chapter E.65
the emergence of business cycles with reference to non-linearities, local inter-
action and a stochastic economic environment. Silverberg et al. (1988) present a
model of self-organization in the diffusion of innovations with transitions
between different technological trajectories, which is capable of accounting for
the often observed S-shaped form of the technology diffusion curve. Dosi and
Kaniovski (1994) assess how useful it might be to apply the method of gener-
alized urn schemes, of the kind first introduced by P. and T. Ehrenfest (1907),
in the analysis of technological and economic dynamics.
This line of research recognizes that for many purposes the deterministic
dynamics of neoclassical growth theory may well be a misleading and not just a
poor approximation of economic development in reality. These deterministic
dynamics, in the case of intertemporal utility maximization formalized in terms
of Hamiltonian functions, are directly transferred from the Newtonian theory of
dynamics in closed mechanical systems.
6
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global equilibrium to which the system inevitably converges. Once the laws of
motion and the initial conditions are known, the dynamics are fully predictable
and, what is more, reversible.
This criticism also applies to Romer's (1990) deterministic model of en-
dogenous technological change and similar models within the new growth
theory. Although these models assume positive external effects, and thus do
feature more than one steady-state growth equilibrium, they admit only the
suboptimal equilibrium to be within the reach of market forces on their own.
Unless the government intervenes, there is no source of random fluctuations to
endogenize the selection of an alternative self-reinforcing equilibrium as a
feasible outcome of the market process. The mechanical determinism of these
models is as well mirrored by their completely symmetric treatment of all newly
introduced varieties of capital inputs, which drive productivity.
In reality, by contrast, innovations usually seem to imply the breaking of
symmetries, in the technological, sectoral and geographical dimension. A par-
ticular technical solution often gains market share at the expense of competing
approaches, as in the case of PCs versus mainframe computers, electric engines
versus internal combustion technology, Diesel engines versus steam power on
ships, the supersonic aircraft versus wide-bodied passenger aircraft, etc. More-
over, history has seen many unexpected path-breaking technological break-
Samuelson (1983), one of the pioneers of formal dynamics in economics, is quite
explicit on this in the introduction to the enlarged edition of his Foundations of
Economic Analysis.66
through inventions that provided focal points around which subsequent com-
plementary innovations have tended to cluster (Sahal 1985; Perez 1985).
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Nor does the other prototype model of endogenous technological change, the
one due to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and based on a Poisson process of
randomly distributed quality increments for a well-defined product line, do full
justice to the essentially stochastic nature of innovation. Obviously, this model
cannot capture symmetry breakings in the heterogeneity of emerging tech-
nologies, because it is restricted to one technological dimension only. But
Aghion and Saint-Paul (1991) have shown how Markovian fluctuations can be
introduced into a vertical model of productivity growth, and have analyzed how
long-term growth changes in response to changes in the amplitude or frequency
of fluctuations. Cheng and Dinopoulos (1991) have used a similar model to
analyze how the interaction between stochastically distributed technological
breakthroughs and quality improvements may generate endogenous growth with
fluctuations. These Schumpeterian models of growth thus have the potential to
explain an asymmetrical distribution of economic activity over time.
A further source of randomness which may affect technological change at the
level of industries and entire economies are pecuniary and technological exter-
nal effects: Their relative magnitudes and ranges across industries and regions
are, at least to some extent, specific to each individual innovation, for they
depend on the kind of complementary technologies and institutions that may
facilitate their diffusion as well as on the particular sets of complementary and
substitutional goods and services already in existence at the particular point in
time of an innovation's occurrence.
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3 Moreover, the dynamic effects of network
externalities, provided they are significant, depend on the particular path taken
by the stochastic adoption process.
What is then the most fundamental reason why neoclassical deterministic
dynamics are likely to be misleading in the study of innovating economies? If it
is to be summarized in one word, it should be irreversibility; breaking the time
6
2 Rosenberg (1994) has emphasized that the emergence of technological guideposts,
focusing devices or paradigms can best be understood with reference to a path-
dependent process, in which randomness plays a crucial role.
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3 Sometimes it may not even be clear in advance whether a new piece of technical
knowledge will diffuse primarily as a technological external effect or as a kind of
pecuniary external effect. For example, a firm may have developed a new spe-
cialized machine tool for in-house use and may have decided to keep it secret to
hold on to its productivity advantage vis-a-vis competitors. In this case, a com-
petitor's learning about the new machine tool would be considered a technological
external effect. Or the firm may come to think that it would be cheaper to buy the
machine tool from a specialist supplier to whom it may therefore license the in-
novation, granting the right to cover fix costs from sales to competitors. In this case,
competitors would benefit from pecuniary external effects.67
symmetry, implied by deterministic dynamics, is one of the characteristic
features of innovation and technological change. To be sure, the creation of new
technical knowledge, which seems to be a driving force of economic growth, is
an irreversible process. But this requires to adopt a probabilistic, instead of a
deterministic model of dynamics. In particular, any empirical test of hysteresis,
a phenomenon related to irreversibility, must be based on a probabilistic
methodology that encompasses hysteresis, rather than on a deterministic model
that would exclude hysteresis a priori.
Much of the empirical work reported below is concerned with the question
whether it matters for aggregate industrial dynamics that innovation is a fun-
damentally stochastic phenomenon from a microeconomic point of view. The
following two subsections will discuss some of the mathematical tools which
can be used in modelling the complex dynamics in economies characterized by
stochastic technological innovation and change. This discussion, accompanied
by illustrative computer simulations, will prepare the ground for the subsequent
empirical work by illustrating how certain features of stochastic processes gen-
erate characteristic patterns in the data.
II. The Master Equation Approach to Specialization in
Small Open Economies
The transitional dynamics of multisectoral growth and specialization are already
quite difficult to analyze in the context of deterministic models. A recent paper
of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) demonstrates that new analytical tech-
niques are needed to understand other than the most basic versions of such
models. Yet, even more involved is the formal analysis of multisectoral growth
and specialization in essentially stochastic models. Durlauf (1993) provides a
fairly general example of a multisectoral stochastic model, which yields non-
ergodic growth.
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4 This model is appropriately formalized in terms of random
fields methodology, a new branch of probability theory which deals with
stochastic processes in more than one dimension. Multi-dimensionality of the
stochastic analysis is essential to multisectoral models of economic growth,
where interaction between individual elements of the system may take place
across industries as well as across time.
The aim of this section is more modest. The following discussion of sto-
chastic models of specialization in open economies will be restricted to the case
For a definition of non-ergodicity, see Section E.I.68
of two sectors. This can be modelled as a one-dimensional stochastic process in
time, because under the assumption of full employment the relative shares of the
two sectors in the total resources of the model economy require one state vari-
able only. The simplest way to illustrate some of the basic implications of
national external effects for the dynamics of specialization is within a stylized
model of a small open Ricardian economy with labour as the only factor of pro-
duction, where a comparative advantage is due to higher labour productivity in
one of the two sectors and where increasing returns to scale take the.form of a
positive externality for all firms in the respective sector. Reallocation of labour
between sectors can be characterized as a stochastic recontracting process on
perfectly competitive labour markets (Arthur 1988).
Suppose two new technologies are being introduced, replacing an older tech-
nology used in the small open economy, which has been completely specialized
in that one old technology, as is typical for Ricardian economies with only one
factor of production. Subsequently the one industry of that economy separates
into two, with each branch specializing in the production of only one of the two
new differentiated products, which are assumed to sell both at the same constant
price in world markets. Each entrepreneur makes an initial random choice for
one of the two technologies. But workers, who make only individual and unco-
ordinated decisions, frequently change jobs and decide anew with which tech-
nology to work. Let JpA8 denote the probability of transitions from technology A
to technology B, and pBA the probability of transitions from technology B to
technology A.
Assume initially workers are on average indifferent between the two tech-
nologies, so that in each event of a job change both technologies are chosen with
probability p^ = pBA = 1/2 . The result of workers' never-ending recon-
tracting is that the share of workers in each of the two technologies moves up
and down in the form of a Markov random walk
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5 with reflecting barriers. Re-
flecting barriers are, of course, the direct consequence of the limited size of the
economy's labour force: when all workers are in one sector, intersectoral tran-
sitions can only be in one direction, namely from the full sector into the
abandoned sector. Four different cases illustrate how comparative advantages
and increasing returns to scale in the form of positive external effects may shape
the dynamics of such a stochastic process:
A Markov random walk is a well-known type of a stochastic process in discrete
(event or historical) time in which the probabilities of transition of the state variable
(here the share of workers in technology A) from any present state to any other state
are not only independent of the past (which defines a general Markov process) but
also independent of the present state. When the Markov random walk takes place
over a discrete state space, as it does here, it is also called a Markov chain.69
(i) Identical productivities. First, assume labour productivity to be exogenous
and the same in both constant-returns-to-scale technologies. Assuming that job
switches occur strictly sequentially, one at a time, and that workers' individual
transition rates are homogeneous, the probability P(n,t + 1) of having a certain
number n of workers involved with technology A at time t + 1, which stands
here for event time rather than historical time, is defined as:
[16] P{n,t + l) = P{n,t)(l-PAB{n)-pBA{n))
+ P{n -1, t)pBA {n -1) + P{n +1, t)PAB(n +1)
l,t)+0.5P{n-l,t).
The evolution of this probability is described by the Master equation of
motion
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6 taking into account the lower boundary at n = 0 and the upper bound-
ary at n = 100 , set by the fixed size of the small country's labour force:
= 0.5 P{n +1, t) - 0.5 P(n, t) + 0.5 P{n -1, t) - 0.5 P(n, t)
Y n<n<n
'^ = 0.5 Pin +1,0 - 0.5 P(n, t)
dP<<n'
t>} = 0.5 P(n -1, t) - 0.5 P(h, t).
Approximating the state variable n to a continuous variable would lead to the
one-dimensional Fokker-Planck diffusion equation, used extensively in the
natural sciences. Both of these equations have the property of finally developing
into a long-run stationary probability distribution, irrespective of the initial al-
location of workers across industries (Weidlich and Haag 1983: 9). This dis-
tribution can be calculated by setting the Master equation equal to zero and
solving for P(n), given the transition probabilities. The Markov random walk
The basic assumptions that justify the use of the Master equation to account for
changes in the common probability distribution of a vector of random variables,
defined on a discrete state space over time, are that workers' transition rates are
homogeneous, depend on the current state of the economy, but not on its history,
and that there is only one event at any one time. For further details see Woeckener
(1992).70
with reflecting barriers, considered here, will result in equal stationary prob-
ability of all possible allocations of workers, whatever the initial choices of
entrepreneurs. This is easily seen to be the only feasible solution to the station-
ary Master equation:
[18]
 dpM=0 ^ p(n + l)+P(n-l) = 2P(n) V n<n<n
dt
with the boundary conditions
0.5 Pin +1) - 0.5 Pin) = 0 = 0.5 P(n -1) - 0.5 P(n)
subject to the normalization condition X/tP(n) = l.
(ii) Comparative advantage. If workers are more productive in technology B,
giving the country a comparative advantage in that industry, so that sector Z?'s
firms therefore pay higher wages, this can be modelled by making the probabil-
ity of transitions from A to B higher than that of transitions from B to A. As a
result, the long-run stationary probability distribution of the share of workers in
technology A will be highly skewed towards a low long-run share of workers in
technology A. Assuming p^ = 0.6 and pBA = 0.4, the Master equation reads:
[19] ^khll = 0.6P(n +1,0 - Q.6P(n, t) + 0AP(n -l,t)- 0AP(n, t) dt
V n<n<n
and at the boundaries
dP(n,t)
dt = 0.6P(n + l,t)-0APin,t)
dt
Setting these equations equal to zero, one can recursively express the station-
ary probabilities of all states in terms of the stationary probability of one of the




In the simple case considered here, where transition probabilities are equal
for all states, this formula simplifies to:
[21] P(n) = P(n) (PBA/PAB)
11 ,
which can be solved explicitly using XHP(«) = 1. The stationary probability is
distributed according to an exponentially decreasing function of n. A few
selected values are P(0) = 1/3, P(5) = 0.0439 and P(10) = 0.0058, while
P(100) is virtually, yet not quite equal to zero.
(Hi) Increasing returns to scale. What cases (/) and (ii) have in common is
that the transition probabilities are equal for all states. Thus, there is no real
need to evaluate the process in terms of the Master equation to understand the
main trend of convergence to the long-run stationary distribution. A standard
analysis in terms of mean values of the stochastic Markov process would suffice.
Mean value analysis, however, ceases to be sufficient when increasing returns to
scale in the form of positive external effects are introduced into the model.
Firms are unable to internalize the externality, thus remain in perfect com-
petition with each other and pay wages equal to average productivity in their in-
dustry. Average productivity and wages in each industry are then a positive
function of industry size, so that the probability of choosing a job in a particular
industry positively depends on the number of workers already involved with the
corresponding technology. This clearly is a case of positive feedback.
To illustrate the case of positive externalities in both technologies, assume
that the (JV = 100) workers in a small open economy have the following prob-
abilities of transition:
[22]
From the Master equation follows that the stationary probabilities must obey:
[23] (1.5 - In / N)P(n +1) + (-0.5 + In / N)P(n -1) = P(n)
with the boundary conditions72
Assuming that there are positive probabilities for both n and n being
greater than zero, it is straightforward to argue recursively that all other states
of incomplete specialization must have zero probability: The only feasible long-
term stationary distributions are those where all states, except the two end states
of complete specialization, -have zero probability. Since the system is entirely
symmetrical when it starts from n = 50, there is no reason to believe that the
stationary probabilities are anything but
P(n) = P(n) = 0.5.
Technically speaking, there are absorbing barriers at n = 25 and at n = 75
due to the force of the increasing returns, assumed to be of equal strength in
both technologies. Once the process of specialization has moved beyond one of
these absorbing barriers, it is impossible that whatever technology is then
dominant fails to attract all workers in the small economy. This can be recog-
nized in the graphical representation of the switching function p{n) on the
domain of n, depicted in Figure 2. Probability piles up in the end states because
there is zero probability of exit from either of these.
Figure 2 — Workers' Switching Function in a Small Open Economy: The
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Note: The horizontal axis shows the share of workers in technology A, the
vertical axis the probability of the next switch being from Bio A.73
If, however, the strength of the increasing returns in the form of positive ex-
ternal effects was not so rapidly increasing, there would not have to be ab-
sorbing barriers. Consider, as an example, the Markov process with transition
probabilities





PAB{n) = 0.9 - 0.8 / (1 +
 25U("
/N)
The switching function is depicted in Figure 3. This function has a positive
probability of exit from every state. While there is again a pile-up of probability
at the end states, the economy will never be irreversibly locked into any of these,
it will rather from time to time make sojourns in both states of complete
specialization. One can therefore aptly speak of punctuated equilibria. A snap-
shot of the evolving probability distribution after 100 switches is given in
Figure 4, which graphs a non-parametric density estimate based on data from a
computer simulation.
The existence of punctuated equilibria need not, however, imply that the end
states have the highest probability in the long term. The likeliest states may well
be ones where the economy is incompletely specialized. As an example,
Figure 5 has the switching function for a process where the probability of
switching to technology A first increases, as A wins the larger share of the econ-
omy's resources, but then decreases, as the economy gets too congested with
firms using technology A. An economic reason for such a phenomenon might be
that workers are not all homogeneous and that some workers do not have the
Figure 3 — Workers' Switching Function in a Small Open Economy: The
Case of Bounded Positive Externalities in Both Technologies
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Note: The horizontal axis depicts the shares of workers in technology A, the
vertical axis the probabilities of the next switch being from B to A.74
Figure 4 — The Probability Distribution of Workers' Shares in Technology A
in a Small Open Economy: The Case of Bounded Positive Ex-





Note: Non-parametric density estimate (using a Gaussian kernel with window
width 0.05) of a computer simulation with 1,000 runs, each beginning with
50 per cent of workers in either technology. The shares of workers in technology








Workers' Switching Function in a Small Open Economy: The
Case of Bounded Positive Externalities and Congestion in Both
Technologies
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Note: The horizontal axis depicts the shares of workers in technology A, the




The Probability Distribution of Workers' Shares in Technology A
in a Small Open Economy: The Case of Bounded Positive Ex-
ternalities and Congestion in Both Technologies after 500
Switches
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Note: Non-parametric density estimate (using a Gaussian kernel with window
width 0.05) of a computer simulation with 1,000 runs, each beginning with
50 per cent of workers in either technology. The shares of workers in technology
A are plotted on the horizontal axis.
appropriate skills to work with technology A. The probability of further job
switches from B to A would therefore decline, once all workers with flexible
skills are already employed with technology A. The same would hold for tech-
nology B if there was congestion, too. A snapshot, again based on computer
simulation, of the probability distribution after 500 switches is given in
Figure 6; notice that the two modi of the distribution are not at the extremes of
complete specialization in either technology.
(iv) Increasing returns versus comparative advantage. As a final case, con-
sider a small open economy with increasing returns in the form of positive ex-
ternalities in technology A and a comparative advantage in technology B. In
particular, assume transition probabilities are






The Master equation reads
Again, the long-run stationary probabilities of all states can be expressed in
terms of the probability of the lower end state according to:
[27,
subject to the normalization condition £nP(n) = l. The solution is an extreme
form of a bimodal distribution, where the modi are at the end states of complete
specialization. Their stationary probabilities are
P(0) = 0.1087 and P{\00) = 0.6209,
while the stationary probabilities of almost all states in between are virtually, yet
not quite equal to zero. Thus, the economy is almost certain to develop a very
high degree of specialization in either technology, and much more likely to be
specialized in technology A, where it exploits increasing returns to scale, than
in technology B, where it has a comparative advantage. Yet in either case, the
economy may still have transitions from complete specialization in one tech-




The characteristic feature of this kind of recontracting process with punc-
tuated equilibria is that the likely allocation of labour may depend for a long
time on the initial (perhaps arbitrary) share of workers in technology A. If that
share was small, the positive external effects would be weak and wages lower
than in industry B so that workers would be more likely to move there. If the
initial share of A exceeded a critical level, the positive external effects would
already be sufficiently strong to entice more workers into technology A, re-
' If the time horizon is extended to infinity, such radical transitions will certainly
happen at some points in time. Recall that one may therefore aptly speak of punc-
tuated equilibria.77
inforcing its productivity and wage lead. Because the economy remains almost
completely specialized in one technology for long periods of time, the dynamics
of specialization may now look to a temporary observer like a Markov chain
with absorbing barriers. But, of course, unless complete specialization in one
technology is fully absorbing, there always remains the possibility of a transition
to the other extreme, however unlikely it may be.
The assumption made about the evolution of transition probabilities in cases
(Hi) and (iv) prevent these processes from being adequately understood by
making reference to the theory of ordinary stochastic processes. A fundamental
characteristic of these cases is the asymmetric frequency distribution of fluc-
tuations around the global mean of the state variable before and after the point
of bifurcation. These fluctuations happen frequently before, and only rarely after
this point. For the time-dependent as well as for the stationary solution of these
processes, use of the Master equation in discrete (event) time is therefore indis-
pensable.
Similar stochastic processes with hysteresis can as well arise in open econ-
omy models other than the simple Ricardian one, although in more complex
models of the Heckscher-Ohlin variety rarely with the result of (almost) com-
plete specialization. In any case, to rationalize the hypothesis of technological
accumulation, based on historical leads and lags, in economic terms, the as-
sumptions of the standard neoclassical model of perfectly competitive markets
and constant returns to scale production technologies have to be altered in some
way that would affect identical countries asymmetrically. As an important
example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) derive a hysteretic variant of their
model of dynamic comparative advantages by simply assuming that knowledge
spill-overs from R&D are only national in reach. The unintended by-product of
private R&D investments then contributes to the national stock of public tech-
nical knowledge, thereby enhancing productivity in the R&D of national firms
relative to foreign competitors in the same sector.
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But other explanations for hysteresis might also be relevant. So for instance the
network externalities stemming from large distribution and service networks in
international markets (Katz and Shapiro 1985).78
III. The Approach of Generalized Urn Schemes
to Specialization in a Two-Country Model
While the small country case, in which the process of specialization is bounded
by the scarcity of factors of production, can be suitably modelled as a re-con-
tracting process, using the Master equation approach, this does not hold for the
case of a large open economy. In this case, the resources of the large country are
less likely to place the binding constraint on the growth of any individual
specialized industry whose share in the total economy remains small. Instead,
the process of a country's specialization in an emerging industry, whose speed
and sustainability largely depend on the elasticity of effective demand, is likely
to be bounded by the limited size of world markets for the specialized good. It is
for this reason that a modelling approach within the framework of generalized
urn schemes seems more appropriate.
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The difference between this and the Master equation approach is simple, yet
important: While the Master equation models transitions which remain of con-
stant magnitude relative to market size, generalized urn schemes have transi-
tions which shrink monotonically in proportion to market size. As a con-
sequence, systems described by the Master equation have convergence in distri-
bution, while generalized urn schemes exhibit the stronger form of convergence
to one of possibly several stable fixed points of the process.
1. Bounded Learning by Doing
Suppose there are two large open economies each of which has a perfectly com-
petitive machine tool industry. These competing industries begin at about the
same time with the introduction of some newly invented product where pro-
ductivity is subject to positive external effects from learning by doing. Assume
that both countries have the same potential of learning by doing and that prices
equal marginal costs in each industry, but that marginal costs decline as learn-
ing by doing accumulates. Although the production function may be identical in
the two countries, marginal costs may differ at any given point in time due to
differential learning experiences. The potential customers, distributed uniformly
on a straight line between the two countries, are highly price sensitive and take
transport costs into account, which are a linear function of distance from the re-
spective producer.
6
9 Applications of such schemes to economic allocation processes are described in
Arthur (1988), and more extensively in Dosi and Kaniovski (1994).79
What determines the shape of this allocation process is the sequence of
customers' orders which arrive at random from the different locations between
the two countries, where the producers are located. At any point in time, the
next purchase will pick the offer from country A if the excess transport costs of
this offer (versus country 5's offer) are lower than the excess price of country
B's offer over country A's offer, and vice versa. Assume that purchases are
strictly sequential, i.e. never simultaneous.
As in the dynamics of specialization in a small country, there may be situ-
ations where the allocation process leads to an equal share of the market
between the two countries' industries and others where the process leads to a
monopoly of one country. However, because in general the probability that the
next customer will buy from a particular country does not only depend on the
current share of that country in the world market but also on the current total
size of the expanding world market for the newly introduced good, these allo-
cation processes do not have the property that probabilities of transitions are
only dependent on the current relative market shares of the countries. Because
the transition probabilities, instead, also depend on the absolute numbers of
adoptions from each country, these processes are more difficult to analyze for-
mally than the recontracting processes examined above.
Nevertheless, Arthur et al. (1983), Arthur and Ermoliev (1986) and Arthur
(1989) have been able to establish a number of general theorems, which cover a
large number of cases. These theorems assert that the possibility of monopoly of
one country's industry depends on the shape of the relevant adoption function
which maps vectors of adoption shares of the two countries' products JC onto the
space of probabilities p, with which the products will be adopted when the next
customer makes his choice. In this representation there may be certain stable
attractors, or fixed points, to one of which market shares and choice prob-
abilities would converge. The main theorems are as follows (Arthur 1989: 125):
THEOREM 1: "An adoption process is non-ergodic and non-predictable if and
only if its adoption function p possesses multiple stable fixed points." Non-
ergodicity means here that the process converges to one of several asymptotic
adoption shares.
THEOREM 2: "An adoption process converges with probability one to the
dominance of a single supply country if and only if its adoption function p
possesses stable fixed points only where x is a unit vector."
THEOREM 3: In a general model, where the next customer's payoff to buying
from country A, after country A's industry has already produced and sold a
units, is given by n(a) = u(A) + g(a), an additive function of random transport
costs u(A) and the product price g(oi), the possibility of country monopoly
depends on the shape of the monotonically increasing price-saving function80
g(a). Where this Junction increases without upper bound, the process has stable
limit points only at simplex vertices, with probability one. Where this function is
bounded, because the potential for price saving becomes exhausted, the
monopoly of a single country may not occur.
To prove these theorems is not easy when p is a function of shares as well as
market size, which grows over time. Since this is the case here, one first has to
show that the adoption function converges to a limiting function p. In the
present example of bounded learning by doing the limiting function is one
where both countries' goods are chosen with probability 1/2. This is because
the productivity lead a country may have gained through faster learning by
doing will inevitably be eroded, when the learning in the leading country levels
off and the other country catches up. Hence the limiting function has only one
stable fixed point, namely at equal market shares for both countries; and a stable
asymmetric adoption pattern (a permanent bifurcation in terms of market
shares) could only occur if the market was saturated before the upper bound of
learning by doing was reached in both countries. So, unless the system has a
mechanism to exit one country, if it does not sell a certain minimum share of
products over a specified period of time, the termination of the adoption process,
i.e. the collapse of the market, appears to be the only mechanism capable to
prevent convergence to equal world market shares of the two countries.
7
0
The evolution of the probability distribution of a country's market share can
be illustrated be means of computer simulations for particular cases. Suppose
that the probability that the next purchase will be from country A is a function
of the number of previous sales from country A as well as of the number of
previous sales from the competing country B:
[28] P(a,t) = ^
where a is the number of previous purchases from country A, t is the total
number of previous purchases from both countries, the current size of the world
market. For various given values of t, this adoption function is represented in
Figure 7. These graphs clearly show that the market share a country must have
to raise the likelihood (above the even odds) of winning the next purchase is
larger, the larger the total market has already grown.
Computer simulations, selected results of which are displayed in Figure 8,
reveal that the probability distribution of adoption shares of the two countries
does not converge monotonically to its long-term equilibrium: It begins as an
7
0 As an aside, the situation of market collapse would, in fact, be quite relevant in the
case of product cycles.81
Figure 7 — The Adoption Function for Two Large Countries' Products in the
World Market: The Case of Bounded Learning by Doing
Panel a: total market size t = 50
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Note: The vertical axis plots the probability that the next adoption will benefit
exporters in country A as a function of the number of previous adoptions of
products from that country; this number is plotted on the horizontal axis.82
Figure 8 — Evolution of the Probability Distribution for Adoption Shares of
Two Large Countries' Products in the World Market: The Case of
Bounded Learning by Doing
After 50 adoptions After 65 adoptions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
After 80 adoptions After 90 adoptions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.083
Figure 8 continued
After 100 adoptions After 120 adoptions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
After 200 adoptions After 500 adoptions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Note: The graphs are non-parametric density estimates (using a Gaussian kernel with
window width 0.05) of computer simulations with at least 1,000 runs each. The hori-
zontal axis stands for adoption shares of products from country A.unimodal symmetrical distribution, evolves into a bimodal distribution after
about 60 adoptions, and then into a trimodal distribution after about 90
adoptions. The third, central modus subsequently continues to grow, to attract a
larger and larger share of the distribution's total probability mass, while the two
marginal modi move towards the end states of the allocation domain, and shrink
into insignificance. Finally, the distribution regains a unimodal shape, and then
goes on to converge in probability to the point where all probability mass is
concentrated at the state of equal market shares for both countries' industries.
In reality, of course, this process would in many cases be truncated, because
markets for any particular good rarely grow without bound. But then, if the
market collapses at a time when the probability distribution has reached its bi-
modal or trimodal stage, one country's industry may indeed have come to
dominate the market at the other country's expense in an actual realization of
the adoption process. This temporary asymmetry of adoption realizations would
be due to the more rapid learning by doing which the winning country's in-
dustry would have accidentally been able to exploit, benefiting from a com-
paratively larger share of the early adoptions (by lead customers).
On the other hand, the market might not collapse, but might stabilize at a
certain size despite saturation if there is demand for product replacements. The
continuing process could then be modelled as a recontracting process, in which
positive feedback and path-dependence may or may not be important. A reason
for continued positive externalities in product adoption might be conformity ef-
fects as in the case of fashionable product design, or quality improvements in-
corporating learning-by-using feedbacks from customers. The country which
has won the larger share at the time of market emergence may thus be able to
hold on to self-sustaining market dominance even as market growth levels off.
Endogenous quality improvements have, at least theoretically, the potential of
providing unbounded reinforcement in the adoption process.
2. Unbounded Positive Feedbacks
Unbounded positive feedbacks, which can help to sustain productivity gains
from bounded learning by doing in a particular country, may as well originate
from the production side. For example, a country could raise the quality of its
products by introducing more differentiated and specialized non-traded in-
puts,
7
1 which would become a profitable activity as the volume of production in
This would not only hold in the case of strictly non-traded inputs, but also when in-
puts are costly to trade, for example, because they require extensive specialized
service facilities or other fixed set-up costs.85
Figure 9 — The Adoption Function for Two Large Countries' Products in the
World Market: The Case of Unbounded Learning by Doing
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Note: The vertical axis plots the probability that the next adoption will benefit
exporters in country A as a function of the number of previous adoptions of
products from that country; this number is plotted on the horizontal axis.86
the country grows. Such a process would be akin to endogenous growth due to
monopolistic competition and increasing specialization in capital goods, as
modelled by Romer (1987) as well as by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b). An-
other way to sustain productivity gains from bounded learning by doing might
be to transfer these gains, at least partly, to other product lines, or to the next
generation of products, a possibility examined in recent theoretical work by
Stokey (1988) and Young (1991).
The case of unbounded positive feedbacks is relatively simple to analyze with
reference to an adoption function, like that depicted in Figure 9, which con-
verges to a function with stable fixed points at the end states of monopoly of
either country. This is confirmed by computer simulations, in which the prob-
ability of purchase from country A is assumed to evolve according to (where a
is again the number of previous purchases from country A, and t the total
number of purchases from both countries):
f 1 if a>f/2+25
[29] /?(a,r) = jl/2(0.02(a)-0.02(f-a) + l) if f/2-25<a<f/2 + 25
[ 0 if a<t/2-25.
Figure 10 reveals that the evolution of the probability distribution of adoption
shares has basically three stages: it is first unimodal, then trimodal, and finally
bimodal. In the final stage, the two modi grow relative to the rest of the distri-
bution, and move towards the end states on the domain. It is interesting to note
that the trend towards the concentration of an entire industry in one country,
which results from unbounded learning by doing in large countries, may render
the observable dynamics of increasing industrial specialization in that country
quite similar to the situation in a small country, where positive externalities may
lead to the absorption of all resources in one industry.
As a caveat, these results suggest that unless learning by doing is unbounded,
for one reason or another, the assumption of stationary transition probabilities,
which is important in the subsequent empirical work, may be a less defensible
assumption in the case of large countries than in small countries.
To summarize, the benchmark model of dynamic comparative advantage as-
sumes both that the privately appropriable part of R&D output is internationally
tradeable and that knowledge spill-overs are not impeded by international bor-
ders. Then, disregarding other institutional factors, the international allocation
of R&D activities is — at least in principle — not tied to the location of the
users of R&D output. Moreover, in the absence of adjustment and transaction
costs, patterns of specialization in technology as well as in actual production
would be quite mobile over time and independent of each other as they respond
to changes in the relative factor endowments of countries. Since the comparative87
Figure 10 — The Evolution of the Probability Distribution for Adoption Shares
of Two Large Countries' Products in the World Market: The Case
of Unbounded Learning by Doing
After 100 adoptions After 150 adoptions
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After 200 adoptions
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After 500 adoptions
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Note: The graphs are non-parametric density estimates (using a Gaussian kernel with
window width 0.05) of computer simulations with at least 1,000 runs each. The hori-
zontal axis stands for adoption shares of products from country A.advantages for production and for R&D in an industry would be distinct and
might be located in different countries, not even the specialization patterns of
those technologies which are confined to single industries would need to evolve
along the same trends as the corresponding industries.
By contrast, the case for historical events as the determinants of sectoral
patterns of technological specialization, based on the theory of technological ac-
cumulation, would imply that patterns of specialization in technology as well as
in production are much less mobile, especially when a country's industrial
structure is already heavily skewed towards certain industries.
7
2 If knowledge
spill-overs from R&D were only national in reach, hysteresis could be decisive
in the sense that temporary events, like price shocks or industrial and tech-
nology policies, can have lasting effects on a country's pattern of technological
specialization and trade. Such lasting effects might be recognizable through
high persistence of specialization patterns in production and technology despite
changes in the relative factor abundance of countries. Persistence would be ex-
pected to be particularly pronounced in technological specialization where the
positive external effects in the form of knowledge spill-overs from R&D would
have their most direct and strongest impact. But in general, a close relationship
would be expected between the dynamics of countries' specialization in certain
technologies and in the production in those industries whose products make in-
tensive use of these technologies.
7
2 Although related, the theory of technological accumulation is not simply a re-
vamping of earlier technology gap theories. Whereas the latter assumed a single
country to be the technological leader in all sectors, and all other countries more or
less behind, technological accumulation theory allows for the possibility that tech-
nological leads are spread across different countries rather than being all con-
centrated in one.89
... the effect of the division of labour, both in mechanical
and in mental operations, is, that it enables us to purchase
and apply to each process precisely the quantity of skill
and knowledge which is required for it: we avoid em-
ploying any part of the time of a man who can get eight or
ten shillings a day by his skill in tempering needles, in
turning a wheel, which can be done for sixpence a day;
and we equally avoid the loss arising from the employ-
ment of an accomplished mathematician in performing
the lowest processes of arithmetic.
— Charles Babbage (1835: 201)
D. Comparative Advantage for Research and Devel-
opment across Industries in OECD Countries
I. The Hypothesis of Comparative Advantage for Research
and Development
Is the notion of comparative advantage relevant for the allocation of R&D
activities across countries and across industries? This question, although of
great importance for the desirability and design of industrial and technology
policies, seems to have received little attention in the scholarly literature so far.
As a general theoretical explanation for specialization in production and trade,
the concept of comparative advantage is sometimes used as a catch-all for a
variety of sources like different productivity levels due to different technologies
(the case of Ricardo 1817), differences in factor endowments (the basis of
Heckscher-Ohlin theory), or even differences in organizational conventions
between countries as recently suggested by Aoki (1993).
7
3 To better understand
the pros and cons of selective industrial and technology policies, it will be im-
portant to empirically discriminate between the different potential sources of
comparative advantage. The present chapter explores whether factor proportions
are empirically relevant as a potential source of comparative advantage in R&D
activities.
Aoki (1993) argues that comparative advantage for innovative activities in different
kinds of technological environments can arise endogenously as differentiated modes
(i.e. organizational conventions) of information processing in firms and R&D
laboratories emerge from the evolutionary interaction of managers within their re-
spective systems. In his analysis the relative magnitudes of systemic risk at the
macrolevel and of idiosyncratic risk at the microlevel of a given technological en-
vironment determine which mode of information processing is more efficient.90
Recent advances in the theory of economic growth, surveyed in Chapter B,
have emphasized the importance of the creation and adoption of new technical
knowledge in determining the distribution of industrial production across inter-
dependent economies and in raising productivity. Knowledge capital created by
industrial research and development and the capacity to absorb and apply new
technical knowledge in the production sphere are thought to be additional
factors in determining countries' production specialization across industries.
This thinking rests on the assumption that industries can be distinguished by the
intensity with which they rely on innovation and on the adoption of new tech-
nology. Only if industries can be consistently classified into high-, medium- and
low-technology industries, can countries' differential innovative abilities con-
stitute an important source of comparative advantage for high-tech versus low-
tech industries.
7
4 This kind of comparative advantage is a central theme of
much recent theoretical work on endogenous technological change in open
economies, like that of Grossman and Helpman (1991), but also of earlier
empirical work on the technology factor in international trade, like that of Dosi
et al. (1990).
A considerable part of R&D outputs probably is industry-specific. So, too, are
some of the inputs, like highly specialized scientists, at least in the short run.
But apart from this, R&D may be industry-specific in the deeper sense that it is
not an economically homogeneous activity across industries in which any kind
of R&D output can be generated efficiently by much the same combination of
inputs: teams of scientists, engineers and technical support staff in equal pro-
portions and all equipped with a capital stock of approximately equal value per
employee, consisting of laboratories with all the necessary instrumentation. In-
stead, R&D activities in different industries seem to have different relative
resource requirements. Consequently, not only the overall level of R&D ac-
tivities in any particular country, but also the relative distribution of a country's
R&D activities across different industries may reflect comparative advantages




A widely used measure is R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of business enterprise
R&D expenditure either to sales or to value added. On this criterion aerospace
(aircrafts), computers, electronics, pharmaceuticals (drugs and medicines), pro-
fessional instruments and electrical machinery are usually classified as high-tech-
nology industries. See, for instance, OECD (1992a: 125).
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5 In an early empirical analysis of factor endowments and international innovation
patterns Davidson (1979) concludes that countries tend to concentrate their inno-
vative activities in those industries whose production uses intensively their most
expensive factors. This, he argues, might lead to trade patterns conflicting with
Heckscher-Ohlin theory. But he does not consider the possibility — to be examined
here — that differential factor costs in the R&D of different industries can also be91
Of course, the possibility that comparative advantages for production and for
R&D in one and the same industry are economically and geographically distinct
can only arise if the output of R&D is internationally tradeable, at least to some
extent. If it were not, then patterns of specialization in R&D would be fully
determined by countries' patterns of specialization in the production of tan-
gibles, thus ultimately by the comparative advantages for producing the differ-
ent manufacturing products. But in reality, the generation and application of
new technical knowledge need not always happen in the same place. Within
firms, R&D is often concentrated in centralized laboratories, whereas the ap-
plication of new technical knowledge takes place in all plants wherever they
may be located. The pervasive activities of multinational enterprises — the
prototype of a capitalist institution geared towards the transfer of technology
across national borders — testify that profitable opportunities for international
trade in technical knowledge exist and are indeed exploited, although perhaps
not fully. Moreover, there is evidence of a considerable and increasing inter-
national trade in patents and licences for new technology even between un-
related firms in the OECD countries (Vickery 1986).
This raises the question whether one can empirically identify the sources of
comparative advantage for the R&D activities in individual industries that are
distinct from the country-specific determinants of the related manufacturing
activities. Looking at individual industries, what actually determines the allo-
cation of their R&D activities across countries? To the extent that part of the
industry-specific technical knowledge is not tradeable, or tradeable only at very
high transaction costs, R&D activities should be geographically tied to in-
dustrial production. But to the extent that tradeable technical knowledge is
generated, other factors may become important codeterminants of the inter-
national allocation of industry-specific R&D activities.
Countries with above-average endowments of university-educated scientists
and engineers, for instance, might have a comparative advantage in those R&D
activities which require the most intensive use of scientists and engineers and
relatively little use of technical and other supportive staff.
7
6 These countries
an important influence. To measure patterns of innovations in eight selected in-
dustries he relies on a (University of Sussex) data base of product and process inno-
vations that certain 'knowledgeable sources' (technology experts) deemed to be of
commercial and technical significance.
7
6 In the medium term, scientists and engineers — at least the majority of them — can
be viewed to be sufficiently mobile across technical fields so as not to be con-
strained to work in only one particular industry. For example, aircraft engineers can
do useful work also in other transport engineering, the knowledge of pharmacists
can be of use in general chemical or food research, and electrical engineers can
apply their skills just as well to computers or electrical machinery as to radio, tele-
vision and communications equipment. Also relevant in the medium term is the92
would then have a greater share of their total manufacturing R&D devoted to
the most human-capital-intensive R&D activities. Analogously, countries with a
relatively low percentage of university-educated engineers in the labour force
might specialize in R&D activities which are comparatively less demanding of
human capital, but more labour-intensive. Of course, if other factors were im-
portant codeterminants of comparative advantage in R&D, these would make
things more complicated. Nevertheless, any relevant factor which is and re-
mains characteristic of countries in the long run, could — at least in prin-
ciple— be identified in empirical cross-country studies. The preceding is taken
to be the factor endowments hypothesis of R&D in the present study.
The alternative hypothesis would be that patterns of specialization in R&D
are not directly determined by relative factor endowments, but instead are the
outcome of a unique historical process. Economic historians like Rosenberg
(1994), Arthur (1989) and David (1988a, 1988b) have argued that such proces-
ses are path-dependent, so that future patterns of specialization in R&D would
remain unpredictable even if the likely future movements of all relevant factor
endowments were known.
Any empirical study of these issues will have to cope with several theoretical
and methodological difficulties, including the question of exogeneity of factor
endowments with respect to specialization patterns, the Heckscher-Ohlin as-
sumptions of complete immobility of the relevant factors across borders and per-
fect mobility of factors within countries, and the difficulties of measuring
human capital endowments of countries and human capital requirements of
production.
The present value of the human capital endowments of the richest OECD
countries may well have surpassed the present value of their respective endow-
ments of physical capital. But much of this immense stock of human capital is
unusable in R&D. To measure the relevant portion of human capital in a prag-
matic way, this study simply takes the full-time equivalents of R&D scientists




It is a basic assumption of this study that many scientists and engineers are
not so specialized that they can be employed only in the R&D of one particular
industry. At the same time, it is assumed that scientists and engineers do not
mobility of students of science and engineering. Cohorts of students often con-
centrate their studies on those fields which are expected to offer the broadest choice
of job openings and the highest salaries.
These are 'scientists or engineers engaged in the conception or creation of new
knowledge, products, processes, methods and systems, including managers and
administrators engaged in the planning and management of the scientific and tech-
nical aspects of research work' (OECD 1981: 67).93
migrate in large numbers across international borders in search of higher in-
come opportunities. Although there is some evidence that scientists and engi-
neers are more mobile within the English-speaking industrial countries than
across countries with different languages, it remains realistic to assume that for
most countries people's cultural and social ties tend to be quite effective breaks
on the mobility of human capital.
7
8 The assumption of no international mobility
of human capital may therefore be a good approximation for the purposes of this
study.
Section D.II presents a preliminary exploration of some of the relevant data
on R&D activities in OECD countries which bear on the questions discussed
here. Section D.III, then, goes on to examine the relevant hypotheses more care-
fully within the framework of regression analyses. Section D.IV presents tests
for the impact of human capital endowments on countries' specialization in the
R&D of individual industries, and draws preliminary conclusions from this par-
ticular empirical approach.
II. The Distribution of R&D Activities across Industries in
OECD Countries
The present study looks at fourteen OECD member countries for which more or
less comparable data on R&D activities is available for the period from 1970 to
1989, albeit with quite a few deplorable data gaps.
7
9 These countries are
Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DK), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), West Germany (DEU), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), the
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom (UK)
and the United States (US). Combined they generated roughly 90 per cent of
total OECD exports throughout the period considered here. Panel a of Figure
Al in Appendix III shows countries' relative endowments with R&D scientists
and engineers.
Four subgroups of countries can be distinguished for the 1970s, with the
United States and Japan being the countries relatively (as well as absolutely)
7
8 It is noteworthy that recent empirical research of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) as
well as Sinn (1992) suggests that even the international mobility of financial capital
remains much lower than was once thought by many advocates of free exchange
rates and of the abolishment of capital controls.
The descriptive statistics of this section refer to data averaged over two ten-year
intervals, the 1970s and the 1980s, so that data gaps are hidden. See Appendix I for
a list of variables and observations included in this study.94
best endowed with R&D scientists and engineers, West Germany, the United
Kingdom and Australia being almost at a par in the second group, Sweden,
Norway, the Netherlands, France and Canada forming the third group, and Fin-
land, Belgium, Denmark and Italy having the smallest share of R&D scientists
and engineers in their respective total labour forces. Japan, after overtaking the
United States in the late 1970s, has improved its lead in the 1980s. For the other
countries, the figures for decades' average endowments with R&D scientists and
engineers indicate that Sweden and Norway have overtaken both Australia and
the United Kingdom, thus moving from sixth and seventh place, respectively, to
fourth and fifth place right behind West Germany. Australia has also been
overtaken by France and finds itself at about the same level as Canada which
has meanwhile surpassed the Netherlands. Among the laggards, Belgium seems
to have had the biggest relative improvement, overtaking Finland and almost
catching up to the level of the neighbouring Netherlands.
Panel b of Figure Al shows the average years of schooling of the adult
population in 1975 and 1985. Comparing this graph with the previous one
suggests that having a high level of formal schooling in the average may pro-
vide a fertile breeding ground for scientists and engineers, but that schooling
alone is apparently not the whole story in explaining why some countries carry
out relatively more industrial R&D than others. In fact, there may be a size
effect: the three countries best endowed with R&D scientists and engineers, the
United States, Japan and West Germany, are also the three biggest in the
group.
8
0 On the other hand, the economies of France and Italy, also rather big,
appear to be constrained by their comparatively low levels of educational
achievements in the adult population average.
8
1 Among the well-educated
Scandinavian countries and Canada, only Sweden and Norway seem to have
translated this advantage into a relative endowment with R&D scientists and
engineers comparable to that of the leading big countries.
Hence, this first look reveals something for everybody: For superficial sup-
port of the factor proportions version of comparative advantage one might point
to the United States and Italy, whose ranking in terms of average schooling co-
incides with that in terms of R&D scientist and engineers endowment and
8
0 A size effect may stem from economies of scale associated with the application of
new knowledge in production and from positive externalities in the form of knowl-
edge spill-overs as emphasized by Romer (1990), or from other kinds of com-
plementarities, like world class technical universities, public research institutions
and technology transfer centres, which are sometimes subsumed under the term
'technology infrastructure'. See Tassey (1992).
8
1 A scarce supply of skilled scientists and engineers can become a binding constraint
for an economy already at relatively low levels of innovative activity because these
are the people which are also needed in the planning and supervision of much of
modern manufacturing.95
which are two countries that are generally considered a technological leader and
a technological laggard, respectively.
8
2 Those who believe in economies of scale
and agglomeration in the creation and application of new knowledge can point
to the fact that the three recognized technology leaders, the United States, Japan
and West Germany, are not only relatively best endowed with R&D scientists
and engineers, but are also the three biggest economies. Those who believe in
country idiosyncrasies and path-dependency can point to the diverse Scandi-
navian experiences where Sweden seems to have caught up to the global R&D
leaders, whereas Finland and Denmark, although equally well educated, keep
on lagging in terms of their relative endowments with R&D scientists and engi-
neers, which may be indicative of their intensity of engaging in innovative
activities.
Clearly, the data, summarily described above, are too highly aggregated and
too small in number to really test any of the competing hypotheses mentioned,
but they do indicate that the resource which probably has the greatest im-
portance for the allocation of R&D activities — human capital embodied in
R&D scientists and engineers — is distributed rather unevenly across countries.
This picture already emerges from a small sample of some of the richest OECD
countries which are, at the same time, quite similar in so many other respects.
More pertinent information can be extracted from detailed data on the re-
sources devoted to R&D activities in individual industries. Table Al in Appen-
dix III lists average R&D intensities, defined here as the percentage of current
R&D expenditure to value added, in 17 manufacturing industries and 14 coun-
tries in the 1970s (panel a) and in the 1980s (panel b). Tables A2 and A3 list
the corresponding rankings across countries and across industries, respectively.
Table A2 indicates that those countries with a higher ranking in terms of total
manufacturing R&D intensity tend to have a higher ranking in individual in-
dustries as well. In the 1970s as well as in the 1980s, the US had the highest
ranking in terms of total manufacturing R&D intensity and Australia the lowest
of all sample countries. Most of the other countries (with intermediate rankings)
also kept their relative position over time. Among the few countries which did
change their ranking slightly are West Germany, moving from fifth to fourth
place, and Japan, moving from Seventh to sixth place. For some countries, the
rankings in terms of total manufacturing R&D intensity largely coincide with
their rankings in terms of relative endowments of R&D scientists and engineers,
but notably for Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden they do not. Japan
8
2 It is clear that a more rigorous statement on comparative advantages would have to
relate relative prices to relative factor endowments, rather than relative factor en-
dowments to market outcomes in terms of countries' relative technological strength.96
ranks much lower in terms of R&D intensity than in terms of relative endow-
ment with R&D scientists and engineers, the other three countries much higher.
Perhaps more revealing are the rankings of R&D intensity across industries
in Table A3: those industries with a higher (lower) ranking in terms of overall
R&D intensity for all countries combined tend to have a higher (lower) ranking
also in individual countries. This pattern seems to be remarkably stable for most
industries. Exceptions are shipbuilding and aircraft which have a very high
ranking in some countries and a very low ranking in others. Shipbuilding is the
second most R&D-intensive industry in Japan, but among the least R&D-in-
tensive industries in Australia, Finland, France and Norway. Aircraft is the
most R&D-intensive industry in France, West Germany, the US and others, but
among the least R&D-intensive industries in Finland and Japan. These dis-
crepancies suggest that shipbuilding and aircraft may be industries in which
R&D activities are highly concentrated on a world-wide scale and that the tech-
nologically lagging countries in these fields compete either with older tech-
nology or with technology licensed from the small group of technological
leaders. But in general, R&D intensity appears to be a property of industries
which is preserved across countries.
This overall picture is supported by the correlations between countries' R&D
intensities across industries (Table 2) and between industries' R&D intensities
across countries (Table 3). In the 1970s as well as in the 1980s, correlations of
R&D intensities across industries are remarkably high. For each country, the
correlations with overall R&D intensities, computed for all countries combined,
are actually positive and mostly close to unity. Only West Germany's R&D
intensities in the 1970s are negatively correlated with more than two other
countries. The correlations in Table 2 thus support the view that industries are
universally distinguishable by the relative intensity with which R&D activities
are pursued. Incidentally, industries with the highest relative R&D intensity as
defined here, such as aircraft; radio, television and communication equipment;
computers; and drugs and medicines, are among those classified as high-tech-
nology industries by the OECD (1992a: 125), on the basis of ratios between
R&D expenditure and production in the three periods 1972-1974, 1979-1981
and 1987-1989. Also the industries with the lowest relative R&D intensity in
Table Al, such as food, beverages, tobacco; fabricated metals; iron and steel;
and non-metallic mineral products, are consistently classified as low technology
by the OECD.
Looking at correlations between the R&D intensities of industries across
countries (Table 3), a similar picture emerges.
8
3 Except for non-ferrous metals
That the correlations in Table 3 appear weaker than those in Table 2 may be partly
due to the fact that there are fewer countries than industries in the sample.97
Table 2 — Bivariate Correlations between Countries' R&D Intensities across

















































































































































































































































in the 1970s, all correlations of individual industries with the total manufac-
turing R&D intensities of countries are positive. Also, most bivariate corre-
lations between individual industries are positive. The only industry which
stands out in both periods as an exception is radio, television and communi-
cation equipment where countries' R&D intensities are negatively correlated
with most other industries. Apparently, the countries making a particularly
strong R&D effort in this industry — relative to their value added in this in-
dustry — are not the countries most specialized in R&D generally. On the
whole, however, the correlations in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the R&D in-
tensity of country-indexed industries, that is to say the ratio of R&D activities to
value added in an industry as observed in a particular country, depends largely
on two things: which industry one is talking about and whether the country,
where the activities are located, has a comparative advantage in doing R&D.
The high aggregate R&D intensity of some countries does not seem to be
merely a statistical artefact concealing totally random patterns in individual in-
dustries. Instead, countries that specialize in innovative activity — doing R&D
with a comparatively higher intensity relative to their other economic activities
in manufacturing — tend to do so throughout all industries. This supports theTable 3 — Bivariate Correlations between Countries' R&D Intensities across Countries in the 1970s and 1980s
Food, beverages, tobacco (1)
Chemicals, excl. drugs and
medicines (2)
Drugs and medicines (3)
Rubber and plastics (4)
Non-metallic mineral products (5)
Iron and steel (6)
Non-ferrous metals (7)






radio, TV and communication
equip. (11)
Radio, TV and communication
equip. (12)
Shipbuilding and repair (13)
Motor vehicles (14)
Aircraft (15)














































































































































































































































































view that a comparative advantage in R&D is indeed a country characteristic
which some of them have and others do not.
But not all R&D activities are of the same kind — another fact which can be
exploited in assessing and testing the impact of factor endowments on the allo-
cation of R&D activities across countries. Hence, if countries' unequal relative
endowments with R&D scientists and engineers are suspected to be a source of
comparative advantage for R&D, this may be relevant not only for the aggregate
level of R&D compared with all other economic activity, but also for countries'
differential emphasis on R&D in different industries, provided that industries'
R&D can actually be distinguished by their intensity of using different factors of
production.
Focusing on human capital intensity, the ratios of R&D scientists and engi-
neers to other R&D personnel observed in different industries and countries are
given in Table A4. These ratios can be considered a first, rough indicator of
human capital intensity of R&D activities.
8
4 Rankings across countries are
shown in Table A5, rankings across industries in Table A6. These rankings do
mostly not coincide with those in terms of R&D intensity shown in Tables A3
and A4. For example, Australia and Japan whose ranking in terms of R&D in-
tensity is low and roughly average, respectively, have the highest rankings in
terms of R&D scientists and engineers per other R&D personnel in both
periods. Sweden, on the other hand, ranks high in terms of R&D intensity but
roughly average in terms of human capital intensity in R&D. Similarly, in-
dustries' rankings in terms of R&D intensity and human capital intensity in
R&D differ markedly.
8
5 Aircraft, for instance, the highest ranking industry in
Worries that this indicator might be misleading in the presence of important other
factors— physical capital for instance — may actually be unwarranted. Brockhoff
(1988) finds in regression analyses that the number of persons employed in R&D
can in fact serve as a rather good indicator of real R&D expenditure. These re-
gressions lend some support to one of the crucial assumptions of this study — that
non-human factors are of minor importance in R&D. Only on the basis of this
assumption, as well as on' the assumption of no factor intensity reversals, can in-
dustries' R&D activities be completely and transitively ordered according to their
human capital intensity alone, and the 'chain of comparative advantage' can be in-
voked. Each country will tend to export R&D services from the segment of in-
dustries, in which this country has a comparative advantage due to its relative en-
dowment with human capital, and import R&D services of other industries.
This is hardly surprising given the complex causality for industries' R&D intensity
discussed in the theoretical and empirical literature on industrial organization and
R&D. The main causal factors considered in this literature are expected market
size, technological opportunities stemming from favourable supply side conditions,
and the degree of appropriability of quasi-rents on innovations, which depends
partly on the system of intellectual property rights and the market structure of a
given industry. For a theoretical review and an empirical exploration into the
determinants of R&D intensity, see Pakes and Schankerman (1984).100
Table 4 — Bivariate Correlations between Countries' Average Ratios of R&D
Scientists and Engineers to Other R&D Personnel across Industries














































































































































































terms of R&D intensity in both periods ranks only sixteen in terms of human
capital intensity in R&D. Food, beverages and tobacco, on the other hand, with
the lowest ranking in terms of R&D intensity, has an average ranking in terms
of human capital intensity in R&D. There is some correspondence, however, in
the case of the metal industries, which have low rankings both in terms of R&D
intensity and in terms of human capital intensity in R&D, as well as in the
microelectronics industries, namely office machines and computers, electrical
machinery and radio, television, communication equipment, which have high
rankings on both indicators.
Table 4 gives the coefficients of bivariate correlations between countries' hu-
man capital intensity in R&D across industries as well as of the correlations of
each country's human capital intensity in R&D with all countries' combined
human capital intensity of R&D across industries. After eliminating — for lack
of sufficient data — the Netherlands as well as the United States, the remaining
countries have mostly positive correlations with the overall ratios and directly
with the other countries in the sample. In the 1970s, though, Canada, Denmark,
Japan and Sweden have negative correlations with the overall ratios, whereas in
the 1980s only Sweden displays a slightly negative correlation coefficient with
the overall ratios. Assuming industry-specific R&D production functions being
identical across countries, several potential explanations for the high percentage
of negative correlations remain: there might be factor intensity reversals, in-101
creasing returns due to economies of agglomeration in R&D,
8
6 or important
additional R&D production factors other than R&D personnel and scientists and
engineers.
A more uniform picture emerges from the table of correlations for human
capital intensities in R&D between industries and across countries (Table 5).
All correlations of individual industries with the overall ratios are highly
positive in both the 1970s and the 1980s. Negative correlations between in-
dividual industries are rare. Most industries' ratios of R&D scientists and engi-
neers to other R&D personnel and the countries' ratios in total manufacturing
are also positively correlated with the relative R&D scientists and engineers en-
dowments of countries. All this is consistent with the prediction of factors pro-
portions theory of international trade that countries, while specializing in the
production of those goods which make relatively intensive use of the abundant
factor, also tend to use the abundant factor more intensively whenever smoothly
convex production technologies permit factor substitution as a response to
changing relative factor scarcities. But there are puzzles left, namely the
negative correlations of the relative R&D scientists and engineers endowments
with the ratios of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D personnel in the
iron and steel, office and computing machinery and shipbuilding industries in
the 1970s as well as with the iron and steel and the office and computing
machinery industries in the 1980s.
The factor proportions theory of international trade considers three basic
(non-exclusive) possibilities for an open economy to respond to changes in the
factor endowments relative to the trading partners which may be relevant for the
allocation of resources in R&D activities: above average endowments of scarce
human capital in the form of R&D scientists and engineers can be allocated,
first, so as to generally increase the human capital intensity of all R&D ac-
tivities, second, to increase the R&D intensity equally in all industries, or third,
to shift the pattern of specialization to those activities for which factor endow-
ment relations constitute a source of a comparative advantage.
To sum up, the data on some of the relevant factor endowments, on R&D
intensities and on relative input requirements in R&D suggest that countries
actually make use of the first two possibilities mentioned, namely to increase the
human capital intensity in all R&D activities and to increase the R&D intensity
in all industries. For a preliminary examination of the third possibility, charts of
R&D intensities in each country, relative to the respective industry's overall
R&D intensity across all countries, are presented in Figure A2 and charts of
normalized R&D intensities in each industry, i.e. R&D intensities relative to the
For an empirical test of tendencies towards the international agglomeration of R&D
see Cantwell (1991).Table 5— Bivariate Correlations between Industries' Average Ratios of R&D Scientists and Engineers to Other
R&D Personnel across Countries in the 1970s and 1980s
a
(1) | (2) | (3) I (4) | (5) [ (6) 1 (7) | (8) \ (9) | (10) [ (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (IS) | (16) [ (17) | (18)
Food, beverages, tobacco (1)
Chemicals, excl. drugs and
medicines (2)
Drugs and medicines (3)
Rubber and plastics (4)
Non-metallic mineral products (5)
Iron and steel (6)
Non-ferrous metals (7)





Electrical machinery, excl. radio,
TV and communication
equip. (11)
Radio, TV and communication
equip. (12)
Shipbuilding and repair (13)
Motor vehicles (14)
Aircraft (15)





































































1.00 0.82 0.45 0.50 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.72 0.72 0.09 0.66 0.72 0.29 -0.07 0.49 0.86 031 0.67
(0.91) 1.00 0.62 0.77 0.61 0.48 0.84 0.60 0.59 -0.28 0.53
(0.73) (0.78) 1.00 0.79 0.69 0.53 0.52 0.73 0.71 0.30 0.38
(0.87) (0.80) (0.78) 1.00 0.72 0.36 0.75 0.72 0.66 0.12 033
(0.62) (0.86) (0.47) (0.71) 1.00 0.74 0.47 0.73 0.65 0.81 0.49
(0.49) (0.62) (0.23) (0.51) (0.71) 1.00 0.18 0.73 0.58 0.55 0.30
(0.84) (0.73) (0.46) (0.74) (0.85) (0.62) 1.00 0.47 0.55 -0.56 0.71
(0.75) (0.63) (0.46) (0.85) (0.68) (0.41) (0.53) 1.00 0.91 0.37 0.71
(0.72) (0.57) (0.40) (0.78) (0.70) (0.16) (0.55) (0.91) 1.00 0.21 0.87
(0.05) (0.07) (-0.55) (-0.24) (0.11) (0.20) (0.15) (0.05) (0.25) 1.00 -0.05
(0.60) (0.40) (0.30) (0.72) (0.56) (0.05) (0.45) (0.87) (0.97) (0.16) 1.00 0.79 0.20 0.40 0.74 0.86 0.84 0.74
(0.66) (0.59) (0.33) (0.77) (0.70) (0.51) (0.48) (0.85) (0.86) (0.38) (0.80) 1.00 0.51 0.34 0.67 0.94 0.91 0.97
(0.73) (0.63) (0.30) (0.71) (0.75) (0.43) (0.64) (0.87) (0.93) (0.35) (0.89) (0.89) 1.00 0.55 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.59
(0.54) (030) (0.17) (0.71) (0.56) (0.90) (0.56) (0.69) (0.50) (0.08) (032) (0.80) (0.59) 1.00 030 0.16 0.52 0.46
(0.66) (0.57) (0.60) (0.82) (0.56) (0.11) (036) (0.82) (0.87) (0.04) (0.86) (0.84) (0.70) (0.56) 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.71
(0.66) (0.56) (0.34) (0.75) (0.63) (0.32) (0.46) (0.94) (0.97) (0.24) (0.97) (0.88) (0.86) (0.70) (0.92) 1.00 0.79 0.87
(0.90) (0.78) (0.34) (0.70) (0.77) (0.57) (0.81) (0.70) (0.76) (035) (0.63) (0.76) (0.80) (0.59) (0.65) (0.70) 1.00 0.90
(0.86) (0.81) (0.55) (0.88) (0.69) (0.67) (0.69) (0.89) (0.84) (0.30) (0.74) (0.93) (0.89) (0.81) (0.78) (0.86) (0.88) 1.00
0.08 0.21 0.26 0.46 0.12 -0.14 0.44 0.45 0.55 -0.30 0.75 0.58 -0.10 0.58 0.62 0.67 0.73 0.56
(0.44) (0.20) (0.33) (0.64) (0.24) (-0.19) (0.08) (0.77) (0.81) (-0.15) (0.89) (0.71) (0.66) (0.43) (0.69) (0.84) (0.37) (0.59)
aThe results for the 1980s are given in parentheses.103
respective country's total manufacturing R&D intensity, in Figure A3. These
charts are designed to make visible any simple patterns of R&D specialization
across industries — if there are any — which conform to the factor proportions
version of comparative advantage. In fact, the charts provide a rough illustration
of how countries' strengths in R&D across industries are distributed over the
space of human capital intensities in R&D (Figure A2), and of how the relative
degree of R&D specialization in a particular industry is distributed across
countries that are ranked according to their relative endowment with R&D
scientists and engineers (Figure A3).
Remember that, in Figure A2, a clear-cut pattern can be expected only for
those countries which rank either very high or very low in terms of their relative
endowments with R&D scientists and engineers. A case in point is the United
States which had the highest ranking in the 1970s. As expected the US economy
invested relatively more in R&D for industries which make relatively intensive
use of R&D scientists and engineers, the exceptions being the high R&D
specialization in motor vehicles and rubber and plastics.
8
7 By contrast, France
as a country with a relatively small endowment of R&D scientists and engineers
seems to have invested more in R&D for industries whose R&D makes
relatively little use of R&D scientists and engineers, with radio, television and
communication equipment industry being the exception here. Unfortunately, no
fitting patterns can be recognized for any of the other countries.
A glance at the normalized R&D intensities in each industry (across coun-
tries) in Figure A3 reveals patterns confirming expectations only in the cases of
drugs and medicines, rubber and plastics and electrical machinery. The latter
industry is the industry with the highest ranking in terms of human capital in-
tensity in R&D in the 1970s as well as in the 1980s. Ignoring Finland and
Norway, there is indeed the expected positive relationship between countries'
relative endowments with R&D scientists and engineers and countries' R&D
intensity in the electrical machinery industry relative to their total manufac-
turing R&D intensity in the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, this relationship
seems to have broken down. In the case of rubber and plastics, one of those in-
dustries making the least intensive use of scientists and engineers in their R&D
activities, a negative relationship is expected and more or less confirmed by the
data.
8
8 The drugs and medicines industry also shows a negative relationship,
A possible explanation for these exceptions is that both the motor vehicles and the
rubber and plastics industries are classified as scale-intensive by the OECD
(1992a: 152). The United States, being the biggest economy of all, should naturally
have a locational advantage for these industries.
8
8 The appearance of two subgroups of observations in the case of rubber and plastics
suggests that there may be another important explanatory variable in the relation-
ship discussed here.104
which is not inconsistent with this industry's fairly low ranking in terms of
human capital intensity in R&D. Unfortunately, negative relationships are also
recognizable in the radio, television and communication equipment and pro-
fessional instruments industries, two industries with high rankings in terms of
human capital intensity in R&D. These observations are at odds with the factor
proportions hypothesis to explain countries' patterns of specialization in in-
dustrial R&D.
The next section will examine these issues more systematically within the
framework of regression analyses which will allow the inclusion of other ex-
planatory variables, such as country size and time trends to capture secular
changes in countries' industrial structure.
III. Testing for the Determinants of Human Capital Intensity
in the R&D of Individual Industries
The previous section reported bivariate correlations between averages of the
ratios of R&D scientists and engineers over other R&D personnel in different
countries and in different industries for the 1970s and the 1980s which support
the assumption that country-indexed industries can be economically identified
by the intensity with which human capital is used in the pertinent R&D ac-
tivities. To provide a sharper test of this assumption, which is essential for the
relevance of comparative advantages based on factor proportions, an analysis of
variance has been carried out using yearly data on employment of scientists and
engineers as well as of university graduates in R&D activities.
8
9 Separate re-
gressions of the following type have been run first for each country across in-
dustries, and secondly, for each industry across countries indexed by i:
[30]
Full-time equivalents of university graduates employed in R&D are a measure of
human capital which better captures the relative frequency of formal academic
qualifications among R&D personnel. Unfortunately, there are many large gaps in
the data, and for several countries the data on university graduates in R&D are
entirely missing. Data on research scientists and engineers are not, however, to be
seen as a poor substitute, but may after all be the more appropriate data: R&D
scientists and engineers are the people who actually create new knowledge and most
of them presumably hold university degrees or have other advanced technical
qualifications.105
where h is either the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D per-
sonnel or the ratio of university graduates to other R&D personnel, S denotes
country dummies in the industry regressions and industry dummies in the coun-
try regressions, y time dummies controlling for seven three-year periods be-
tween 1969 and 1989, t a linear time trend and £the residuals.
9
0 On the basis of
the residuals from the full model, from the model with dummies for time effects
only and from the model with country or industry effects only, F-tests are car-
ried out to test for the joint significance of the respectively omitted dummy vari-
ables in each case. The results of the regressions for each country and industry,
for which sufficient data have been available, are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
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, T-O to the model with time effects only,
and IN-O to the model with industry effects only. TEST-IN denotes the F-test statistic for industry effects, TEST-T
that for time effects; DOF-N and DOF-D denote the degrees of freedom for numerator and denominator, respectively..
9
0 In equation [30], the coefficients for the dummies, which are 0, 1-variables
depending on the category to which an observation belongs, are not explicitly
written just as they are customarily not written for the constant term fx, which cap-
tures the sample mean.106
Table 7 — ANOVA Results with Test Statistics for Country and Time Effects
in Each Industry
Food, beverages, tobacco










Office and computing machinery
Electrical machinery, excl. radio,
TV and communication equip.























Office and computing machinery
Electrical machinery, excl. radio,
TV and communication equip.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T-O to the model with time effects only,
and C-O to the model with country effects only. TEST-C denotes the F-test statistic for country effects, TEST-T that
for time effects; DOF-N and DOF-D denote the degrees of freedom for numerator and denominator, respectively.
Table 6, panel a, has the results for thirteen country regressions in which the
dependent variable is the log of the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to
other R&D personnel. The test statistics for industry effects are larger than the
critical value at the 95 per cent level of significance for all thirteen countries; in
fact, the test statistics are even larger than the critical value at the 99 per cent
level of significance for all countries except for Australia. Time effects not
captured by the linear time trend, on the other hand, are insignificant at the
99 per cent level except for Japan and Sweden. In other cases than these, time
effects are significant at the 95 per cent level in Canada, Denmark, France,
West Germany, but only just.
Table 6, panel b, displays the results from country regressions using the ratio
of university graduates to other R&D personnel as the dependent variable.
Again, all industry effects are highly significant, but time effects are significant
only for Belgium and Sweden.
Table 7, panel a, shows the results from industry regressions using the ratio
of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D personnel as the dependent vari-
able. Country effects are highly significant even at the 99 per cent level for all
industries, but time effects are insignificant even at the 95 per cent level except,
perhaps, for iron and steel in which case the test statistic just equals the critical
value.
Table 7, panel b, displays the results from industry regressions using the ratio
of university graduates to other R&D personnel as the dependent variable. Here,
all
1 country effects are significant except those for the shipbuilding industry.
Time effects, on the other hand, are insignificant for almost all industries. They
are significant at the 95 per cent level only for iron and steel, office and com-
puting machinery and the aircraft industries.108
Taken together, these results support the assumption that the intensity of
using human capital in R&D is a characteristic feature of industries, when
holding the country fixed, and of countries, when holding the industry fixed. On
the background of this confirmed assumption, it makes sense to pose the
question to what extent countries' choices to devote resources to the R&D of
particular industries depend on countries' production specialization in these
same industries, and to what extent they depend on whether countries are
abundantly or poorly endowed with scientists and engineers.
IV. Testing for the Impact of Human Capital Endowments
on Countries' Specialization in the R&D of Individual
Industries
To test for the impact of sectoral specialization in value added and of the en-
dowment with R&D scientists and engineers on the sectoral specialization in
R&D, regressions have been run for each industry separately, which have the
following form:
[31] \n{shrdpt_x) = po+p1\n(shvat)+P2Hrdset/rgdpt)+ p3\n(rgdpt) +p4\n(t)+et.
In these regressions the dependent variable is the (lagged
91) share of an in-
dustry in the corresponding country's total R&D personnel in manufacturing.
9
2
Independent variables are the corresponding share of the industry in total manu-
facturing value added (shva), the total R&D endowment of the country, scaled
9
1 A one-year lag in variables averaged over five-year intervals means that relation-
ships are assumed to be close to contemporaneous. Longer lags might be justified if
one were to estimate the effects of R&D on productivity or on other variables of the
tangible side of the economy. Yet even for this case, empirical studies, like that of
Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), tend to find only shortly lagged and contem-
poraneous correlations between R&D expenditures and productivity growth. In the
present context, one-year lags are taken into account only to acknowledge that R&D
activities logically precede the other economic activities with which they are eco-
nomically connected.
9
2 Expressing the variables as shares is done to avoid regressing country size on coun-
try size and to alleviate the heteroscedasticity problem. This same purpose is pur-
sued when scaling countries' R&D endowments on countries' real GDP.109




94 The data are entered as averages over five year periods from
1970 to 1974, 1975 to 1979, 1980 to 1984 and 1985 to 1989 in the case of the
independent variables, and of the periods from 1969 to 1973, 1974 to 1978,
1979 to 1983 and 1984 to 1988 in the case of the dependent variables. The
intertemporal averaging is done to reduce random noise and serial correlation as
well as to alleviate the problem of data gaps of which there are more for some
countries than for others.
9
5 For all industries, separate regressions for two sub-
periods, the 1970s and the 1980s, as well as a regression over the entire twenty-
year period have been run, and_ conventional Chow tests carried out to test for
structural stability over time. According to these tests, the hypothesis of
structural stability cannot be rejected for any of the industries at the 95 per cent
level of significance. Results of the regressions over the full period are reported
in Table 8.
Some of the estimates of coefficients that capture the impact of value added
and countries' endowments with R&D scientists and engineers may be difficult
to interpret due to multi-collinearity,
9
6 but in general they are suggestive of how
industries differ with respect to the determinants of countries' specialization in
R&D. Four cases can be distinguished: (i) industries in which both value added
specialization and endowments with R&D scientists and engineers have a posi-
tive impact on specialization in R&D; (ii) industries in which countries'
endowments with R&D scientists and engineers are insignificant but a positive
impact of value added is highly significant, in other words: industries in which
R&D activities are closely tied to production; (Hi) industries in which endow-
ments with R&D scientists and engineers are highly significant, but value added
specialization insignificant, i.e. industries which may be distinguished by the
greater international mobility of their R&D output; (iv) industries in which
neither endowments with R&D scientists and engineers nor specialization in
value added seems to be an important (positive) determinant in R&D allocation,
e.g. industries in which historical and path-dependent processes of allocating
R&D activities dominate.
9
3 Included in the regression to capture scale effects which might be of particular im-
portance for the allocation of R&D in some industries.
9 Included in the regression to capture the effects of long-run structural change, which
might cause some industries to become generally more R&D intensive and others to
become less so over time.
Aggregation over five-year time intervals reduces the danger of giving some coun-
tries much more weight than others simply because their statistical offices have
worked on a more regular basis.
9<^ Coefficients of bivariate correlations between the independent and dependent vari-
ables are reported for each industry in Table A7.110
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Note: The regressions are based on data pooled over fourteen OECD countries and four five-year periods from 1970 to
1989 for the ndependent variables, and from 1969 to 1988 for the
reduced sample for some industries. For data availability see the da
dependent variable. Missing data imply a badly
a appendix. Behind the industry names there are
Continued on next page112
Table 8 continued
the industries' rankings in terms of their average ratios of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D personnel in the
1970s and 1980s, taken from the last column of Table A4.
All variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is the industry's share of countries' total R&D
personnel employed in manufacturing. Independent variables are the industry's share in total value added of the coun-
tries' manufacturing sector, the countries' endowment with R&D scientists and engineers relative to the labour force,
the countries' real GDP in 1985 US$ at purchasing power parities, and the calendar time, i.e. the year of observation.
Data have been averaged for each of the four five-year intervals before taking logarithms. Figures in parentheses below
the coefficients are standard errors.
F-VR denotes the F-test statistics for the joint significance of Value added and R&D-S&E endowment. F-RT
denotes the F-test statistics for the joint significance of RGDP and Time. F-ST denotes the F-test statistics for struc-
tural stability of the full model across the two subperiods, the 1970s and the 1980s. Figures in brackets show the
degrees of freedom for the numerator and denominator, respectively.
(/) R&D specialization driven by value added and endowments. Empirically,
industries of type 1 turn out to be drugs and medicines, non-ferrous metals,
shipbuilding, motor vehicle and other transport equipment industries.
9
7 Of
these, only shipbuilding and other transport equipment show a significant posi-
tive impact of the country's relative endowment with R&D scientists and engi-
neers on the R&D specialization in the industry. This is consistent with ship-
building's high ranking in terms of human capital intensity in R&D, but in-
consistent with the fairly low ranking of other transport equipment. The case of
Sweden appears to be the outlier which disturbs the picture. However, since
other transport equipment is an industry formed as a statistical residual, not
much weight should be given to the results in this case.
Strength in R&D for drugs and medicines, non-ferrous metals and motor
vehicles, by contrast, seems to be associated with below-average relative en-
dowments with R&D scientists and engineers. And these industries have rela-
tively low average ratios of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D per-
sonnel, ranking ten, eleven and seventeen among the seventeen industries in-
cluded in the sample. This is consistent with the factor proportions hypothesis
of trade and specialization. In the case of drugs and medicines and non-ferrous
metals, it is the significant negative effect of size (measured by real GDP) that is
striking, in the case of shipbuilding, it is the significant positive time effect. In
the case of other transport equipment, the coefficient on value added, which is
much greater than unity in absolute size, may be interpreted as pointing to posi-
tive scale effects from the production side, perhaps in the form of cumulative
learning effects.
9
7 Interpretations have to be treated with caution, not least because the sample size is
small. Moreover, in shipbuilding the case of Japan may dominate the impact of all
other countries, while in the case of other transport equipment Sweden may be an
outlier.el
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(M) R&D tied to production. Industries of type 2, where R&D is closely tied
to production and where countries' relative endowments with R&D scientists
and engineers have no significant effect, are food, beverages and tobacco,
chemicals, rubber and plastics, iron and steel, machinery nee, aircraft and pro-
fessional instruments. Apart form the significant positive effect of the share in
value added, the food, beverages and tobacco and professional instruments in-
dustries have a negative size effect, the chemical and aircraft industries a nega-
tive time effect, and the iron and steel and the machinery industries a negative
size effect but a positive time effect. In the chemical industry's case, the finding
of a close tie between value added and R&D specialization may at first sight
seem to be in contrast to Klodt (1987: 65-66), who reports a negative, albeit in-
significant, coefficient of correlation between the share of chemical industry
R&D in a country's total industrial R&D and an indicator of 'revealed com-
parative advantage' based on export and import data for the chemical industry.
But Klodt's regression is based on a more aggregated data set and subsumes
under chemicals petroleum refineries as well as petroleum and coal products,
both of which are excluded from the data on chemicals in the present study.
(Hi) R&D specialization independent of value added specialization. None of
the industries falls into the third group. Those industries in which the industry's
share in total manufacturing value added does not help to explain the industry's
share in R&D employment are either cases for which the regression is clearly
misspecified, as for non-metallic mineral products, or industries in which
neither specialization in value added nor endowments with R&D scientists and
engineers are a significant determinant, that is to say type 4 industries.
(iv) R&D specialization apparently determined by unique historical events.
To this group belong fabricated metals, office and computing machinery,
electrical machinery as well as radio, television and communication equipment.
Of these, office and computing machinery seems to have a positive time effect,
electrical machinery a negative size effect, radio, television and communication
equipment a positive size effect and fabricated metal products a negative size
and a positive time effect.
In this group of industries, which comprises the entire microelectronics
complex, specialization in R&D does not seem to be associated with patterns of
strengths and weaknesses in production, nor with relative endowments of R&D
scientists and engineers. These industries thus seem to offer broad scope for
historical explanations for the observed patterns and dynamics of specialization
in R&D activities. But such historical explanations cannot always be reduced to
first-mover advantages and relative country size. For example, in the case of the
electrical machinery industry, the present findings suggest that the large tech-
nology pioneers in this field at the turn of the century, i.e. the United States and
Germany, far from being able to monopolize R&D activities, may actually have114
lost out compared with the increasing relative strength of pertinent R&D
specialization of smaller countries.
To sum up, the results of multiple regression analyses reported here do not
appear to be inconsistent with the factor proportions hypothesis of specialization
in R&D for those industries in which countries' endowments with R&D scien-
tists and engineers do have a significant effect. However, for most industries
they do not. Among these, there is a group of industries in which R&D activities
appear to be closely tied to production. Several of this group are well-estab-
lished, some even traditional industries: chemical, machinery nee, aircraft and
professional instruments, are all among the higher ranking industries in terms
of R&D intensity, but they are nevertheless industries which have in recent
years relied more on gradual technological development than on revolutionary
technological breakthroughs. By contrast, in the entire microelectronics group
— which has probably experienced the fastest and most radical technological
change of all industries in the twenty years from 1970 to 1989 — specialization
in R&D does not appear to be associated with specialization in production, nor
with countries' relative endowments with R&D scientists and engineers.
9
8 In-
stead, a significant part of the variation in countries' share of their total R&D
personnel allocated to these industries appears to be associated with structural
change over time in the case of office and computing machinery, an industry
which enjoyed spectacular growth in the 1970s and 1980s, and with country
size in the case of electrical machinery and radio, television and communication
equipment.
An obvious drawback of the regression analysis reported here is that it uses
pooled cross-section and time series data. Although the latter has been averaged
over four five-year intervals, there is no assurance that observations from one
country on any particular variable are independent in the time dimension. The
effects discussed here stem primarily from variation in the cross-country
dimension, which consists of no more than fourteen cases. Hence, the infor-
mation contained in each country's time series is not exploited efficiently. There
may well be better ways of simultaneously exploiting the information from
cross-section and time series data to answer the questions posed. For example, it
might be more appropriate to estimate separate cross-country equations for each
subperiod by using the technique of seemingly unrelated regressions. In such a
model one could constrain the parameters of interest to be the same for all
periods, so as to use the information from the whole sample efficiently.
9
8 Incidentally, this also seems to hold for the fabricated metal products industry, cer-
tainly for the greater part a rather traditional industry.115
Another drawback of the regression analysis in this chapter, however, would
not be solved by adopting the seemingly unrelated regression technique: Since
estimation would essentially concentrate on cross-section variation, any impor-
tant dynamic effects on which the data might contain interesting information
would continue to be ignored. To resolve this problem, new co-integration
techniques for panel data, like those recently developed by Quah (1994) and
Levin and Lin (1992, 1993), promise to capture some of the dynamic effects
which lead to countries' patterns of technological specialization by exploiting
all the available information about how the variation in the relevant variables
over a cross section of countries changes over time.
Applying these new techniques will be a task for future research. The present
study, however, takes a different path, and uses a more direct methodology to
analyze the empirical dynamics of technological as well as industrial spe-
cialization, which is the subject of Chapter E.116
It must be emphasised that the economies of large-scale
production and the different equipment of factors are not
independent "causes" of trade; on the contrary their
effects are intermingled in several ways.
— Bertil Ohlin (1933: 107)
E. Technology and Empirical Dynamics
of Specialization in Open Economies
I. Statistical Inference for Stochastic Processes and the
Hypothesis of Hysteresis
For the purposes of this study, a stochastic process can be defined as a time-
ordered sequence of random variables, realizations of which are observed at
various times t. These realizations are also called states, and the set of all
feasible realizations is termed the state space of the process; it is in this study
the real line R. A more general definition of stochastic processes might allow
for multi-dimensional random 'variables', i.e. random vectors, or even for con-
cepts other than random variables to quantify events on a sample space.
A rigorous treatment of stochastic processes with applications to economics
is provided by Stokey and Lucas (1989). According to their general definition
(Stokey and Lucas 1989: 223) a stochastic process on some fixed
probability space" (Q, F, P) is an increasing sequence of c-algebras
JTJ C F2 c F3 c...c F , a measurable space (Z,3), and a sequence of functions
ot\Q.-*Z , t = l,2,..., such that each ct is Ft-measurable. Then, in the case
where Z = R, i.e. the real line, the at are simply random variables for each t
on the probability space {Q, F, P); and a sample path of the process is a se-
quence of real numbers {ot(ct))}™=1 for each fixed event a> e Q . The minimum
cr-algebra that can be applied on the real line is called a Borel algebra; and any
of its subsets are referred to as Borel sets.
A probability space consists of a sample space Q, i.e. the set of all possible
outcomes of a random experiment, a cr-algebra F, i.e. an appropriate mathematical
structure to handle events on an infinite and uncountable sample space, and a
probability measure P, i.e. a set function with F as its domain and the closed
interval [0,1] on the real line as its range.117
Economic time series often contain observations at regular time intervals so
that it is usually convenient to formulate the stochastic process, assumed to have
generated the data in terms of random variables, in discrete time. All empirical
work reported in the present section is based on such processes in discrete time.
The primary task for statistical inference is to uncover the structure of de-
pendency between the various random variables which constitute a particular
process and whose realizations are observed at different points in time. From
the dependency structure, it may then be possible to make inferences about the
long-term asymptotic behaviour of the process, which may for example display
hysteresis or other characteristics.
Inference on the dependency structure, however, is made difficult by the fact
that non-experimental data normally reveal only a single realization of the se-
quence of random variables, each of which may well have a different distribu-
tion (Spanos 1986: Chapter 8). To draw any inferences in such a situation
requires that some a priori restrictions on the process be imposed so that some
more specific probability model can be constructed. The purpose of such re-
strictions is to reduce the dimensionality of the time-ordered random variables'
joint distribution, and thus to reduce the number of unknown parameters whose
values have to be estimated from the data of a single realization.
1. The Inappropriatcness of Stationarity Assumptions
The justification for imposing specific restrictions should ideally be derived
from some a priori knowledge, say, in the form of economic theory. For
example, the assumption that the individual random variables of a stochastic
process are normally distributed is usually justified with reference to the fre-
quency of experimental data sets, which can be approximated by the normal
distribution. The assumption of stationarity, i.e. roughly speaking the tendency
of a time series to stay within certain bounds around a constant mean, is usually
justified by postulating that the series represents a (stable) long-term equi-
librium. A restriction on the structure of serial correlations between different
time-indexed random variables is often derived from some theoretical as-
sumption about the formation of expectations by economic agents, e.g. adaptive
or rational expectations.
The a priori restrictions that econometric analysis imposes on a stochastic
process are generally of two kinds (Spanos 1986: 137-144): (i) restrictions on
the time-heterogeneity of the process, and (ii) restrictions on the memory of the
process. Restrictions on the time-heterogeneity are usually designed to impose
some degree of stationarity on the process so that the impossible task of estimat-
ing an entirely different distribution function for each point of observation is118
avoided. There are several different definitions of stationarity which are more or
less amenable to tests in actual data. Strict stationarity requires that the joint
distribution function for any number of consecutive time periods of a process
remains unchanged when it is shifted in time by an arbitrary value T , implying
that the individual random variables are identically distributed.
In practice, though, this would be impossible to verify from the data of a
single sample path. A weaker form of stationarity, which is testable, is defined
in terms of the first two moments of the joint distribution and requires that the
mean E[X(t)] = \i and the variance fs^A"!/]}
2] of the stochastic process X(t)
be constant and independent of time t, and that the autocovariance v(f1,f2) =
E[{X(0)}{X(t2 -1{)}]- fj-i depends on the time distance \t2 - %|, but not on the
dates tx or t2 .
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Spanos (1986: 137) points out that stationary processes with considerable
time-homogeneity are appropriate for modelling phenomena close to their
(globally stable) steady-state equilibrium, which random fluctuations con-
tinually perturb, but never irreversibly or for long periods of time destabilize. It
is therefore clear that processes with hysteresis do not belong to the class of
stochastic processes which are stationary: The discussion in Chapter C showed
that hysteresis implies bifurcations, i.e. the breaking of time symmetry in the
distribution of the time-indexed random variables of the process. The assump-
tion of stationarity, by contrast, would impose time symmetry and would thus
exclude hysteresis a priori.
It follows that an operational probability model to examine the hypothesis of
hysteresis without bias must allow for at least some degree of time-hetero-
geneity, i.e. non-stationarity. Current econometric practice usually associates
non-stationarity with a limiting case of stochastic processes, which has in recent
years caught a great deal of attention by researchers of macroeconomic series —
namely autoregressive processes with a unit root. These are best described as
non-stationary time series which are stationary in first differences. For example,
consider yt = yt_^ + et where et is a zero-mean stationary process. If et is
normally distributed with E[ej] = o
2) yt follows a random walk. In this
special case, the shape of the random variables' distribution is maintained over
time, but the variance grows linearly with time, i.e. E[{X(t)}
2] = t <r
2, which
Since the normal distribution is fully characterized by its first two moments, weak
stationarity implies strict stationarity if the random variables are known to be
normally distributed.119
means in practice that the variance grows with the sample size (Hansen
1991: 345).
Since the non-stationarity of unit-root processes manifests itself merely in the
variance being a linear function of time, it is clear that this limiting case is not
far enough away from stationarity to accommodate hysteresis. Recall from the
computer simulations in Chapter C that hysteresis implies that the shape of the
distribution, not only its variance, changes over time. An appropriate probability
model therefore has to allow for a more general kind of time-heterogeneity than
random-walk processes do.
Random walks nevertheless have one important feature which may inno-
cuously carry over to an appropriate probability model of hysteresis, and that is
the nature of the restriction imposed on the memory of the process. This restric-
tion takes the form of the so-called Markov property, which simply says that the
future realizations of the process are independent of the past when the present
realization is known. This property is, strictly speaking, a restriction on the
conditional memory of the process, but not directly on the memory of the
process itself. For this reason, the Markov property is compatible with both
ergodicity and non-ergodicity, and may consequently encompass both the ab-
sence and the presence of path-dependence (or state-dependence), of which
hysteresis is an example.
Ergodicity is a weak form of temporal independence, which nevertheless
directly restricts the memory of a stochastic process. Ergodicity means that the
conditional probability measures of a stochastic process are consistent with only
one joint time-invariant probability measure, which is thus necessarily in-
dependent of the state initially realized. Non-ergodicity, by contrast, means that
there may be multiple time-invariant probability measures for the joint distri-
bution; and this may imply a 'long', i.e. an unrestricted memory. In other
words, initial conditions or the history of a particular sample path matter even
in the long term.
Spanos (1986: 143) argues that memory restrictions are necessary for in-
ference because they enable the econometrician to 'model the temporal depend-
ence of a stochastic process using a finite set of parameters in the form of tem-
poral moments or some parametric process'. Obviously, as long as there are
only finite data sets, no more than a finite number of parameters can be
estimated. But, even appropriate memory restrictions on their own may be in-
sufficient to estimate a stochastic process on the basis of a single sample path,




1 The time series of such a sample path would be considered as 'degenerate'.120
Both implications of hysteresis, the a priori unspecified form of time-
heterogeneity in the distribution and the non-ergodicity in the temporal depend-
ence structure, seem to render classical statistical-inference techniques in-
capable of properly testing the hysteresis-hypothesis. These techniques are, after
all, based on specific assumptions about the nature of the underlying distribu-
tion.
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2 Classical tests generally require that the type of the distribution is
known and that it is of a sort whose exact shape can be described by a small set
of parameters. But in view of possible hysteresis in the data, the unknown distri-
bution of the random variables must be allowed to evolve over time, which can
hardly be compatible with any standard distribution; no particular assumption
about the type of the underlying distribution or its parametric description can
hence be appropriate as an a priori restriction.
It follows that one may need to adopt non-parametric methods as well as use
data from more than one realization if non-ergodicity is presumed to hold for a
stochastic process. Before turning to the details of methodology and application
of non-parametric estimation of Markov processes from several parallel re-
alizations, it may be useful to clarify the general structure of Markov processes
more formally, and to discuss how ergodicity and non-ergodicity would manifest
themselves in a finite number of observations.
2. Non-Ergodicity in Markov Processes
To gain a better understanding of Markov processes, think of a stochastic
process in general as a sequence of transition functions; for each of which an as-
sociated operator T* maps the space of probability measures X on the measur-
able space (Z, 3) into itself. Stokey and Lucas (1989: 213) suggest to interpret
(T*X)(A) as the probability that a state in set A will be realized after the
transition if the preceding state is drawn according to the probability measure
A . In general, the transition functions of a stochastic process can have arbitrary
arguments. It is therefore a special case when they have the current realization
of the process as their only argument. This special case defines a first-order
10
3
Markov process, for which the conditional probability of the event
{coeX2:[o"/+1(o)),...,<7f+M(oj)]eC}, given the event {(0 e£2:<Jr(o)) = aT,
10
2 Compare for the introductory chapter in Gibbons and Chakraborti (1992).
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3 In higher-order Markov processes, the transition function would have as its
arguments realizations of some finite number of periods into the past. But the
assumption of a first-order Markov process does usually not constitute a serious
restriction because, as Stokey and Lucas (1989: Section 8.4) show, second- or
higher-order Markov processes can be written as a first-order process after suitably
redefining the state space.121
r = t-s,...,t-l,t} has occurred, can be written as (Stokey and Lucas
1989: 223):
[32] Pt+\,...,t+n{c\at-s,..., at_h at) = Pt+1^t+n(C\at), f = 2,3,...; /i = 1,2,...; s = l,2,...,t-l; CG3".
If these conditional probabilities are independent of time t for all aeZ and
C e 3 , the Markov process is said to have stationary transitions. It is important
to keep in mind that this does not necessarily imply a stationary stochastic
process as defined above; in fact, the stationarity of a Markov process does not
depend in any way on whether the process has stationary transitions. Stationar-
ity instead requires that the sequence of probability measures Kt converges, in
some sense, to an invariant probability measure A *. Stokey and Lucas
(1989: 317) define an invariant probability measure to be a fixed point of the
operator T *, so that A* = T * A * . This is equivalent to saying that A * is the
probability measure over the state st+i in period t+1 if it is the probability
measure over the state st in period t.
There are different classes of Markov processes depending on whether they
are defined on a continuous or on a denumerable state space. The following dis-
cussion is primarily concerned with finite-state Markov processes, which are
defined on a denumerable space with a finite number of states. Such processes
are also called (finite) Markov chains. They illustrate many of the typical long-
run behaviour patterns of general Markov processes, and are an important tool
in the empirical implementation below.
Suppose (as in Stokey and Lucas 1989: 320) that a suitable probability




A transition function P can then be represented by an Ixl matrix II = [^y],
with elements n^ = P(siy{sj}). The ith row of this Markov transition matrix
gives the probability distribution over the post-transition states conditional upon
the ante-transition state being st-. If p G A denotes the probability distribution
over the state in period t, then the probability distribution in period t +1 can be
determined by matrix multiplication as p = pll. By inductive iteration, U
n
defines n-step transitions, and the behaviour of the sequence {II"},7=o reveals
the long-term behaviour of the Markov chain.
Stokey and Lucas (1989: Chapter 11) illustrate all feasible types of long-term
(limiting) behaviour by means of five typical examples of Markov matrices:
(i) Their first example illustrates the case where the entire state space forms an122
ergodic set, denoted E and defined by the condition that p(si,E) = 1, for s,- e is,
and that no non-empty subset of E is itself ergodic. Ergodicity of a Markov
chain thus implies that it is 'irreducible' because each state is accessible from
all others, even if not necessarily by one-step transitions, (ii) The second
example concerns the case where part of the state space is transient, which
means that there is a positive probability of leaving and never returning to these
transient states. These are therefore not part of any ergodic set that may exist.
(Hi) The third case illustrates the possibility of cyclically moving subsets, where
the entire state space may be one ergodic set,
10
4 but where the sequence of
transition matrices II does not converge to a time-invariant distribution in each
of its rows, (iv) Next, there is the possibility of two (or more) ergodic subsets,
where the system may converge to two (or more) different invariant distribu-
tions depending on the system's initial state, or on the particular sample path
realized. In this case, the Markov chain as a whole is said to be non-ergodic;
and the different invariant distributions might correspond to different steady-
state equilibria in a related deterministic model, (v) Finally, there can be mix-
tures of the aforementioned cases, e.g. the state space may consist of transient
states and more than one ergodic set.
Stokey and Lucas (1989: 326-328) then show that in all five cases the se-
quence of averages {A^}
 = {(V
n)X/t=on
/c} necessarily converges, as n—> °o ,
to a limiting Markov matrix Q, whose rows are invariant distributions with re-
spect to time. Thus, one can be sure that there always exist time-invariant dis-
tributions of the long-run average probabilities over all states of a finite Markov
chain (with stationary transitions) and that these invariant distributions are
given for each initial state si by the corresponding row of Q. In Sections E.II
and E.III this kind of convergence will be invoked to draw inferences on
ergodicity versus non-ergodicity in empirically estimated transition matrices.
To summarize, if one wishes to examine the hypothesis of hysteresis without
inappropriate restrictions one may want to use a Markov process as an oper-
ational probability model. Yet, in order to draw inferences on Markov processes
without any prior information about the transition functions one needs to as-
sume stationary transition probabilities or get data on more than one sample
path. However, if some states are transient or if the state space contains more
than one ergodic set, as under the hypothesis of hysteresis, the assumption of
stationary transitions may not suffice to estimate all transition probabilities from
a single realization of the process. It is for this reason that the present study
adopts the ensemble view, which assumes that the specialization dynamics of
Some authors exclude cyclically moving subsets from the definition of ergodicity.
See, for example, Osaki (1992: 119).123
different countries are each an independent realization of the same underlying
Markov process.
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5 According to the ensemble view, one may be able to
estimate transition probabilities for all states even if an individual country's
specialization path gets locked into one of the extreme states at an early date
within the observation period.
This approach, admittedly, ignores potential cross-section interdependencies
between different countries' specialization experiences. A probability model that
explicitly accounts for the relevant cross-section correlations would have to be
formulated as a stochastic process made up of random functions of several vari-
ables. These functions would have as their values elements y/a of some con-
figuration space f, where aeA is a set of multiple indexes, one for each di-
mension of potential interdependencies. In such a formulation, any element \(/a
would assign values from the state space S to a particular site a of A. A stoch-
astic process of this kind is known as a random field in probability theory.
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For an application of random fields to the problem of industrial speciali-
zation dynamics in open economies, it would be useful to restrict the index set
to an integer lattice and to let one index count time periods, a second index
stand for countries' positions in geographical space, and a third index for coun-
tries' positions in some abstract space of technological similarity, for example.
In this sense, there may be neighbour relations in more than one dimension.
The relevant dimensions to consider in empirical work would have to be de-
termined by theory. For example, as pointed out in Chapter B, the theory of en-
dogenous technological change in open economies assumes that knowledge
spill-overs from R&D accompany trade relations; and this hypothesis finds
empirical support in Coe and Helpman (1993). Knowledge spill-overs may in-
deed be one of the most important kinds of interdependencies in economics, on
which random fields analyses might shed new light in the future.
10
5 Recall that a similar interpretation was given for the analysis (in terms of Master
equations) and for the computer simulations used in Chapter C to determine the
long-run stationary distributions of a specialization indicator in two-sector models of
small and large open economies. This analysis, too, relied on the ensemble view,
i.e. on a statistical population of stochastic specialization processes, but in that case
all starting from identical exogenous conditions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
control all the exogenous conditions for actual observations of countries'
specialization patterns, data on which are used in the empirical analyses below, but
Section E.III will make an attempt at including conditioning information about
countries' factor endowments.
106 por a formai introduction to this part of probability theory see Griffeath (1976). A more applied introduction is provided by Kindermann and Snell (1980).
Applications so far have been primarily in statistical physics, going back to the
pioneering work of Ernst Ising in the 1920s on ferromagnetic materials. Recall from
Section C.2 that statistical physics is used to analyze the microscopic events in self-
organizing processes.124
To turn a random fields model of these issues into an operational probability
model, one would restrict the conditional probabilities for y/a to depend only
on elements which are within some fixed distance D, analogously to memory
restrictions in ordinary stochastic processes. Indeed, for D = 1, the Markov
property, one would obtain a (symmetric) Markov random field.
10
7 As Durlauf
(1993) points out such multi-dimensional stochastic processes may exhibit
richer, and for many economic applications more interesting, forms of non-
ergodicity than one-dimensional Markov processes do even if these are vector-
valued. In particular, random fields may have multiple joint invariant probabil-
ity measures which are consistent with non-degenerate time series (that is with-
out excluding certain states from being realized).
The econometric analysis of random fields is still to be developed and will
not be pursued much further in this study.
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8 To make the available data on
patterns of industrial specialization in OECD countries accessible to empirical
analysis, the present study implicitly assumes that cross-section correlations are
of little importance and concentrates on the dependency structure in the time
dimension of the process. The data from different countries are essentially
treated as independent observations. This simplifying assumption permits esti-
mation of transition probabilities without explicitly modelling interdependencies
between countries. But Section E.III will make an attempt to account for some
of the cross-sectional variation by including countries' factor endowments as
exogenous variables.
II. Estimating Markov Transition Probabilities for the
Specialization Dynamics in OECD Countries
1. Autoregressions and Stochastic Kernels
The stylized model of the stochastic recontracting process and dynamic
specialization in the small open Ricardian economy, which was analyzed in
Section C.II, lends itself naturally to an empirical examination. The focus of
this will be on questions like: What are the actual dynamics of specialization in
technology and industrial production of open economies? Are these dynamics
10
7 Asymmetry, for instance in the time dimension, could be introduced by defining
conditional probabilities that depend only on neighbouring states in one direction.
108 jjjg generai theory of estimation in random fields without imposing a priori
restrictions on the distribution is treated in Ramm (1990).125
quite similar or rather different from one industry to another? Is there any
evidence for hysteresis in terms of high persistence of above-average or below-
average specialization in either technology, production or both?
Research on these questions should be seen as complementary to recent
econometric attempts at diagnosing the international range of positive external
effects from R&D more directly. Recall from Section B.V that a number of em-
pirical studies, surveyed in Griliches (1992), have estimated social rates of re-
turn to R&D investments well above the private rates of return. These studies
leave little doubt that intra- and intersectoral knowledge spill-overs from R&D
are pervasive, yet incomplete and_ often effective only after some time lag. The
time series regularly show a strong positive correlation between the productivity
growth of a firm or an industry and its own R&D investment.
Lichtenberg (1993) extends this line of research and finds that in a number of
industrial economies also the national productivity growth is significantly and
positively correlated with the respective own R&D expenditure of these coun-
tries. Under the assumption that R&D expenditures are themselves exogenous
with respect to productivity, this result leads to a rejection of the hypothesis that
knowledge spill-overs from R&D are not at all reduced or slowed down at inter-
national borders. Coe and Helpman (1993) find empirical support for the as-
sumption that international spill-overs from R&D depend mainly on the in-
tensity of bilateral trade relations and that notably small countries with open
markets derive considerable productivity gains from foreign R&D advances.
Despite these findings, it would seem premature to regard the hypothesis of
hysteresis in the dynamics of specialization in open economies as confirmed.
Sceptics would rightly point out that, although positive externalities may have
some influence in the direction of idiosyncratic patterns of specialization, other
factors like foreign direct investment and the associated technology transfers
might prevent it. A theory of leapfrogging, like that of Brezis et al. (1993),
would even argue that it is precisely the temporary exploitation of positive ex-
ternal effects and hysteresis in one country which gives other countries a better
starting position in the next round of innovations and productivity advances, be-
cause after a change of technological trajectory the old externalities are quickly
devalued and new innovators are more likely to look for low-wage labour rather
than for a location in a high-wage country with a fading technology.
Ignoring the possibility of repeated switches among technological trajec-
tories, the stylized model of Section C.II defined the state variable of the re-
contracting process as the share of workers in industry A. Specialization of the
small two-sector Ricardian economy was unambiguously measured by the share
of industry A in the total labour force. But how can sectoral specialization in in-
dustrial production be measured in a multi-country, multi-factor world? To ob-
tain a measure which is comparable across countries and across industries, it is126
suggested to compute — for each industry in each country — an indicator on
the basis of value added (VAI), namely the contribution of an industry to gross
domestic product:
[33]
where Vij stands for value added in country i and industry;, Z,-V£j for total
value added in industry ; over all countries, ZyKj f°
r
 total value added in
country /, and ZjXyK,; f°
r
 total value added in all countries and all indus-
tries.
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9 This indicator of specialization measures how many times greater or
smaller the ratio of a country's value added to the world's value added is in a
specific industry as compared with all of manufacturing. In a sense, the indi-
cator compares the relative weight of a certain industry in individual countries
with the relative weight of this industry in total world manufacturing. A loga-
rithmic transformation renders the indicator unbounded on both sides, sym-
metric around zero — the point of no specialization — and relatively sensitive
to small deviations from zero as they are typical for large countries (Grupp and
Legler 1989). Nevertheless, large countries show much less specialization and
dynamic variation of this indicator, basically for two reasons: one is the effect of
regional evening out, and the other is large countries' effect on the normalizing
quantity since they themselves make a considerable part of total value added in
the world.
The indicator of industrial specialization largely suppresses information
about the absolute scale of an industry, of a manufacturing sector, or of a coun-
try. The effects of some of these and other scale variables (e.g. human capital
endowments and intraindustry trade) on rates of growth have been examined in
cross-country regressions by Backus et al. (1992), who find positive correlations
for the manufacturing sector, but little or no effect elsewhere. Instead of scale,
the specialization indicator adopted here rather measures the relative impor-
This formula is closely related to the production intensity index (PII) suggested by
Bowen (1983) as a comparative measure of trade specialization for each industry ;
within each country i:
Pllij = (I-jYj I (Xt QwJ) +1 = Qij l[{Yil Yw) IQW],
where net trade T: .• is equivalent to domestic production (2/ / minus domestic
consumption Cj •, and Y} and Yw are gross national and gross world product,
respectively. These kinds of pragmatic specialization indicators have their roots in
the work of Liesner (1958) and Balassa (1965).127
tance of an industry within a given manufacturing sector. This may be impor-
tant to keep in mind when confronting the results of the present study with
those of other empirical research on related issues.
Discussing the determinants of specialization in terms of comparative ad-
vantage versus hysteresis due to technological accumulation, it is natural to
focus on the specialization in those tradeables for which the hypotheses are
primarily formulated, namely manufactures. The limited availability of reliable
data on value added by industry, which is taken from the 1992 version of the
OECD STAN database, has made it necessary to restrict the scope of this study
to only twelve countries — Australia, Canada, Finland, France, West Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States — and to the nineteen-year period from 1970 through 1988.
Unfortunately, the sample limitation implies that the specialization indicator
could not be computed relative to world value added but only relative to total
value added in the twelve sample countries. This would not matter much if the
sectoral composition of value added in all countries excluded from the sample
was on average the same as that of the countries included. In reality, however,
the sectoral composition of value added in the remaining, mostly less developed
countries is likely to be quite different. The absolute values of the specialization
indicator as they have been computed for the sample countries are therefore
misleading as measures for specialization relative to the world.
11
0 But, in the
present context, the absolute values are of little interest compared with the
dynamics of the relative specialization positions of specific industries in the
various countries.
Thus the fact that not all countries of the world are included in the sample
may matter far less than the small number of observations at the level of in-
dividual industries, which is a direct consequence of the small sample size of
only twelve countries. In any case, one might argue that the twelve countries
considered are responsible for most of the dynamics in specialization, since they
command a dominant share in world trade, especially in manufactures: about 85
per cent of OECD exports and roughly two thirds of world exports in terms of
11
0 Although the omission of other countries may affect not only the absolute levels of
the specialization indicator but also the relative position of industries in an in-
dividual country, the omission would not affect the relative ranking of countries in
individual industries. In any case, the observed relative dynamics in industrial spe-
cialization between the twelve countries are unlikely to be affected in a fundamental
way by the omission of other, mostly developing countries which are of lesser im-
portance in world trade. The dynamics of specialization captured by the indicator
are also unlikely to be disturbed by country-specific measurement problems. In-
flating figures on value added for an entire country or for a particular industry need
not significantly alter the dynamics of specialization unless the figures are treated
inconsistently over time, say by being first understated and later overstated.128
value. The twelve countries also have a dominant share in the world's value
added in manufacturing as well as in the resources used intensively in manu-
facturing — especially in technology and R&D inputs, i.e. primarily human
capital, which are thought responsible for hysteresis.
To measure technological specialization, one should ideally use a direct
measure of the creation of new technical knowledge, essentially the output of
R&D efforts, whose international mobility is crucial for the hypotheses con-
sidered here. Direct measurement of intangible R&D output, especially of the
part which spills over as a technological externality, is of course infeasible. In
view of these difficulties, Soete (1981) suggests as a proxy the index of revealed
technological advantage (RTA) which is based on patent count data. This index
is defined as the ratio of a country's share of sectoral patenting to the country's
overall share of patenting in a particular foreign country. This gives some re-
assurance that patents granted are of similar 'quality' in terms of novelty, since
novelty requirements are routinely checked during the nationally standardized
approval procedure.
Usually the foreign country is chosen to be the United States — the country
which has the largest and most important market for technology and, therefore,
is most likely to stand high on the patent application agenda of every commer-
cially minded inventor in any country. Moreover, the US Patent and Trademark
Office publishes patent count data which are aggregated according to the US
Standard Industrial Classification and are thus particularly suitable for eco-
nomic analysis (see the Appendix for details). The RTA index defines the tech-
nological activities of a country as more specialized in those areas where this
country gets a larger share of US patents than in the average of all sectors.
11
1 In
its formal structure, this index is analogous to the indicator of industry spe-
cialization in terms of value added introduced above, so the RTA is:
11
1 While the RTA index obviously neglects potentially large differences in the
economic value of patents (and may thus not be an all too reliable measure), it does
have some important advantages, especially over R&D indicators based on input
data. In contrast to these, the RTA index values are more readily comparable across
countries and sectors and over time. The index automatically corrects for common
industry trends across countries, such as industry-specific propensities to patent, and
for common economy-wide trends across industries, such as the documented decline
in the ratio of the number of patented innovations to the number of scientists end
engineers involved in R&D since 1960 (Evenson 1991). A problem, however,
remains with domestic US patents because individual US inventors are known to
file relatively more patent applications in certain fields of technology than in others,
while filing very few foreign patent applications at all. Many of the domestic
applications of individual inventors cannot be counted as technical advances
comparable to patents originating from corporate research laboratories. Therefore,
US patents held by individuals have here been deducted before computing the
technology specialization indicator in order to avoid biasing figures for the United
States towards those sectors in which leisure inventors were most active.129
[34] RTAij = (Gitj I IGij)I (XGt-,• /
» j
 l i
where G,-,• stands for the number of US patents, by date of application, which
are of practical use mainly in industry j and granted to inventors resident in
country i.
A general model of the stochastic process of the evolving cross-section distri-
butions of measures of specialization is given by the stochastic difference
equation (Quah 1993a: 13; Stokey and Lucas 1989: 234-237):
[35] A, = T*{Xtx,ut),
where T* is an operator which maps the probability measures X in period /—I,
together with a disturbance u, into probability measures in period t. Ignoring the
disturbance u leaves a difference equation in probability measures, a model of
the law of motion in industrial specialization, which can be used, by iteration, to
predict future cross-section distributions:
[36] x
t+s
Taking this iteration to the limit as s -* oo, gives a characterization of the
likely long-run distribution of the cross-country, cross-industry specialization
indicator. Analogously to the conclusions from the small open Ricardian econ-
omy, hysteresis would imply that the probability measure { Xt+S: s > 0} tends
towards a bimodal distribution in the long run, with very little or virtually no
measurable mobility of individual industries between the two modes. The alter-
native hypothesis would be that the future degree of specialization of a certain
industry in a particular country is only temporarily dependent on that industry's
starting position, but entirely independent of it in the long run, provided there is
either virtual equality of relative factor endowments across countries or enough
mobility in relative factor endowments to undermine established comparative
advantages over time. The probability measure would then tend towards a uni-
form distribution in the long run.
As Quah (1993b) points out, such a model of dynamically evolving distri-
butions is like an autoregression, except that its values are distributions rather
than scalars or vectors of numbers.
11
2 But one should emphasize that simple
parametric autoregressions fail to be informative on the hypothesis of hysteresis
Recall from Section E.I that the model of evolving distributions is designed to avoid
stationarity assumptions which would exclude hysteresis a priori.130
which is here appropriately formalized in terms of a probability model of
evolving cross-section distributions. In particular, an estimated slope coefficient
smaller than one, obtained from regressing an indicator of specialization on its
lagged values, cannot be taken as evidence that past specialization in a certain
sector would give this sector a disadvantage for future growth. A linear re-
gression of the logarithmic industry specialization indicator in 1988 on a con-
stant and the industry specialization indicator in 1970 (lagged 18 years) yields
an estimated slope coefficient of 0.70, a t-value of 20.2 and an adjusted R
2 of
0.67, which seems to imply that past specialization does not give countries
much of an advantage in particular sectors for the future. Instead, the sectoral
strengths of countries seem to erode over time; measured specialization seems to
converge to neutrality.
Similarly, a regression of the technology specialization indicator in 1989 on a
constant and the technology specialization indicator in 1972 (lagged 17 years)
gives a slope estimate of 0.49, which suggests there was even less long-term in-
fluence of past specialization in technology. But this interpretation is merely an
example of the so-called Galton's regression fallacy, which often arises when
the dependent variable y and the independent variable x have a bivariate normal
distribution and are measured as deviations from their means, which is true for
the specialization indicators used here. The conditional distribution of the de-
pendent variable y is then also normal around the mean m, according to:
E(Y\X = x) = m(y) + pcr(y)/cr(x)(x - m(x)). If the variances of the two mar-
ginal distributions <J
2(.) are very similar, the regression coefficient must be
smaller than unity because the correlation coefficient p always is. This does not
reveal any useful information about the relationship between the two variables
(Maddala 1992: 104-106).
Moreover, taking the negative slope estimates from above at face value would
imply that the distributions of the specialization indicators must converge to a
single point at the mean. But as can be seen from comparing non-parametric
density estimates for selected years (Figures 11 and 12),
11
3 the distributions of
the specialization indicators do not collapse. Instead, excess kurtosis, made
visible in Figure 12 by graphing — in addition to the density estimates — the
normal density for the sample mean and sample variance of the technology
specialization indicator, seems to be decreasing over time, and that for both the
technology and the industry specialization indicator. These kinds of methodo-
The density estimates in Figures 11 and 12 are based on the Gaussian kernel with
window width selected automatically as suggested in Silverman (1986: 45—48).131
Figure 11 — Non-Parametric Density Estimates for the Industry Specialization
Indicator for 1970 and 1988
1970
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Note: Only points supported by sample data are shown, so as to indicate the dif-
ferential reliability of the estimate on various subsections of the domain.132
Figure 12— Non-Parametric Density Estimates for the Technology Speciali-
zation Indicator for 1972 and 1989
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Note: The more regular shaped (flatter) lines graph the corresponding normal
densities for the sample means and variances.133
logical problems, associated with 'Galton's fallacy', also beset the (growth)
convergence regressions discussed in Section B.V above.
A better way of estimating a model of evolving cross-section distributions in
terms of probability measures, recently used by Quah (1993a) in a different
context, is to specify the operator T* as a stochastic kernel,
11
4 which maps the
product of the real line with its Borel sets to the unit interval, and to estimate
this by appropriately rescaling a non-parametric density estimate of transitions,
to obtain a conditional probability for each fixed neighbourhood in the con-
tinuous state space of degrees of industrial specialization. Loosely speaking, this
method makes a (two-dimensional) non-parametric density estimate of the
transition function implied by the underlying stochastic difference equation.
While a proper judgement on the hypothesis of hysteresis will have to take into
account the actual movements in relative factor endowments, unconditional
estimation may already give valuable insights into the nature of specialization
dynamics. Indeed, the unconditional dynamics should be looked at first, because
conditioning brings in methodological problems of its own; e.g. the exogeneity
of changes in relative factor endowments may be in doubt.
Figure 13 graphs stochastic kernel estimates
11
5 of one-year and five-year
transitions in the industry specialization indicator. Figure 14 does the same for
the corresponding technology specialization transitions. These graphs make
clear that there is high persistence in specialization in the short run — prob-
ability mass is concentrated on and closely around the 45°-diagonal. But there
seems to be considerably less persistence over longer time horizons, particularly
in the case of technological specialization: probability mass leaks out and flows
away from the diagonal, and apparently more so at the ends of extreme speciali-
zation.
11
6 Comparing the lower panel in Figure 13 and 14 suggests that over a
five-year period there is less persistence in technology than in industry speciali-
11
4 The difference equation in probability measures then becomes, for all H on the real
line, Xt(H) = \M{x,H) ht-\(dx), where M:/?X.9f->[0,l] denotes the stochastic
kernel, x the specialization indicator at time t—1, and H the expected specialization
indicator at t; recall that K is a suitably defined probability measure.
11
5 Using the squared Epanechnikov kernel, as described in Silverman (1986:
Chapter 4).
11
6 In the lower panel of Figure 13, the spikes at the positive end of specialization are
merely a consequence of outliers in non-parametric density estimation and should
not distract from the more relevant other parts of the picture. Such outliers are more
frequent for small countries where manufacturing is more likely to be dominated by
one particular industry, which then causes the 'value added indicator' of spe-
cialization to take on an unusually high value. A usually law value would indicate
that an industry is almost non-existent in a country; for example, many countries
have no real aircraft industry.134
Figure 13 — Stochastic Kernel Estimate for Industry Specialization Transitions
after One Year and Five Years
Five years135
Figure 14 — Stochastic Kernel Estimate for Technology Specialization Tran-
sitions after One Year and Five Years
Five years136
zation measured in terms of value added — just the contrary of what would
presumably be needed to establish causality from hysteresis in technological de-
velopment to hysteresis in industrial specialization patterns.
2. Finite Markov Chains
Although the graphic results of the preceding subsection give a rather sug-
gestive visual picture of the overall dynamics in sectoral specialization, as
documented in the data, they do not allow to draw proper statistical inferences,
nor to calculate the expected long-run stationary distributions, should they exist.
But these kinds of inferences would be essential for a sound judgement on the
hypothesis of hysteresis.
Therefore, an alternative approach to estimation may be preferable, in which
the operator T* is approximated by a finite Markov chain transition matrix for a
discretized state space. An empirical estimate of the transition matrix can give
useful information on the intradistributional mobility of individual industries
between different degrees of specialization over time, and can be used to cal-
culate long-run stationary distributions of the specialization indicator —
provided they exist — according to the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
[37] IT = IT • U
s~
r with the time period index S —> «>,
where IT denotes the transition probability matrix; its rows contain the con-
ditional probabilities that a transition beginning in a certain discrete state
(row /) will end after one step (in event time) or one period (in historical time)
at a certain state (column j). Yl
r consequently has the probabilities of moving
from initial states to intermediate states after r steps or periods of time.
To discretize the continuous state space of the logarithmic specialization in-
dicator, six states are defined — somewhat arbitrarily — by setting upper
boundaries at fi-sd, /i-sd/3, fi, /i + sd/3, ji + sd, and at °o, where /n
stands for the sample mean and sd for the standard deviation of the indicator
realizations over all years from 1970 to 1988. The corresponding 6x6 Markov
chain transition matrix is estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function
[38] log/, =log/>i(1970)+Zfy
with respect to /?,% and subject to the restriction Z/Ay =1,
where /7,-(1970) are the initial probabilities of having a realization of the spe-
cialization indicator in state i, pg are the probabilities of having a realization in
state) after a specified transition period, conditional upon a prior realization in137
state i, and hy sue the observed frequencies of transitions from state i to state j
in that period. Ignoring any information about transition probabilities which
may be contained in the initial probability distribution,
11
7 and assuming the
transition probabilities to be invariant with respect to time as well as across in-
dustries and countries, the Maximum Likelihood estimator can be readily com-
puted as:
t
39] Pij = hjlh >
 wher
e
 hi = ^j
hij -
This estimator can be shown to be consistent and to have an asymptotic nor-
mal distribution (Basawa and Prakasa Rao 1980: 54-57).
Table 9 presents estimates of first-order, time-stationary transition prob-
abilities over periods of one, five and ten years for the entire data set of industry
specialization in terms of value added, including all twelve countries and the
seventeen industries described in the appendix. The first panel gives the one-
step annual transition matrix, whose (i, j) entry is the conditional probability
that the degree of specialization of a certain industry in a certain country has
transited from state i to state j after one year. The first column gives the total
number of observed transitions from all starting states /, which are arranged in
increasing order of indicator values. Entries on the main diagonal are the
probabilities that the degree of specialization of an industry observed in a
certain interval of the state space will not have moved out of that interval after
one year. Entries to the right of the main diagonal give the probabilities that an
industry increases its relative weight in a certain country compared with that
industry's weight in the world, whereas entries to the left of the main diagonal
are the probabilities for an industry to lose ground in a certain country, relative
to the overall share of this industry in the world.
11
8
The first panel shows high persistence at the extremes, with diagonal entries
of 89 per cent at the low and 90 per cent at the high end of specialization states.
Entries in the middle of the diagonal are much lower, indicating substantial
mobility of industries in those countries in which they have a relative weight
similar to the world average. In rows 2 and 3, the sum of entries to the right of
the main diagonal is greater than the sum of entries to the left, which indicates
This is warranted for large h but may be problematic in other cases. If the total
number of observed transitions were small, due to a short observation period, one
would have to decide how much weight the initial distribution of the specialization
indicator should be given in making inferences about transition probabilities and
about the long-term probability distribution.
Entries are rounded to two decimal places; non-entries indicate that both decimal
places are zero after rounding.138
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that below-average specialization is more likely to be followed by an increase
than by a decline. In rows 4 and 5, the reverse is true for above-average spe-
cialization. These estimates thus do not indicate perfect persistence, but con-
siderable inertia in patterns of specialization. Not surprisingly then, the long-
run stationary distribution — computed according to the Chapman-Kolmogorov139
equation and reported in the first panel along with the sample distribution — is
ergodic
11
9 and does not show any concentration of probability mass at the ex-
treme ends of specialization.
The second and third panels give estimates of five- and ten-year transition
matrices, respectively. The entries on the main diagonal are here much lower,
indicating much less persistence over longer periods of time. Qualitatively,
however, the overall picture remains basically unchanged from the one-year
transitions. The only interesting difference is in the third panel where the
stationary distribution computed from the ten-year transition matrix does seem
to show slightly higher concentration of probability at the extremes than the
sample distribution. But this may merely indicate a mild general trend towards
increasing specialization rather than high persistence, because the off-diagonal
entries in the ten-year transition matrix again show convergence of countries'
shares in industries' value added to the world average.
To illustrate consistency of short-run and long-run estimates, the one-year
transition matrix has been iterated ten times, the result of which is reported in
the fourth panel. Since the entries on the main diagonal are much smaller than
the corresponding entries in the directly estimated ten-year transition matrix,
this comparison suggests that persistence may actually be higher than estimated
by first-order Markov chain models. As a caveat, one should note that part of
the higher mobility in technology may be due to measurement problems: Be-
cause the patent count data are integer-constrained, small countries with often
very few patents per year in some industries will show spuriously high mobility,
so for instance when a year with two recorded patents, assigned for a small
country to a particular industry, is followed by a year with only one patented
application from the same country in that particular industry.
An overall similar picture emerges from estimates of six-state Markov chain
transition matrices for the RTA index of technological specialization, reported
in Table 10. The major difference to the results for industry specialization in
terms of value added seems to be that almost all entries on the main diagonal
(in all panels) are much smaller than the corresponding entries in Table 9.
There appears to be considerably less persistence in technological specialization
than in production, which casts doubt on the hypothesized causality from tech-
nological externalities in the form of knowledge spill-overs from R&D to
hysteresis in production. The high mobility in technological specialization is
underlined by the speedy convergence of the iterated one-year transition matrix
to its stationary distribution, which seems to be almost completed after only ten
iterations (last panel in Table 10).
Recall that a Markov chain is ergodic if it is irreducible, positively recurrent and,
according to some authors, aperiodic.140
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Although these estimation results on the overall dynamics of specialization in
value added and technology do not seem to support the hypothesis of hysteresis,
the picture may be different at the level of individual industries. After all, the
claim of hysteresis is made mostly in view of those industries which make in-141
tensive use of technological innovation and which are therefore rightly classi-
fied as high-technology industries. Separate estimates of five-year transition
matrices for a number of industries, selected for the high technology content of
their typical products, are presented in Table A8, both for the industry and the
technology specialization indicators.
Empirical research on positive external effects from innovation at the in-
dustry level has repeatedly found evidence for their existence in parts of the
chemical industry, in pharmaceuticals, machinery, microelectronics and in the
professional instruments industry (Mohnen 1990). Particular attention will
therefore be paid to the specialization dynamics in these and the closely related
industries of the sample.
12
0 In the chemical (CHEM) industry (excluding drugs
and medicines), persistence in terms of entries on the main diagonal appears to
be even lower than in the five-year transition matrix for all industries, except at
the extreme end of above-average specialization, where the estimated probabil-
ity of remaining in the highest state is 94 per cent. The off-diagonal entries
suggest that the degree of specialization tends to converge towards the average
whenever a national chemical industry is over- or underrepresented in its home
country compared with the share of chemicals in total world manufacturing.
In the technological specialization indicator of the chemical industry, on the
other hand, persistence on the main diagonal is higher for almost all states than
in the five-year technology transition matrix for all industries. Moreover, the
entries in the second, third and fourth row suggest that transitions may often be
away from the average share of chemical patenting in total patents granted in
all fields of technology. However, the bulk of observations, entries in row five,
do not show divergence from the mean. And overall, the chemical industry
technology transition matrix does not look very different from the transition
matrix of specialization in terms of value added.
For the industry specialization indicator in the drug and medicine (DRUG)
industry, generally less persistence is estimated on the main diagonal than in
the chemical industry and in all industries together. This holds, too, for the
technology specialization indicator, except for the middle states. Moreover, only
the third row of the technology transition matrix suggests slightly higher
probability of the indicator moving away from the mean. In the five-year tran-
sition matrix for the rubber and plastics (RAP) industry, by contrast, persistence
appears to be high at the extreme ends of industrial specialization, with a
tendency in the second, third and fourth row to move further away from the
mean. The technology transition probabilities appear to be more in line with
those of all industries, except for the fourth row, where a trend away from the
mean is estimated.
120 See the data appendix for a listing of all sample industries and their ISIC codes.142
In the office and computing machinery (COMP) industry, generally less
persistence is observable — in both value added and technology (except for the
high end of technology transitions) — than in all industries together, and no
tendency of divergence can be detected. Also the electrical machinery (ELMA)
industry seems to have generally lower persistence than the specialization in-
dicators for all industries. But divergence is observed in the second and to some
extent in the fifth row of the value added transition matrix as well as in the
fourth row of the technology transition matrix. The transition matrix estimated
for value added in the motor vehicle (MOTV) industry is rather irregular and
difficult to interpret — due to the unfortunate clustering of most observations in
the fifth interval of the discretizing grid. The technology transition matrix is
characterized by low persistence in the middle states and high persistence at the
ends; but only the third row has an entry that signals a trend away from the
mean.
High persistence at the end states is again characteristic for the estimated
technology transitions in shipbuilding (SHIP), but the transition matrix in terms
of value added is quite similar to that of all industries together. Finally, both the
aircraft (AIRC) industry and the professional instruments (PROF) industry have
very high persistence at the extremes in their value added specialization in-
dicator, but much less so in their technology specialization indicator.
Except for the value added specialization indicator in the motor vehicle
(MOTV) industry and for the technology indicator in the radio, television and
communication equipment (RTVC) industry
121, the estimated transition dy-
namics of industrial and technological specialization in individual industries are
all ergodic with unique stationary distributions. But only for industry and tech-
nology transitions in the drug and medicine (DRUG) industry and for tech-
nology transitions in the aircraft, electrical machinery and, arguably, non-
metallic mineral products industry do the stationary distributions resemble the
corresponding sample distribution, as would be expected in the absence of any
path-dependence or hysteresis. On the other hand, only the stationary distri-
butions for technology in the motor vehicle and professional goods industries
and for value added in the non-metallic mineral products industry turn out
really bimodal, as would be expected in the case of hysteresis. Most stationary
distributions rather have a concentration of probability mass in the middle states
(CHEM, COMP, ELMA value added and AIRC technology) or at one end only
The motor vehicle {MOTV) industry indicator and the radio, TV and communication
equipment (RTVC) technology indicator transitions matrices are divided in two
ergodic sets. In the case of RTVC technology, the highest state appears to be
absorbing, no transitions out of this state are observed. In the case of MOTV value
added, one ergodic set is comprised of the two lowest states, the other of the
remaining four states.143
(RTVC and PROF value added, CHEM and COMP technology and both in-
dicators for FOOD, RAP, IRON, NFM, FABM, MACH and SHIP).
On the whole, these observations, however, should neither be taken as final
evidence for nor against high persistence pointing to hysteresis. Instead, they
may be an unfortunate consequence of including countries of vastly different
sizes in one and the same transition matrix. When the largest or a few of the
largest economies increase their share in total value added in a certain industry,
then more of the smaller economies must be losing shares in this industry.
Consequently, the Maximum Likelihood estimator assigns a larger weight to the
more frequently observed losses of the more numerous smaller economies than
to the corresponding gains of one or very few big economies. A stationary
distribution with a concentration at one end may thus often reflect a monotone




One way of dealing with the inconvenience caused by the great disparity in
the sizes of countries in the sample is to estimate transition matrices ior fractile
Markov chains as proposed by Geweke et al. (1986) and recently applied by
Quah (1993c) in another context. Instead of using an arbitrary grid to discretize
the continuous state space of the specialization indicators, one can fix a set of
increasing, non-redundant probabilities, equally spaced on the open unit
interval, say P= {1/6,1/3,1/2, 2/3, 5/6,1}, and let this determine for each
period t a corresponding set of quantiles.
12
3 The sequence of quantile sets
{Q(f): integer t} then parametrizes movements in the entire distribution, while
the estimated fractile transition probability matrix — named so by Quah
(1993c) —parametrizes intradistribution mobility.
The simple Maximum Likelihood estimator is again based on the assumption
of invariance of the transition probabilities with respect to time and the relevant
cross-section dimension — countries, industries or both. If the estimated fractile
matrix is ergodic, its stationary distribution will be uniform relative to the
12
2 Similarly, a stationary distribution with a concentration in the middle may lend
spurious support to the hypothesis of convergence in specialization indicators. In
fact, it may indicate that the two largest economies, the United States and Japan,
have monotonically moved in opposite directions away from the middle states,
pulling many of the smaller, perhaps initially more specialized economies inwards
from the end states. In theory, the move of two dominating economies in opposite
directions may even be the consequence of hysteresis when one of them is winning a
path-dependent technological race in a certain industry where positive externalities
have a strong impact on productivity.
12
3 Experimenting with different ways of discretizing the state space is generally
recommended as a test for robustness of Markov chain estimates, regardless of any
specific problems like varying country sizes. Arbitrary and inappropriate dis-
cretization without considering alternatives often is. a source of spurious results.144
quantiles Q (Quah 1993c: 15). Estimates of intradistribution mobility will here
be less disturbed by a trend movement of a large country since the fractile
method basically implies a redefinition of the grid discretizing the state space in
each period of time. In order to relate the stationary distribution to the original
state space one would have to consider — in addition to intradistribution
mobility — movements in the entire distribution as estimated in the sequence of
quantile sets {Q(t): integer t}.
124
In the present context, it will suffice to examine whether the interquantile
range increases, decreases or remains constant over time. This can be done by
running a simple linear regression of the interquantile range on time and testing
for significance of the slope coefficient. Within this approach, a significant
positive time trend in the interquantile range combined with high persistence in
terms of large entries on the main diagonal — especially at the ends — of the
estimated fractile matrix would point to hysteresis, whereas a negative or no
time trend in the interquantile range and low persistence in the transitions
matrix would appear to contradict the hypothesis of hysteresis.
Estimates of the ten-year fractile Markov chains for specialization in value
added and technology taking all industries together (reported in Table 11) re-
veal almost the same degree of persistence on the main diagonal as observed in
the previously reported non-fractile Markov chain estimates. Again, persistence
appears to be lower in technology than in value added. But for both, a positive
time trend in the interquantile range, albeit a mild one, is found to be sig-
nificant at the 5 per cent level.
Looking at fractile Markov chain transition estimates for individual in-
dustries (Table A9) generally confirms the picture that has emerged from the
estimates of non-fractile Markov chain transitions. However, more persistence
at the end states of specialization is observed in the chemical, electrical machin-
ery and professional instruments industry, while the radio, television and com-
munication equipment industry divides into two ergodic sets of three states each.
But in the machinery industry as well as the office and computing equipment
industry persistence at the end states appears less pronounced when estimating
fractile Markov chains. In the fractile estimates of five-year technology tran-
sition matrices for individual industries, more persistence at the ends is notice-
able in the drug and medicine and electrical machinery industries, less per-
sistence in the radio, TV and communication equipment and motor vehicle in-
dustries.
But any attempt at forecasting the stationary distribution of individual industries'
specialization on the corresponding original state space may bear the danger of
reintroducing the stated problems associated with vastly differing country sizes.145
Table 11 — Fractile Markov Chain Estimates for the Specialization Indicators
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But only for the technology transitions in shipbuilding, machinery and the
professional instruments industries are positive time trends in the interquantile
range detected which are significant at the 5 per cent level. Of these three
industries, the machinery industry also has a significant positive time trend in
the interquantile range of its industry specialization indicator in terms of value
added, whereas the corresponding interquantile range for the professional in-
struments industry is significantly negative, and that of shipbuilding not sig-
nificantly different from zero. The evidence of high persistence in the estimated
fractile transition matrices of specialization in terms of value added is again
undermined by a negative time trend in the interquantile range in the case of the
chemical, electrical machinery, motor vehicle and aircraft industries.
Where a positive time trend coincides with high persistence at the end states
of value added specialization — as in the rubber and plastics, non-metallic
mineral products and non-ferrous metals industries — this can still not justify a
hysteretic explanation based on knowledge externalities, because no time trend
and low persistence are observed in the corresponding technology specialization
indicators. It appears that the estimated fractile transition matrices for both
technology and value added specialization are jointly supportive of the hypoth-
esis of hysteresis only in the case of the machinery industry.146
III. The Impact of Changes in Factor Endowments
Although the preceding discussion has described the observable dynamics of
technological and industrial specialization for twelve OECD countries in some
detail, this is still a long way from giving conclusive evidence on hysteresis.
Apart from methodological questions such as robustness of the non-parametric
estimates, the main shortcoming of the preceding analysis is its lack of
accounting for relative factor endowments in the sample countries and changes
thereof during the sample period. If factor endowments have any impact at all
on the international allocation of sectoral economic activities, they might — in
the case of monotonic time trends in the dynamic comparative advantages of
countries — even be responsible for patterns of specialization dynamics which
point to a bimodal stationary distribution, just like hysteresis would.
12
5 It is
surely important to account for the influence of changes in the relative factor
supplies of countries when analyzing the dynamics of specialization with a view
to testing hysteresis, although this will — admittedly — be a very difficult task.
A first attempt is made by simply regressing the familiar value added
indicator of an industry's specialization in the sample countries on conceptually
similar indicators of countries' relative factor endowments, and by subsequently
estimating fractile Markov chain transition matrices on the residuals. Provided
all relevant endowments are appropriately considered, this procedure eliminates
that part of the specialization dynamics which can be accounted for by the
dynamics of comparative advantages. The residual dynamics would then lend
support to the hypothesis of hysteresis, if they showed high persistence at the
end states of specialization and a positive time trend in the interquantile range.
They would, on the other hand, cast doubt on hysteresis if there was low
persistence or a negative time trend in the interquantile range.
The factor endowments considered here for each of the twelve countries are:
physical capital, R&D capital, the number of R&D scientists and engineers in
the business enterprise sector, the labour force, and the years of schooling in the
labour force. While R&D capital, using cumulative R&D expenditures as a
proxy for the national stock of technical knowledge, and physical capital are
both stocks from which input services flow, the other three factors are more
direct measures of input flows, although years of schooling and the number of




This can already be seen from the stylized Ricardian model with stochastic re-
contracting discussed in Section C.II.
126 por sources an(j methods see Appendix II.147
On theoretical grounds one might argue that these factor endowments should
not be given equal weight as conditioning factors for sectoral specialization,
because they are likely to possess quite different degrees of international mobil-
ity. Only fully immobile factor endowments should ideally be treated as country-
specific characteristics, but this issue seems to be of lesser importance here, and
is therefore neglected. To avoid implicitly regressing on country size, yearly
factor supplies have been normalized dividing each country's share in the total
supply of all twelve countries by the country's share in the sum of the gross
domestic products of all twelve countries. As with the industry specialization
indicators, a logarithmic transformation is made to obtain more symmetrically
distributed variables.
The separate regressions of each industry's indicator of specialization in
value added on the indicators of relative factor endowments have been done by
ordinary least squares, pooling time series across countries. By design, no at-
tempt has been made to correct the estimation for the substantial autocorrelation
(over time) which is evident in the residuals. After all, it is precisely the
structure of this autocorrelation which is subsequently to be analyzed in terms of
fractile Markov chain transition probabilities. A general tendency of divergence
in the autocorrelated residuals away from their theoretical mean of zero could be
interpreted as evidence in support of hysteresis, whereas substantial non-mono-
tonic mobility of the residuals, or even convergence to the mean, would lend
support to the alternative hypothesis of dynamic comparative advantages as an
adequate explanation of industrial specialization dynamics. Notice that neither
divergence nor convergence in the residuals is predisposed by the chosen
regression method. But the assumption of exogeneity of factor endowments with
respect to industrial specialization patterns is fundamental to the interpretations
advanced. This assumption may, of course, be open to question.
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 12. Note that the estimated
parameters should not be interpreted as revealing any specific economic
causality—for several reasons. First, there is substantial collinearity between
the factor endowment indicators. Some bivariate correlations between the
exogenous variables are higher than bivariate correlations with the dependent
variable in many of these regressions; the variance inflation factors, i.e. the
diagonal elements of the inverse of the correlation matrix, are all around two in
magnitude.
12
7 Second, the regressions are, by ordinary standards, misspecified
since the hypothesis of no country-fixed effects, which is implicit in using only
one common intercept for each industry regression, is clearly rejected at any
This indicates that all variances of the estimated coefficients are about twice as
large as they would be if there was no correlation between the respective regressor
and the other independent variables.148


















radio, TV and communi-
cation equip.



















































































































































































































(eleven countries for MACH, COMP, ELMA,
RTVC, AIRC and PROF), t-values in parentheses. —For further explanations see Section E.III in the main text.
conventional level of significance.
12
8 And third, the estimation of pooled data
by simple ordinary least squares ignores that in reality adjustment costs are
Similarly, the hypothesis of structural stability across time is rejected at the 1 per
cent level of significance in the case of RAP, IRON, NFM, MACH, COMP, ELMA,
RTVC and at the 5 per cent level of significance in the case of CHEM, SCG, MOTV,
SHIP and AIRC. These inferences are based on a general Wald test for the joint
significance of an intercept and slope dummies for the subperiod 1980 through
1988. In the case of the PROF industry, slope dummies for the specified subperiod
are significant at the 5 per cent level for the schooling and the R&D scientists and
engineers endowment indicators.149
likely to have an important impact on the relationship between changing
relative factor endowments and the industrial specialization in open economies.
Nevertheless, the residuals from these 'naive' regressions may be of use in
Markov chain analysis where they are simply taken to be that part of the spe-
cialization dynamics which is statistically unexplained by movements in coun-
tries' relative factor endowments. The regressions are merely used to filter out
those components of the industry specialization dynamics which are not orthog-
onal to relative factor endowments. It would therefore be misleading to include
dummies to capture country-fixed effects in these regressions and thus to avoid
what is, from a statistical point of view, a misspecification. Although such
dummies would surely account for much of the variation in the specialization
indicators and greatly improve the fit of the regressions reported in Table 12,
they would spoil those characteristics in the residuals which bear on the hypoth-
esis of hysteresis. After all, it is precisely the persistence of country specific ef-
fects in the residuals' autocorrelation structures which is to be analyzed in terms
of fractile Markov chains.
A glance at Table 12 suggests that, in some industries — notably in food,
beverages and tobacco and in fabricated metal products — factor endowments
do not account well for the variation in measured specialization. In most other
regressions, however, there are acceptable coefficients of determination, ad-
justed for degrees of freedom. Thus, the residuals from these regressions are
likely to have dynamics quite distinct from those of the unconditioned indicators
of industrial specialization in the sample countries.
Estimation of a six-state, five-year fractile Markov chain transition matrix on
the residuals from all industries together reveals clearly less persistence on the
main diagonal than in the corresponding unconditioned fractile transition
matrix.
12
9 Moreover, there is no significant time trend. This evidence against
hysteresis is in fact confirmed by most fractile transition probability estimates
for individual industries' residuals: less persistence than in the unconditional
specialization dynamics is observed in the residuals from the drug and
medicine, professional instruments, aircraft, shipbuilding, rubber and plastics,
electrical machinery, office and computing machinery as well as from the
radio, TV, communication equipment industries. The latter industry's residuals
also lose their previously striking division of the five-year fractile transition
matrix into two ergodic sets.
Furthermore, testifying against the case of hysteresis are the significant
negative time trends in the interquantile range — mostly higher in absolute
terms than in the unconditioned dynamics — which are estimated for several
See Table 13 for the estimated overall residual transition probabilities and for
separate estimates of selected industries' residual transition matrices.150
Table 13 — Fractile Markov Chain Estimates for the Industry Residual
Specialization Indicator, 1970-1988











































































































































































Transition end state (quantile^
1/3 1/2 2/3 5/6




































































































































































































Office and computing machinery
Electrical machinery, excl. radio,
TV and communication equip.















































industries. But a significant positive time trend in the interquantile range
remains in the machinery as well as in the rubber and plastics industries.
Nevertheless, hysteresis on the basis of knowledge spill-overs is most unlikely in
the case of the rubber and plastics industry— not only because the residual153
dynamics show so little persistence, but also because low persistence is as well
characteristic for the technology dynamics, be they estimated in terms of fractile
or non-fractile five-year Markov chains transitions (reported in Section E.II.2
above). In the case of the machinery industry the degree of persistence in
technology and in the residual dynamics is quite similar to that of all industries
together — no special case here either. So it seems that the hypothesis of
hysteresis in industrial specialization, based on positive knowledge spill-overs
from R&D, finds little convincing support in the available data, once they are
subjected to a close and careful examination.
To sum up, this chapter has reported new evidence, using an approximation
in terms of finite Markov chains, to assess the empirical dynamics of speciali-
zation in advanced open economies — with an eye on the controversial
hypothesis of hysteresis, allegedly caused by path-dependence and national idio-
syncracies in sectoral technological accumulation. The evidence from the non-
parametric estimates of Markov chain transition probabilities presented here
does not point to hysteresis in the dynamics of industrial specialization, al-
though there may be considerable inertia in some industries.
The basic finding of no real hysteresis appears to be fairly robust since it is
confirmed both when considering all industries together and when scrutinizing
individual industries separately. Conditioning on five factor endowments, as-
sumed to be of particular relevance in technological development and modern
manufacturing, has not overturned the findings. On the contrary, conditioning
— although done here in a crude, preliminary fashion — has strengthened the
case for dynamic comparative advantages (the alternative hypothesis) as an
adequate explanation of observable specialization dynamics.
As a caveat, one should note that these conclusions are arrived at without
having considered the possibility that the observed specialization dynamics have
in part been shaped by specific industrial policies, which governments of in-
dividual countries may have undertaken in the past. Moreover, the conclusions
drawn from the residual dynamics hinge on the exogeneity of changes in factor
supplies, including physical and R&D capital, with respect to changing patterns
of specialization. This exogeneity is likely to be disputed by advocates of path-
dependence in technological change and industrial specialization dynamics.
A number of other important problems also remain unresolved in this study.
One of these is how to take the great variation in the size of national economies
properly into account. This problem might be alleviated if a larger cross section
of countries became available, in which the specialization dynamics of more
countries of similar size could be compared with each other. Another possibility
to come to terms with size might be to apply the methodology explored here to
regional data sets, where hysteresis would again be a serious hypothesis to
confront, and where the largest region might not be as dominant as the United154
States are in the world economy. Alternatively, instead of trying to avoid the
statistical problems stemming from vastly differing country sizes, one could
address the issue more directly; an important question would be whether hyster-
esis might become effective only when a certain industry, or the pertinent R&D
activities of a country, had passed a certain threshold in terms of absolute size.
Another important question relates to the level of industry aggregation used
in this study. The hypothesis of hysteresis based on path-dependence in tech-
nological dynamics may actually be more relevant at lower levels of sectoral ag-
gregation. Besides, potentially interesting information may surface from tech-
nology measures other than patent count data. Quantitative information on
R&D inputs, for instance, may reveal how intensively the R&D activities in dif-
ferent industries make use of scarce factors, like specialized human capital.
Finally, the incorporation of conditioning information needs to be improved
upon, and more powerful methods of statistical inference need to be devised and
applied in future work on this subject.155
In the model, "picking winners" is easy. If only it
were so in reality!
— Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1988: 31)
F. Implications for Industrial and Technology
Policies
The theory of endogenous technological change, which was discussed in Chap-
ters B and C, states conditions, i.e. the national diffusion of knowledge spill-
overs from R&D among others, under which certain targeted industrial and
technology policies have the potential to raise national welfare. The empirical
findings reported in Chapters D and E, however, raise doubts whether in the
1970s and 1980s the theoretical conditions were met in OECD countries for
which data on sectoral R&D activities and patterns of industrial and techno-
logical specialization have been available. Chapter D showed that the notion of
comparative advantage goes a long way towards explaining actual patterns of
specialization in countries' R&D activities. And the work reported in Chapter E
did not find much evidence of hysteresis in patterns of industrial and tech-
nological specialization.
I. Human Capital, Path-Dependence and the Historical
Nature of Economic Development in Geographical and
Technological Space
1. Positive Feedbacks in Human Capital Accumulation
In the present chapter, these empirical findings are taken to be merely prelimi-
nary results, not giving a final verdict on recent theories of endogenous tech-
nical change and path-dependent economic development. The discussion will
adopt the perspective of an economic consultant to a benevolent government
which considers embarking on a regime of targeted industrial and technology
policies despite the uncertainty about the validity of economic rationalizations
of such policies. Such a discussion seems important in view of the possibility
that, despite the predominantly negative findings of the present study, hysteresis
in specialization dynamics may still hold on a lower level of aggregation.156
What are the deliberations a responsible economic consultant should make
and present to his benevolent government? The answer has to be that, before
recommending any targeted policies for practical implementation, the applied
economist must first test the empirical implications of the theory in general, so
as to verify its validity, and second check whether all the particular conditions
for a welfare-improving potential of certain kinds of policy interventions, which
the theory identifies, are fulfilled in a given historical situation.
This twofold test would be a formidable task even if a theory of endogenous
technological change were to be considered in isolation, as the only relevant hy-
pothesis. But an additional, major difficulty lies in the need to discriminate both
between the various particular versions of the theory of endogenous techno-
logical change, on the one hand, and between these theories and other theories
of human capital accumulation and growth, on the other hand. The problem is
that some of the latter have empirical implications similar to those of some of
the former theories. Observational equivalence, however, does not necessarily
imply that the industrial policy implications are equal, too. It is for this reason
that the present chapter discusses some other new (and not so new) theories of
growth, which contend hypotheses that are partly complementary and partly
alternatives to the theory of endogenous technical change.
This is not to deny that recent strides in the microeconomic modelling of the
private incentives to invest in research and development, from which the theory
of endogenous technical change derives the determinants of innovation and
growth, have contributed considerably to a better understanding of growth in
industrialized economies. In particular, the models of horizontal product differ-
entiation are able to formally describe the increasing differentiation and spe-
cialization of technical knowledge as an important source of progress in pro-
ductivity, and to make it accessible to general equilibrium analysis.
Variety must have value: what else could explain the enormous complexity of
modern economies? The models, in particular the 'love-of-variety' function of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), formalize the economy's production apparatus with a
flexibility that does better justice to real-life arrangements, characterized by
never-ending adjustments and rearrangements through investments, than does
the Cobb-Douglas production function on its own, or its direct theoretical gen-
eralizations which are rooted in static analysis. It is, of course, characteristic for
the change in the production apparatus of a growing economy that relative
scarcities of goods and factors change all the time and that production processes
used are constantly being replaced — and not merely by other technically ef-
ficient processes previously known but often by entirely new processes. These
are sometimes discovered accidentally, but for the larger part they are found by
carefully planned, profit-seeking research and development efforts. However,
the accumulation of technical knowledge alone can hardly be the complete157
answer to the perennial question what causes growth. One hint at the com-
plexity of these causes is the observation that new knowledge can often generate
productivity gains only when it is efficiently put to use by specialists.
To be sure, Grossman and Helpman (1991) seem to recognize this, as they
differentiate between unskilled labour and scientifically or technically trained
specialists, and in Chapter 5 of their book endogenize the supply of human
capital (which individuals offer in the labour market) by explicitly modelling
the incentives for the young to undergo specialized academic or vocational
training. The models of endogenous technological change generally emphasize
the scarcity of individual human capital as a crucial bottleneck for long-term
growth. But in their dichotomy of skilled versus unskilled workers, which are
assumed to substitute (albeit imperfectly) in production, the authors neglect any
direct, threshold complementarity between skilled specialists and specialized
technical knowledge, which is frequently observed in reality. Yet, it is explicit
consideration of the increasing differentiation and specialization of individual
human capital which reveals important new insights into the potential growth
effects of industrial policies; and some of these are overlooked in the theory of
endogenous technical change.
A certain restrictiveness of the models of endogenous technical progress
results, for example, from the models' implication that the exogenous size of the
labour force sets an upper limit for the accumulation of individual human capi-
tal in each country. Indeed, the capacity of each individual brain may be
limited, but this does not necessarily restrict the capacity of a whole people
when the accumulation of individual human capital is a process of increasing
differentiation and specialization of individual skills and qualifications. Already
Adam Smith ([1776] 1994) recognized the productivity gains that a team of
complementary specialists could realize in comparison to the same number of
'jacks of all trades', but he assumed that the scope for specialization was limited
by the size of the respective market. Many economists have accepted this idea
and have viewed the observed secular increase in specialization since the in-
dustrial revolution as a consequence of falling transport costs, facilitating the
spatial expansion of local markets.
Becker and Murphy (1992), by contrast, develop a theory of endogenous
growth in which the specialization of individual human capital is not con-
strained by the limitations of local markets, but rather by costs of coordination
without which cooperation between different specialists would be all but im-
possible. These coordination costs consist of communication costs, an increased
probability of error in sequential and complementary work processes, and of ef-
ficiency losses, which are due to free-rider behaviour and blackmail attempts in
teams as well as due to the unavoidable debates and vote-taking to unify differ-
ent individual goals into a common group goal.158
In Becker and Murphy's model, the costs of coordinating a team, which can
be achieved either hierarchically within an organization or decentrally via mar-
kets, increase overproportionally when the size of the team grows. At the same
time, the productivity of the individual team member increases because in larger
teams it is profitable to invest in a deepening of human capital facilitating an
even stronger specialization of the individual. The limit of an efficient team ex-
pansion is reached when the marginal productivity gain just equals the ad-
ditional coordination cost per team member. This limit is approached more
rapidly, the higher the coordination costs and the steeper their increase in the
course of team expansion. The coordination of specialized human capital and of
other production factors is probably the most important task of entrepreneurs. A
large part of the decentral information needed for this job is in market econ-
omies transferred via prices which indicate the scarcity of specialized resources
and the relative importance and urgency of tasks (Hayek 1945).
An increase in (private) technical knowledge, on which specialists can rely in
their work, raises both their average productivity and the marginal product of
team expansion, which in turn creates further incentives to expand the division
of labour, the specialization of individuals, and to deepen the individuals'
human capital. Although Becker and Murphy (1992) assume that the returns to
training any one individual decrease, they do manage to model a process of en-
dogenous growth because each expansion of the division of labour due to an in-
crease of average productivity raises the private marginal product of additional
knowledge; the private incentives for human capital accumulation are hence
maintained. The division of labour and the accumulation of human capital as a
private endowment of individuals are linked by mutual causality without any in-
volvement of technological external effects.
Given the absence of any market failure, the growth rate of the model econ-
omy is efficient. Nevertheless, economic policy measures can have an influence
on the growth rate by altering the level of coordination costs and thus the in-
centives to acquire specialized skills and knowledge. The coordination costs are
lower in economies with a stable market-based system and with a government
guaranteeing free price formation, so that the advantages of an increasing di-
vision of labour can be used optimally even in anonymous teams. Consequently
as far as industrial policy measures bring about price distortions in product and
factor markets — especially in the case of output subsidies and artificial trade
barriers, but possibly also in the case of R&D subsidies — they put a constraint
on growth in the long term, regardless of any short-term merits they may have.
This model of endogenous growth based on an increasing division of labour
assumes that the individual's comparative advantages in performing certain
kinds of work are not bestowed upon him by nature, but rather that people are
born without any bias to develop special skills and that they acquire their par-159
ticular comparative advantages by undergoing specialized education and train-
ing. Although in reality specific talents for particular types of jobs may indeed
be rare, great differences in people's general talents are observable. Each gen-
eral talent for learning and creative problem solving can become productive in a
variety of areas. Since the leading positions in the management of an economy
and its government are (and should be) mostly occupied by highly talented
people, their choice of career can be extremely important for an economy. This
is so especially because the kind of leadership exerted can cause considerable
positive or negative external effects; and thus the private incentives for a highly
talented person to choose a particular career may differ from the social in-
centives. Murphy et al. (1991) develop an endogenous growth model in which
the consequences of the individual career choices of an economy's most talented
young people for the long-term rate of growth can be analyzed.
The starting point of this analysis is the observation that the most talented
individuals are attracted to occupations which exhibit increasing returns to
ability. Such occupations are found in industries which have a large market,
whose technology is characterized by only weakly decreasing returns to scale,
and in which the 'compensation contract' guarantees the private appropriation
of a large share of the total social returns to an individual's talent in his oc-
cupation. Thus, for example, inventive and entrepreneurial activity is more at-
tractive for highly talented individuals, the lower and flatter the shape of the
marginal cost curve for manufacturing and sales, the better the patent protection
and the more favourable the opportunities for price discrimination so as to ap-
propriate part of the consumer rent generated by product innovation or some
other entrepreneurial move.
13
0 On the other hand, leading positions in the gov-
ernment bureaucracy or in the legal profession, say, that of lawyer specializing
in civil law cases, can also be attractive for highly talented individuals.
But while inventive and entrepreneurial activity contributes to technical pro-
gress and productivity growth, i.e. generates positive external effects, lawyers
and government bureaucrats draw their incomes primarily from the redistri-
bution and partial acquisition of other people's income and wealth. They thus
generate negative external effects because they reduce the amount of resources
available for productive use and, by imposing an implicit or explicit tax, weaken
the incentives to undertake inventive and entrepreneurial activity. When the
attractiveness of leading positions in the redistribution sector exceeds that of
The breadth and length of patent protection and the opportunities for price dis-
crimination — for example by regional segmentation of the market — are typical
determinants of the share of the social returns to innovation which are privately ap-
propriable by the inventor. Further determinants are, among other things, the extent
of legal regulations pertaining to licence contracts, the extent and reliability of in-
tellectual property rights and the rate of income taxation.160
entrepreneurial activities, many of the most talented young individuals will
choose careers in the redistribution sector and will thus come to waste a great
deal of talent in an economic 'zero-sum game'. Consequently, fewer talented
individuals will find their way into inventive and entrepreneurial activities so
that the rate of technical progress and economic growth will be lastingly re-
duced.
In their model-based analysis, Murphy et al. (1991) show how the individual
choices for a career in redistribution versus a career in entrepreneurship, made
by the most talented young~people, can reinforce themselves over time. When
the talent of the best inventors and entrepreneurs in an industry increases,
technical progress in this industry will accelerate. Provided the industry faces
elastic demand, it will expand more rapidly and thereby become more attractive
for additional talent. On the other hand, positive feedback can also result from
the decisions of highly talented individuals to choose leading positions in the
redistribution sector. Since these talents are lost for inventive activities, and
even help to further raise the tax burden on entrepreneurial activities, technical
progress and growth will be reduced. Slow growth, in turn, reduces the oppor-
tunities and profits of entrepreneurial activity, since innovative products gen-
erally have an income elasticity of demand greater than one.
Murphy et al. (1991) conclude that rent-seeking
13
1 occupations in the re-
distribution sector are particularly attractive for talent in wealthy, but slowly
growing economies in which government consumption and transfer payments
claim a large share of national income. The attractiveness of entrepreneurial
activities, by contrast, depends on the size of markets for goods and services, the
quality of the infrastructure, as well as on free access to capital markets,
freedom of contract and the security of private property, inclusive of patent
protection.
Viewed from this perspective, there are at least three reasons why targeted
industrial policies may constrain or reduce economic growth. First, they directly
increase employment in the redistribution sector because industrial policy pro-
grammes have to be administered by the government bureaucracy and taken into
consideration by private business in their own administration. Qualified human
In the political economy literature, 'rent seeking' refers to entrepreneurial activity
which is not directed at the expansion of production, but rather at the exploitation of
opportunities for income and wealth redistribution, created by policies which re-
strict the elasticity of supply or demand functions artificially and which favour in-
siders at the expense of outsiders. Rents are really income that is received by the
owner of a naturally fixed production factor, e.g. land. Since in the model of
Murphy et al. (1991) the quantitative allocation of talent to different sectors of the
economy is not exogenously given, but depends on the quality of the respectively
most talented individual in a sector, the incomes of the highly talented are more cor-
rectly to be termed as quasi rents, instead of simply rents.161
capital is thus tied up and distracted from innovative and productivity-enhanc-
ing activities. Second, any industrial policy, even when initially intended for a
limited time only, raises expectations that it will be continued, further developed
and eventually complemented or replaced by new programmes. Industrial poli-
cies thus create incentives for private firms to invest resources in lobbying for
direct influence on the future design of industrial policy. This lobbying — a
socially unproductive activity — is yet another distraction for scarce individual
human capital, away from more productive activities. Third, if the industrial
policy measures fail to generate an immediate and substantial growth stimulus,
the relative income positions of lawyers and bureaucrats are raised both in the
private and the public sector so that, from the perspective of highly talented
young people, legal studies tend to become a more attractive choice than engi-
neering or scientific training.
Widespread concern about the negative impact of government regulations
and of an expanding bureaucracy on economic growth has been voiced for many
years in the United States, especially in view of the financial incentives that this
trend has created to seek a career as a lawyer. And Murphy et al. (1991) do find
in regression analyses some empirical support for the hypothesis that countries
with a large share of students in engineering studies subsequently attain higher
growth rates, and countries with a large share of their students in legal studies
lower growth rates, than the average of all countries observed.
2. Positive Feedbacks in Spatial Agglomeration
As shown in Chapter B, productivity gains from using ever more specialized
and differentiated inputs, technological external effects of new knowledge and
those pecuniary external effects on the supply or demand side of firms, which
are characteristic for dynamic imperfect competition in the presence of increas-
ing returns to scale, are essential elements in various modelling approaches
within new growth theory. These elements have important implications not only
for the temporal, but also for the spatial development of economic activity. This
is evidenced by the general geographical concentration of economic activity as
well as by the differences in growth rates between different regions and coun-
tries that are linked by trade in goods and movements of factors such as labour
and capital. Efficient agglomerations can, says an implicit hypothesis of new
growth theory, contribute to the acceleration of long-term growth by strengthen-
ing the effectiveness of positive pecuniary and technological external effects in
industries with returns to investment that do not decrease over time.
But just as endogenous technological progress need not be based on positive
technological external effects (though it may be), so are spatial agglomerations162
not necessarily based on positive technological external effects. Here again,
competing explanations have implications which are partly observationally
equivalent.
13
2 One explanation which does not necessarily rely on technological
externalities, and which is emphasized by Krugman (1991), begins with the
recognition that the individual industrial firm has to bear a fixed cost for each
production site it uses, and will thus generally want to concentrate its produc-
tion at as few sites as possible, indeed whenever possible at just one. Whichever
site the firm prefers depends, on the one hand, on the spatial allocation pattern
of demand, on the other hand, on supply conditions which are often influenced
by other firms of the same industry; so for example when several firms move
their production to one and the same site.
Thus, of interest here are not those industries which are tied to the location of
mineral deposits or other immobile factors; in a sense this can even be said of
agriculture which depends on the quality of soil. For those other industries,
which can be defined as 'footloose', technological externalities may, but need
not be important determinants of spatial concentration. Whichever determinants
are decisive in a particular case, depends on a number of circumstances: the
prevailing level of transport costs; the strength and range of external learning
effects or, respectively, the speed of new knowledge diffusion; the strength of
returns to scale internal to the firm; the prevailing market structures in the rele-
vant goods and labour markets; the degree of specialization of workers for their
respective industry; and the share of specialized capital and service inputs in a
particular industry's gross production.
In any case, the determinants of economic concentration are linked to what
are essential modelling assumptions in new growth theory. In the models of
learning by doing and of endogenous technical progress, the possibility of self-
sustaining long-term growth depends on the existence of sufficiently strong
positive external effects from private investments, especially from those in re-
search and development. If such external learning exists, it seems reasonable to
suppose that its impact is greatest at the site of origin, in the source city or in
the surrounding region of a firm, and that the impact decreases with increasing
distance, particularly when language and cultural barriers are crossed. The in-
dividual firm is then attracted to locate in the vicinity of other firms of the same
industry by the prospect of benefitting from technological externalities where
they are strongest.
However, even if external learning effects do not play any role at all, it can
still be advantageous for a firm to establish itself in the vicinity of similar firms.
One reason is the greater availability of specialized inputs and services at that
132 -Qjjg js implant to keep in mind when the discussion turns to the problem of how
to design efficient policies in Sections F.II and F.III.163
location. In the models of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991),
productivity gains due to increased use of specialized and differentiated inputs
serve as an explanation why the average physical return on investment does not
decrease in the course of the accumulation process. Although in these particular
models of endogenous technical change, technological external effects in the
form of knowledge spill-overs are essential, the assumption of non-decreasing
marginal returns does not generally presuppose the existence of technological
external effects when productivity growth is caused by an ongoing process of
introducing new varieties of capital goods and service inputs.
Recall that Romer (1987) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b) have in fact
shown that a positive long-term rate of growth can also be explained as an
endogenous phenomenon within models in which the users of specialized and
differentiated capital goods and input services benefit from purely pecuniary
external effects, associated with the sharing of common sources for the supply of
specialized and ever more refined capital and service inputs by a group of user
firms from one and the same industry. The suppliers of these inputs have to bear
a fixed cost for research and development whenever introducing a new variant.
The suppliers thus work under conditions of increasing returns to scale and
will — in the absence of price discrimination — pass on at least part of their fix
cost digression in the form of price reductions to all user firms whenever a new
customer, or the expanding business of an existing customer, creates additional
demand. In these models of monopolistic competition and increasing speciali-
zation in the capital goods sector, the monopoly power of individual firms is
constrained, and prevented from becoming permanent,
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3 not by technological
but by pecuniary external effects.
At the same time, these pecuniary externalities are a major force that en-
courages the spatial agglomeration of an industry: The productivity advantages
of using differentiated and specialized inputs are better exploited in a geo-
graphically concentrated industry whenever increasing returns to scale and the
costs of transporting industry-specific inputs play a non-negligible role in firms'
location decisions. This has been well known since the 19th century; Alfred
Marshall (1922) devoted the entire chapter ten in book four of his Principles of
Economics to this problem. Krugman (1991) has taken up this theme and ex-
amines the spatial implications of economic development with the aid of
modern analytical tools.
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3 Recall from Section A.II that monopoly power which can be permanently secured
without further effort to invent and develop new goods would eventually destroy all
incentives for private investments in new knowledge; economic growth would thus
peter out.164
In today's industrialized economies, labour and human capital represent par-
ticularly important specialized and differentiated inputs. Recall from the pre-
vious subsection that this observation motivated Becker and Murphy (1992) to
focus on the costs of coordinating individual human capital as a determinant of
endogenous long-term growth. The more specific to individual industries
workers' skills are — and they often seem to be quite specific in reality —, the
more advantageous becomes the geographically concentrated allocation of pro-
duction in these industries. Each individual worker has to bear the cost of his
training, and therefore — in a sense—faces increasing returns to the quality
scale of his qualification. As long as the industry, for which someone is special-
ized, grows and there is strong demand for his particular skills, all is fine. But if
demand unexpectedly shifts to other qualifications, the individual worker, who
may then have a shorter span of his working life left, will shy away from in-
curring the additional fixed cost of retraining for another industry, even if that
might earn him higher periodic income. The individual worker will therefore
prefer to be in a location where competing firms of 'his' industry offer alter-
natives without retraining should 'his' particular firm reduce employment for
internal reasons.
This consideration is important because the labour demand schedules of the
various firms in an industry fluctuate in uncertain and unpredictable ways over
time; in general, the fluctuations in the amount of labour demanded by individ-
ual firms are incompletely correlated. If the individual firm (as argued above)
wants to avoid spreading its production activities over several locations, so as to
better exploit increasing returns to scale, then it is advantageous for all par-
ticipants, workers as well as firms, and thus economically efficient to concen-
trate the entire industry at one site. The advantage for workers is, in the case of
inflexible wages, that the probability of unemployment is reduced, and in the
case of flexible wages that the amplitude of wage fluctuations due to firm-
specific shocks is reduced. In both cases do firms, concentrated in one location,
benefit from a greater flexibility (in the average) of adjusting their employment
to firm-specific shocks (Krugman 1991: 38-41).
In addition, the tendency of an industry to form local clusters can also be ex-
plained by the fact that an individual firm located separately from its com-
petitors would have the position of a local monopsony in the labour market and
— by restricting activity — could push wages below labour's marginal product.
Since the degree of monopsony power of the individual firm depends negatively
on how many other firms it competes with in its local labour market, workers
usually prefer to offer their services at the location with the greatest number of
firms of one and the same industry. Hence, at this location each individual firm
can find more workers willing to work at some fixed rate of pay, and con-
sequently each firm can make larger profits there than in any location with a165
lower number of firms from the industry. — As it is advantageous for both
firms and workers to migrate to the location with the highest density of firms in
the industry, eventually the entire industry will end up in just one location. The
quest for allocational efficiency in the labour market seems to be an important
force behind agglomeration at the industry level (Krugman 1991: 45-49).
While these effects can explain the geographical concentration of individual
industries, agglomerations at the aggregate level of an economy appear to be
primarily related to the interaction of strong firm-specific returns to scale, low
transport costs and a large share of footloose production, i.e. production not tied
to the location of mineral deposits. Strong firm-specific returns to scale imply
that it may be advantageous for a firm to concentrate all of its production at one
location even when it will thereby incur considerable transport costs when de-
livering to geographically distant markets. As transport costs fall, it becomes
advantageous even for firms with less strong internal returns to scale to concen-
trate all of their production at one site. By choosing a particular location, firms
generate a positive pecuniary externality, mostly due to the additional demand
of the firm's workers for other industries' goods and services.
To be sure, this mobile demand is irrelevant for the location of industries
which are geographically tied to certain places, for instance because of mineral
deposits. However, what can be said is this: the larger an economy's share of
geographically mobile production, the lower the relative significance of the
share of demand generated by geographically immobile industries, and con-
sequently, the greater the influence of the demand externalities from mobile
production on spatial patterns of allocating mobile production (Krugman 1991:
Chapter 1). Demand externalities are often reinforced by locational advantages
resulting from dense traffic and communication networks. The densest infra-
structure naturally develops in the region with the largest concentration of eco-
nomic activity, because in this region the cost of a given infrastructure — due to
indivisibilities in infrastructure investments — makes up a lower share of value
added than in other regions; and indivisibilities of infrastructure investments
prevent networks from being adjusted continuously in proportion to a rising
level of economic activity.
Although demand and infrastructure externalities, both in a sense examples
of 'network externalities', help to explain why there are agglomerations of eco-
nomic activity at the aggregate level, these explanations do not account for how
the geographic patterns of agglomerations evolve within a given economic
space. In what regions the forces of localization become so strong that these
regions turn into gravitation centres of economic activity, is often decided either
by historical accidents or by developments set in motion by the power of self-
fulfilling collective expectations. Krugman (1991: 11-14), discusses the ex-
ample of agglomeration in the American industry belt which emerged in the166
north-eastern United States and in the southern part of Canada in the last
century. This agglomeration, he argues, represents just one of several paths of
development possible at the time. Correspondingly, the observed agglomeration
of industrial activities in the Ruhr area and in the Rhine-Main area of Germany
can be interpreted as just one of several patterns that were possible ex ante.
Spatial allocation patterns develop and reinforce themselves as a result of de-
central, but interdependent decisions of market participants in the course of a
path-dependent allocation process with stochastic elements (see for the analysis
Chapter C). Stochastic elements come into play, for example, when individual
firms which are important first-movers make erroneous location decisions
which may then reinforce themselves as suppliers and competitors follow.
Stochastic allocation processes of this kind generally have multiple, irreversible
long-term equilibria which can differ considerably in terms of efficiency. That
the result of decentral decisions under these conditions is a Pareto-optimal allo-
cation in the long term is put into doubt by careful analysis: there is very little a
priori reason to expect a bias towards a Pareto-optimal allocation (Arthur 1988;
David 1988a; David 1988b). Even rational expectations would not prevent a
possible lock-in into an inefficient long-term allocation, as Arthur (1989)
shows. On the contrary, rational expectations may actually worsen the funda-
mental market instability and accelerate the process of lock-in.
Moreover, the optimality of path-dependent processes can normally not even
ex post be verified because a welfare-economic comparison would require com-
plete knowledge of the alternative development paths, which were excluded
from becoming reality. In any case, in planning industrial policy interventions
one has to take into account that these may influence not only the temporal but
also the spatial allocation of resources, provided they have any effect at all. In-
dustrial policy is therefore, in its motivation as well as in its effect, often inter-
twined with regional policy.
Agglomeration hypotheses have in recent years been put forward not only to
explain the differences in development between regions, but also to explain ag-
glomerations across industries or technologies, as well as temporal fluctuations
in economic activity (Hall 1991). The latter is of obvious interest to growth
theory since economic cycles are empirically inseparably connected with the
temporal development of economic activity. The interpretation of economic
cycles as agglomeration phenomena assumes that it is advantageous for the in-
dividual firm to synchronize its activities with the general economic cycle,
either for reasons internal to the firm, e.g. increasing returns to variable factors
of production, or for the presence of positive external effects, e.g. the higher
probability of success in many kinds of market searches during a boom relative
to a recession.167
Similar reasoning is sometimes put forward to explain technological devel-
opment as a sequence of agglomerations. Search under extreme uncertainty, the
need to synchronise new technologies with existing technologies so as to exploit
complementarities, and increasing returns to R&D investments are features of
technological development which seem to favour agglomerations along certain
technological paths, or 'innovation avenues' (Sahal 1985). And so are the many
specialized capital inputs and the high degree of specialization of the scientists
and engineers needed to push the frontier of knowledge back in certain de-
limited areas of technology. Hence, the advantages of locally concentrated la-
bour markets, pointed out by Krugman (1991), seem to be just as relevant to
agglomeration in some abstract technology space. In addition, true tech-
nological externalities in the form of knowledge spill-overs from R&D may re-
inforce path-dependence in technological development if they benefit primarily
those who work on related research programmes. Any such agglomerations in
technology would likely affect the dynamics of industrial structure, since many
industries are defined around (and their productivity is driven by) the typical
technologies they use.
But agglomerations in technological space or across industries can also be
explained in a rather different way, namely in terms of the agglomeration of a
country's individual human capital, particularly its entrepreneurial and in-
ventive talent, in certain industries (or technologies). This explanation has been
formalized by Murphy et al. (1991) who show that sectoral rates of growth may
differ from industry to industry, and can deviate from the Pareto-optimal growth
rates, for the sole reason that entrepreneurial and inventive talents are attracted
to cluster together in certain industries. This model assumes that highly talented
persons leaving school rarely ask themselves what their comparative advantages
are — which are anyway in most cases only weakly formed at that point in
time— but rather look for careers in which private returns increase over-
proportionally to talent. Although the choices of school leavers for a particular
career may not be strictly irreversible, they certainly have weight for the in-
dividual's future because of the high fixed cost incurred in the course of special-
ized study and training.
In Section F.I.I, the negative effects on growth were discussed which —
under these assumptions — may result from the allocation of individual human
capital when highly talented persons of a country can earn the highest private
returns on their talents in redistributive occupations, for example as a civil
lawyer or a government bureaucrat, and not in economically more productive,
i.e. knowledge-creating, inventive and entrepreneurial occupations. Yet even
ignoring redistributive activities for the moment, the allocation of the highly
talented to the various productive sectors of an economy need not be efficient. In
an efficient allocation, the best talents would be close to equally distributed168
across all industries so that productivity growth in all industries is as large as
possible (Murphy et al. 1991: 511). In the equilibrium of the model, by contrast,
the entire group of the very best of the talented comes together in one and the
same industry, in which the quasi rents
13
4 on extraordinary talent are
particularly high.
The reason is the model's assumption that the most talented person alone
determines productivity progress in her industry, yet due to technological and
pecuniary external effects can appropriate only a fraction of the social returns
generated by her activities. Thus, the industry, which is led by the most talented
entrepreneur of all, will attract many other entrepreneurially particularly
talented persons who can here earn extremely high private returns in the form
of quasi rents on their talent, mainly by technological imitation and by quickly
filling some of the many market gaps and niches, of which new ones emerge in
a dynamic industry all the time. Thus, for the other industries of the economy
only the less highly talented persons remain as inventors and entrepreneurs, so
that productivity progress is slower there than it could be, while leaving pro-
ductivity progress in the industry preferred by the performance elite unchanged.
A clear case of Pareto suboptimality.
While the social returns which the most talented entrepreneur in an industry
generates depend on the size of the market and on the scale characteristics of
the industry's production and sales technology, her private share of the social
returns is mainly determined by the type of compensation contract offered in the
industry. The compensation contract reflects, among other things, the potential
for price discrimination to capture a share of consumer rents and the scope of
protection for intellectual property. Inefficiently slow growth can therefore be-
come a problem even in industries which have a large market with great oppor-
tunities for growth, and which have production and sales technologies with
scarcely decreasing returns to scale, if these industries are stuck with a poor
compensation contract relative to other industries, and thus attract clearly less
inventive and entrepreneurial talent than would be desirable for the economy as
a whole.
At least in theory, then, certain interventions targeted at improving the com-
pensation contract in a 'neglected' industry might appear as potentially welfare
improving industrial policies. The long-term productivity growth could under
certain circumstances be considerably increased in this industry — possibly,
however, at the expense of other industries, which might lose not only rent-
Recan that the term 'quasi rents' describes income that the owner of a production
factor receives whose supply, due to legal regulations or other artificial market
entrance barriers, is less than fully elastic during a particular time. Rents, in con-
trast, are income from production factors whose amount is naturally, and often per-
manently, fixed.169
seeking human capital to the promoted industry, but also their performance
elite, which has determined their speed of innovation and productivity progress.
Apart from unlikely coincidences, the new equilibrium would, following the
logic of the model, again be economically inefficient; and this holds inde-
pendently of whether the rate of productivity growth aggregated across all in-
dustries, i.e. the weighted average of the different sectoral growth rates, has in
the end increased, remained the same or even decreased as a result of targeted
intervention.
Even more complexity is introduced into the model if the sectoral allocation
of the highly talented is assumed to be a stochastic process in time, analogously
to the spatial allocation of economic activities. The motivation for a stochastic
model might be, for example, that the highly talented are individuals with idio-
syncratic, yet stochastically distributed, preferences on top of their desire to
maximize life-time income. In this kind of stochastic model, the economy-wide
growth effects of some specific industrial policy intervention would be virtually
impossible to predict even if the model was a precise and accurate description of
an economy's past and present.
To mention a final instance of a theory which seems to be at least in part ob-
servationally equivalent, there is the claim of Milgrom et al. (1991) to explain
persistent patterns of endogenous structural change in a growing economy with-
out relying on increasing returns to scale at the level of individual activities.
Remember that both the theory of endogenous technical progress and the theory
of 'monopolistic competition among the suppliers of specialized and differen-
tiated capital inputs' invoke increasing returns to the scale of firms' output to
explain why the physical return to investment need not decline in the course of
capital accumulation. These theories differ in their assumption about the rele-
vance of technological external effects. In the model of Milgrom et al. (1991),
by contrast, innovation merely results in falling marginal costs, which induces
both increasing usage of these products as inputs and more investments in the
development of complementary technologies. Instead of assuming increasing
returns to scale for individual activities and temporary monopoly power for in-
novators, the momentum of technological change and economic development is
maintained entirely by positive feedbacks among certain mutually comple-
mentary core activities and practices in the economy. Learning in one industry
is assumed to benefit from high activity levels and learning in related industries.
The formal analysis of these complementarities relies on lattice-theoretic
methods which can handle non-convexities without reference to differentiable




135 por detail of the mathematical model see Milgrom and Roberts (1990).170
II. The Merits and Demerits of Targeted Industrial and
Technology Policy in the Light of New Growth Theory
Since new growth theory has generated quite a number of candidate expla-
nations for the determinants of long-term economic growth, it is hardly surpris-
ing that no simple, clear-cut and uniform conclusions for industrial policy have
so far emerged. Hence, the presently available results will have to be used
within a contingency approach in assessing and designing the particular in-
dustrial policies under consideration to remedy a given situation. Every theo-
retical analysis makes certain assumptions about the properties of the tech-
nology of production in the analyzed economy, about the industrial organi-
zation, the mobility of resources, the accessibility of technical knowledge to
scientists and engineers inside and outside of established firms, about the di-
rection and strength of external effects, as well as about many other things. For
the purpose of policy consulting it will hence be essential to choose, or devise,
models appropriate for the particular industrial policy problem at hand, and to
test their assumptions in a careful empirical study of the particular circum-
stances from which the problem is thought to have arisen.
The critical analysis of some of the fundamental approaches to new growth
theory helps to identify a number of conditions necessary for the mere possibil-
ity that targeted industrial policies may succeed in raising the rate of long-term
economic growth. However, this kind of 'success' and its necessary conditions
do not imply that a particular set of industrial policies will be judged beneficial
from a welfare-theoretic point of view. For a complete welfare assessment, one
would have to compare the expected present value of the possibly accelerated
rate of growth with the direct financial costs and the indirect burden of raising
the means through (inevitably) distortionary taxation; and in most cases, one
would also have to take distributional implications of the planned industrial
policies into consideration.
In the following, only steady-state comparisons of an economy's dynamics
before and after intervention will be considered, which is in the spirit of most
new growth theories' reliance on steady-state constructions (without paying
much attention to transitional dynamics). Abstracting, for the moment, from the
enormous informational requirements in any actual industrial policy planning
— which are the subject of the next subsection — one can isolate, as a first step,
the merely technical conditions to justify targeted industrial policy interventions
under the assumption of complete information and perfect foresight. These
necessary conditions help to define, as a second step, the informational require-
ments for making sure a programme of industrial and technological targeting is
planned and executed in such a way that it will have the intended effects.171
Among the merely technical conditions are, primarily, certain requirements
for the economic apparatus of production. Provided the hypothesis of non-
decreasing returns to investment in the course of capital accumulation holds, it
will be necessary to check that the incentives for investment are distorted across
sectors, i.e. that they are suboptimal either in certain industries only, or sub-
optimal to varying degrees if suboptimal in all industries. By contrast, if the in-
centives for investment were equally suboptimal in all industries, this would not
constitute a case for targeted industrial policies, but rather for a general policy
of supporting investment, for example by lowering the rate of taxing income or
capital income, or by subsidizing private investments in general. Should not the
incentives for investment in general, but only those for investment in research
and development be deemed suboptimal, then again support policies which af-
fect all industries equally would be called for. One example would be preferen-
tial depreciation allowances for research and development investments.
Many countries in fact do grant preferential tax treatment of R&D invest-
ment, because their corporate tax laws prohibit entering own inventions on the
asset side of corporate balance sheets and prescribe treating personnel costs as
current expenditure. This is an implicit discrimination in favour of R&D and
against investments in physical capital because the latter always have to be
entered on the asset side which implies that no part of the costs, not even per-
sonnel expenditure in the case of in-house production of physical investment
goods, can effectively be written down within the first year. From an economic
point of view, this side effect of precautionary tax laws implies distortions not
only in favour of R&D in general, but also in the direction of too much use of
personnel and too little use of machinery and equipment in R&D laboratories,
as well as distortions across industries since the input ratios of personnel to
physical capital in private R&D actually differ significantly from one industry to
another (see Sections II and III in Chapter D).
But there are other, more important reasons why the investment incentives
may deviate to varying degrees from the optimal incentives in the various in-
dustries of an economy. For one, positive external effects in the form of knowl-
edge spill-overs from research and development may vary in strength. It is often
presumed, for example, that knowledge spill-overs are particularly strong in the
computer, scientific instruments, chemicals and machinery industries. Another
reason might be that an industry supplies key technologies whose adoption gen-
erates positive pecuniary external effects in other industries, apart from any
direct knowledge spill-overs, without the 'key industry' benefitting from any
reciprocal external effects. On the other hand, the investment incentives may
deviate because of particularly strong pecuniary or technological external effects
within an industry. This could be related to a particular type of industrial172
organization or market structure, say, the degree of monopoly power in the in-
dustry.
In the case of horizontal product differentiation, the loss of competing firms'
producer rents caused by an innovation is the larger, the smaller the number of
substitutes in the market (Grossman and Helpman 1991: 83).
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partial elasticities of production as well as the elasticities of substitution among
industry-specific, differentiated capital and service inputs normally differ from
industry to industry. So do the productivity gains which the typical firm of an
industry can reap as a pecuniary external effect after an increase in the variety
of specialized capital or service inputs, even if this variety increase is com-
parable in magnitude across industries. This again lets the private investment
incentives deviate from the respective social incentives to a degree which varies
across industries.
Thus, the mere identification of industries for which evidence of market fail-
ure due to technological or pecuniary externalities can be produced is insuf-
ficient to justify the adoption of targeted industrial policies. It is rather neces-
sary to check whether the private investment incentives deviate in some in-
dustries more from their respective social optimum than in others. In a closed
economy, then, the technical requirements of the production side for industrial
policies targeted at the industries found to be constrained by suboptimal private
investment incentives are fulfilled. In open economies, by contrast, the pros-
pects of targeted industrial policies to attain their objectives depend also on the
extent to which the external effects, to be internalized, are limited in range to
the home economy; they might, for example, diffuse to competing economies
only slowly, or considerably reduced in strength.
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In the case of technological external effects in the form of knowledge spill-
overs, these might be constrained in range by the lower intensity of inter-
national communications compared to intranational communications, for in-
stance, due to natural language and cultural barriers, or due to intentional
Whether this loss is 'compensated' for the economy as a whole by an equal gain in
consumer rent in the model, depends on the specification of the representative con-
sumer's preferences. Recall from Chapter B that full compensation occurs in the
special case of a CES utility function, as Grossman and Helpman (1991) have
shown.
In his pioneering empirical study of knowledge leakage from 100 American in-
dustrial firms, Mansfield (1985) finds that information concerning development
decisions, including the detailed nature and operation of new products and pro-
cesses, is in the hands of rivals within 12 to 18 months, on average. While he can
find only minor interindustry differences in the rate of knowledge diffusion,
Mansfield (1985: 223) notes that the technologies transferred by US-based multi-
national firms to their overseas subsidiaries seem to leak out to non-US firms more
slowly than to rival US-firms (Mansfield et al. 1982: 38^10).173
secrecy towards strangers. In the case of pecuniary external effects, limited
spatial range might be partly due to the fact that some of the specialized and dif-
ferentiated capital goods and services are not easily tradeable across regions or
countries; think of technology transfer centres or custom-built equipment re-
quiring a great deal of after-sales service. It was pointed out in Section E.I that
targeted policies may, in the case of purely national external effects from
knowledge creation, raise national welfare at the expense of other countries. In
the case of international external effects, by contrast, targeting by one country
on its own may be ineffective or suboptimal, and may even lower national wel-
fare in the country which carries the direct costs while reaping only a small
fraction of the benefits; this case might instead call for an internationally co-
ordinated response to market failure in knowledge creation.
However, even in this extended form applicable to open economies the neces-
sary conditions for an economy's production apparatus capture only part of the
technical requirements for approving targeted industrial policy interventions. As
further necessary conditions, certain requirements on the structural development
of demand as well as on the system of incentives for the economy's most valu-
able talents have to be fulfilled. As a general rule, there must be a high world
market elasticity of demand for the products of any industry considered as an
industrial policy target. The expansion of exports of a selected industry can be
beneficial for an economy as a whole only if this does not result in too large a
fall in world market prices, i.e. if the price elasticity of demand for these exports
is larger than one. In the case of homothetic preferences, this presupposes a
high elasticity of substitution in consumption between the goods concerned and
the bundle of other tradeables.
In the case of non-homothetic preferences, which is likely to be more relevant
in practice, the price elasticity of demand for a particular good additionally de-
pends on the income elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand then
tends to be larger for those goods whose budget share increases with increasing
income, i.e. whose income elasticity is larger than one. Thus, in the case of non-
homothetic preferences the possibility of immiserizing growth is not necessarily
due to a low elasticity of substitution in consumption between the goods of the
expanding industry and those of other industries. In fact, immiserizing growth
can also occur under the condition of a high elasticity of substitution if the ex-
panding industry supplies goods whose income elasticity of demand lies con-
siderably below one.
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8 For this reason, economic growth may slow down in an
economy where industrial policy is targeted at an industry whose growth pros-
pects are limited not merely by some kind of market failure, but ultimately by a
low income elasticity of demand.
See the theoretical discussion in Section B.II.l.174
In the incentive system for the allocation of talent, targeted industrial policy
intervention must not distort sectoral compensation contracts in such a way that
part of the particularly talented human capital is enticed away from its present
occupations to other activities yielding a comparatively lower social return, be
these other activities inside or outside the industry of present occupation.
Targeted industrial policy might cause such a distortion in a number of ways:
First, as seen in Section E.I.I, industrial policy generally increases employment
in the redistribution bureaucracy. Second, it rewards the 'directly unproductive
activity' of lobbying on thepart of private firms. And third, it raises the attrac-
tiveness of legal studies and lawyer careers,, as compared to science and engi-
neering studies and R&D careers, thus placing a drag on innovation sooner or
later to be felt throughout the economy.
Furthermore, targeted industrial policies may, by unilaterally improving the
compensation contract in a particular industry, attract not only some of those
talented individuals who have hitherto earned quasi rents on their talents in
other industries, but also some of the talents who have actually driven inno-
vation and productivity in some of the other industries. These talents may well
have generated higher social returns in their former occupations than they
might be able, or have opportunity, to generate in the targeted industry, to
which these talents are drawn. Thus, not only the migration of talent from inno-
vative and productive activities to the 'zero-sum game' of economic redistri-
bution may have negative growth effects, but also the reallocation of inventive
and entrepreneurial talent from one productive industry to another, when the
kinds of innovation prevailing in the latter industry generate lower social re-
turns than those in the former.
Finally, one always has to consider price distortions, which inevitably result
from raising the financial means for targeted subsidies. Price distortions will
tend to make the coordination of specialized human capital more costly, lower
the private incentives to invest in human capital, slow down the process of in-
creasing the division of labour and, ultimately, retard economic growth. These
indirect negative effects may, on balance, have more weight than any intended,
more directly felt, positive growth effects of targeted subsidies.175
III. The Informational Requirements for Implementing a
Consistent Set of Targeted Industrial and Technology
Policies
1. The Information Problem in the Closed Economy
The last section discussed necessary conditions to be met for giving targeted in-
dustrial or technology policies any chance at all of raising an economy's rate of
growth. Knowledge of these conditions helps to formulate the informational re-
quirements of planning and executing targeted industrial and technology poli-
cies in practice. The necessary conditions alone, however, are by no means suf-
ficient to define the informational requirements fully. After all, industrial policy
would hardly want to undertake any kind of intervention, but rather a carefully
designed one targeted at the root of the market failure actually diagnosed.
Moreover, the intervention is to make efficient use of the available instruments
of industrial and technology policy.
Thus, the information demand of the industrial policy maker must not only
be concerned with the question of whether there is a case for industrial policy
per se, but also with the more involved operational questions: Of what kind is
the observed case of market failure? What theoretical model matches this case
best? What particular industrial policy instruments would likely lead to what
kinds of result, including the type and magnitude of social costs? — Especially
the choice of an appropriate instrument often requires very detailed knowledge
of the actual situation, since the industrial policy implications of some new
growth models are quite sensitive to changes in parameter values or model
structure. Furthermore, the informational problem is in practice complicated by
the fact that it never suffices to look merely at the situation in one industry in
isolation. Instead, the analysis of the particular situation at which industrial
policies are to be targeted always has to be comparative with respect to the
situations in all other industries, and has to consider the major interindustry
linkages and feedback relationships.
Initially, the problem of information will be discussed in the context of
models that yield industrial policy implications on the basis of pecuniary ex-
ternal effects only. This discussion will show that these models do not contain
any parameters which could serve as a reliable empirical base for the design of
industrial policy programmes to work over longer periods of time. Recall that in
the growth models of 'monopolistic competition and increasing specialization of176
capital inputs', developed by Romer (1987) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992b) for a closed economy, the producers of capital goods set prices above
marginal costs, by a factor which depends on the partial elasticity of final pro-
duction with respect to employing specialized capital inputs. This monopoly
pricing distorts the decentralized decisions about the number of capital input
varieties in use relative to the amounts employed of each one of them (Romer
1987: 58-59).
There are two opposite effects to consider: On the one hand, each individual
producer of a unique capital good faces a downward-sloping schedule of de-
mand, so that the quantities supplied of eacrt capital input are inefficiently low,
whereas the variety on offer is inefficiently large. On the other hand, the intro-
duction of a new capital input variety generates a pecuniary external effect ac-
cruing to the users of the capital input, a kind of 'consumer rent', for which the
innovator is not compensated, so that the variety offered is too small and the
quantities supplied of each individual capital good are to large. Which of these
opposing effects dominates depends on the technology in which the capital in-
puts are used. In the special case of a Cobb-Douglas technology, the two op-
posing effects just cancel each other. Even in this case, however, does the
monopoly pricing of capital goods imply that the private returns to investment
are smaller than the social returns, so that the process of economic accumu-
lation is too slow from a welfare point of view.
In order to raise the private returns to investment in this model, one may
want to use general investment subsidies, i.e. subsidies for the purchase of spe-
cialized capital inputs, or subsidies for capital income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1992b: 654). Both policies have the potential to attain a first-best solution, but
require knowledge of the partial production elasticity of using the specialized
capital inputs in order to determine the appropriate level of subsidization. Direct
subsidies for research and development in the capital goods industry, by con-
trast, turn out to be inappropriate measures, although these would also raise the
private returns to investment. But at the same time, these subsidies would
distort the decentral choices regarding the optimal ratio of variety to the average
quantity of specialized capital inputs in the direction of too large a variety
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992b: 655).
These industrial policy conclusions, however, are not shared by those models
of endogenous technological change which assign an important role not only to
pecuniary external effects but also to technological external effects in the form
of knowledge spill-overs from research and development, while maintaining to
explain productivity gains with an increasing differentiation and specialization
of capital inputs (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991). In these models,
subsidies for research and development turn out to be advantageous, whereas
output subsidies fail to be effective when production and R&D compete for the177
same resources, e.g. scientifically trained specialists, and thus operate under a
common resource constraint. In addition to R&D subsidies, investment sub-
sidies may be called for if monopoly pricing is more pronounced in the inno-
vative industry (under consideration) than in the other sectors of the economy,
for instance, because the other sectors are without monopolistic competition
among the producers of investment goods or because productivity there may not
be driven by endogenous technical progress.
Thus, the important operational question of how to select and combine the
appropriate industrial policy instruments is difficult to address even with refer-
ence to the simplest model of industrial innovation based on increasing spe-
cialization and differentiation of capital inputs: Should preference be given to
R&D subsidies or to subsidies for the acquisition of capital inputs? Or perhaps
to a combination of the two? The answer seems to depend on whether the al-
leged inefficiency in the sectoral process of accumulation is primarily due to
pecuniary or essentially due to technological external effects. As seen in Section
B.V, this question cannot even in the context of narrowly focused case studies
be answered satisfactorily using the empirical methodology available today. Yet,
still more difficult would be an empirical study of the intersectoral interde-
pendencies and a comparison of the type and magnitude of external effects
across industries.
Faced with these difficulties, many economists have chosen a pragmatic line
and have excluded pecuniary external effects altogether from their industrial
policy analysis. They have instead focused their analysis fully on the impli-
cations of technological external effects, which supposedly do not leave a grey
area of uncertainty about how to use welfare theory to assess proposals for tar-
geted industrial policies in practice. In addition, some of these economists even
ignore the unresolved empirical problems of measuring technological external
effects. This light-minded approach will, if adopted provisionally despite being
hardly tenable by scientific standards, soon hit on further difficulties that are
immanent to the models and put in doubt whether there is any practical payoff,
in terms of insight, from exclusively focusing on technological external effects.
These doubts arise because the presence of positive technological external
effects in models of endogenous technological change does not necessarily
imply that the market incentives for research and development are suboptimal.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) show this to be the case in the model of expand-
ing product variety only under the assumption that the representative consumer
maximizes a CES utility function, that is a homothetic utility function whose
empirical validity can be considered refuted (see, e.g. Hunter and Markusen
1988).
Yet, even if a CES utility function was taken to be a valid description, the in-
centives for research and development need not necessarily be 'too small', if en-178
dogenous technological change is based on continual improvements of quality
instead of horizontal product differentiation. Recall from Section B.II.2 that in
the model of quality ladders the incentives to innovate turn out 'too large' if the
size of the respective quality leap is either 'too small' or 'too large'. The model
then calls for the taxation, instead of the subsidization, of research and devel-
opment (see for the theoretical discussion Section B.IV). On the other hand, the
quality leaps turn out 'too small' in the model if their size is endogenously
determined by market forces. In this case, a change in patent law, with respect
to novelty requirements, might be helpful. Yet, how the various parameters of
patent law will influence the innovation behaviour of actual firms in reality is
an underresearched question, on which not even theoretical work has seriously




The choice of appropriate instruments to support the process of industrial in-
novation in a selected industry inevitably raises the question whether this par-
ticular process is better described by the model of horizontal product differen-
tiation or by the model of quality ladders. In reality of course, this analytical
distinction, along the dichotomous lines of stylized models, may not easily be
made even for individual cases of innovation, let alone for a continual sequence
of innovations over longer periods of time. After all, the combination of both
quality improvements and continual product differentiation is characteristic of
endogenous technical progress in reality. In parts of an industry, technical
progress may at least temporarily correspond to the model of quality ladders, so
for example in the development of memory chips or microprocessors in the
computer industry. In this industry as a whole, however, the trend towards in-
creasing variety can hardly be overlooked: some of the pertinent catchwords are
desktop, laptop and notebook computers, networking, CD-ROM, multimedia,
etc. Similarly, in the motor industry, to mention the example of a mature in-
dustry, the trend towards increasing variety is all too visible, but there still are
important quality improvements from time to time, e.g. safety systems.
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Presumably, the character of the innovation process in any particular industry
depends partly on the state of pertinent patent law. While patent law may there-
fore provide a starting point for targeted industrial policy intervention, new
growth theory has so far to say very little about the relevant causality in any
13
9 For a discussion of novelty measurement problems in the case of computer software
see Brockhoff and Zanger (1993).
An example for displacement in car technology is the driver protection system de-
veloped by 'Audi' (the luxury division of Volkswagen) that was supposed to auto-
matically pull the steering column away from the driver in case of a collision; this
system was only a very short time in the market when it was displaced by airbag
technology.179
detail. Nor is much relevant insight to be gained from the sparse economic
analyses of patent protection, or from the recent literature of patent races (see,
e.g. Judd 1985 or Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). It is not clear, for example,
whether a strengthening of patent protection — say, the prolongation of its
duration or the widening of the breadth of protection — would support or
inhibit the diffusion of knowledge spill-overs from innovation. Rivera-Batiz and
Xie (1992) argue that, as a result of stronger patent protection, firms would be
more willing to apply for patent protection and, thus, to make their findings of
new technical knowledge public, instead of keeping them secret. Scotchmer
(1991), however, objects that other firms are excluded from freely using any
new knowledge for the specified period of protection, which diminishes the
profitability of investing in complementary, and further on going research and
development in the area. A reduction of knowledge spill-overs would raise the
costs of research and development (because the individual firm would derive
reduced benefits from the research activities of other firms) but might
strengthen the direct rewards for private research and development (Ordover
1991).
There appear to be few agreed general predictions about the consequences of
reorganizing patent laws for the rate of innovation of private firms. Never-
theless, it seems safe to suppose that increasing the breadth of patent protection
would imply a more intense competition among private firms for certain ex-
clusive patent rights, which are anticipated to return particularly high value to
their owners by covering numerous subsequent applications, although they
might be based on relatively small technical advances themselves. The process
of innovation would thus tend to lose the character of product differentiation
and would instead assume more of the character of quality ladders.
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1 Then, in
the context of quality ladders, the question of appropriate novelty requirements
for patent law would become increasingly important.
The discussion of these selected issues has highlighted that the information
problem is already rather confounded in the case of a closed economy. The de-
tailed planning of targeted industrial and technology policies appears to be a
virtually impossible task. Yet, many more complications arise in open econ-
omies, some of which will be discussed next.
Compare this with the welfare analysis of the optimal breadth of patent protection
in a model of product differentiation given by Klemperer (1990). In Klemperer's
analysis, the particular assumptions made about the substitutability of product
features in consumption are important determinants of whether narrowly defined
patent protection with a long duration or broadly defined protection with a short
duration is more efficient.180
2. The Information Problem in Open Economies
Initially, one needs to assess how similar or how different the relative factor en-
dowments are for the relevant trading partners, that is for the countries which
compete over export market shares in high-technology industries. The analysis
of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a, 1991b) suggests that symmetrical trade
barriers will inevitably reduce growth if the trade partners are very similarly
endowed with factors of production. In the case of considerable differences in
relative factor endowments, the consequences of trade barriers for growth
cannot generally be predicted. While it is true that the individual innovating
firm can usually earn higher temporary monopoly profits in larger, integrated
markets, there also is more competition from foreign firms, which tends to
reduce monopoly rents, ceteris paribus.
For an assessment of the prospects of enhancing growth by subsidizing, tem-
porarily, research and development in selected industries it is important _to know
whether positive external effects, such as knowledge spill-overs or learning-by-
doing, which might cause path-dependent developments, are really more
strongly, or much sooner, effective within their country of origin. This is a
rather difficult empirical question, on which no satisfactory way of answering it
for whatever circumstances may be at hand has yet been found (see the empiri-
cal studies surveyed in Section B.V).
In addition, whether temporary targeted R&D subsidies are a good choice for
a country to win a permanent technological lead in a selected industry also de-
pends on the degree of international inequality of factor rewards that would pre-
vail in the free-trade equilibrium. Recall from Section B.III.2 that targeted sub-
sidies only merit consideration if the free-trade equilibrium does not imply full
equalization of factor prices, and if real wages are higher in the country in
which most of the R&D of the selected industry is concentrated, or else, if
capital is not fully mobile across countries and the real rate of interest is higher
in the country in which most of the R&D of the selected industry is concen-
trated. Both conditions will be difficult to verify empirically, not least because
international quality differences of labour as well as country-specific market
risks for foreign investments cannot be measured accurately and reliably.
Some economists have argued that the increasing internationalization of the
R&D activities of multinational companies, and the ongoing improvements of
information storage and communication technologies, will lead to an increase of
international knowledge transfers (see, e.g. Vernon 1982 and Vickery 1986).
Moreover, it has been argued that the speed of international knowledge dif-
fusion will come to match the speed of national knowledge diffusion in the
future (see the evidence reported in Section B.V). This argument is supported by
the observation that over the past few decades the cost of international com-181
munication (as well as of international transport) has already fallen more
rapidly than the cost of communication (and transport) within countries.
But, as Krugman (1991) points out, a fall in the cost of communication must
often be interpreted as a simultaneous decline in the cost of transporting the
specialized and differentiated inputs as well as the outputs of information-
intensive industries. Thus, the fall in communication costs might lead to an
increased spatial concentration of these industries, because cheaper access to a
geographically dispersed customer base would permit better exploitation of scale
economies in information processing.
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2 In this case, the intensity (and speed)
of knowledge transfers, including those in the form of true technological ex-
ternalities, might increase within the individual national research and develop-
ment centres, or networks, relative to the intensity (and speed) of international
knowledge transfers. Nevertheless, multinational companies could keep their
role as international arbitrageurs of new knowledge.
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3 The improvement of
communication technologies, however, makes it likely that small firms will in-
creasingly participate in the international exchange of knowledge.
On a related issue, the analysis of Becker and Murphy (1992), reviewed in
Section F.I.I, suggests that the costs of coordinating specialized human capital
is an important determinant of the rate of economic growth. This insight bears
on the design of industrial and technology policy. It raises the question how
much individual industrial policy instruments would affect the costs of coor-
dination, for example by introducing price distortions. For a small country,
which has no impact on world market price ratios, the introduction of tariffs
and non-tariff trade barriers presumably distorts prices in the home markets
more than the introduction of subsidies for certain R&D activities would. But
subsidies have to be financed from tax revenue; since truly neutral taxes are not
available in reality, the appropriation of revenue for government subsidies will
inevitably create price distortions which should not be overlooked in assessing
the relative merits of subsidies versus tariffs.
In view of the danger that industrial policies may distort the private in-
centives for talent to choose a career in the directly productive sectors of the
economy versus the redistribution sector, one should ask how large the govern-
ment share in national income already is, how common industrial policy inter-
By contrast, if the costs of transporting specialized inputs declined more rapidly
than those of transporting the output of an industry, this would increase the spatial
range of the pecuniary external effects, generated by the variety of specialized in-
puts readily available in a particular location. The result could then be a lower
spatial concentration of this particular industry because the distance to sales mar-
kets would now have more weight in the individual firm's location decision.
Cf. Aoki (1993) who sees this as a major source of benefits from integrating
diversely specialized national economies.182
ventions are in the economy, how strong the influence of industry lobbies is on
the design and execution of economic policies, and whether additional price
distortions and quantity restrictions would be introduced by a particular newly
proposed industrial or technology policy initiative. Unfortunately, the theory of
positive feedbacks in the allocation of talent does not give any hints what
thresholds might have to be observed, where crossing any such threshold might
trigger an accelerating shift of talent towards redistribution and might ulti-
mately lead to a dramatic decline in the economy's growth performance. In view
of this paucity of theory, it is hardly surprising that empirical research has not
generated much insight into these issues either.
3. Information Problems Immanent to the Models
Part of the information needed to formulate a programme of targeted industrial
policies relates to the question whether it makes sense to view an entire econ-
omy as being identifiable by a single production function, without taking into
account, for example, the geographical dimension at all. Most models of eco-
nomic growth implicitly ignore this question. But, once the process of economic
growth is found to be characterized by agglomeration of economic activity in the
aggregate, or at the level of individual industries, this raises additional ques-
tions about efficiency and distribution in whatever dimension the agglomeration
takes place. These questions are inevitably excluded from any analysis based on
a single production function.
A basic policy question, however, which should not be excluded, is whether
industrial policies are intended to support existing patterns of agglomeration, or
rather aim at inducing a regional restructuring of the economy. In order to as-
sess the prospects of success in either case, it would be important to know
whether past trends of agglomeration can confidently be extrapolated into the
future, or whether new trends should be expected to emerge, for example, to-
wards a more even spatial distribution of economic activity. Here, crucial
parameters are likely to be the future costs of transport and communication. In-
deed, one can argue that the advantages of agglomeration at the industry level,
due to productivity gains from specialized and differentiated capital and service
inputs, diminish when the costs of transporting these inputs decline more rap-
idly than those for the final products of an industry, and that the advantages of
spatial concentration normally become greater for an industry when the trans-
port costs for inputs and outputs fall at an equal rate (Krugman 1991: 50-52).
But in general, the impact of declining transport costs on patterns of ag-
glomeration cannot be easily predicted: while the disadvantage, due to transport
costs, of producing at the periphery for the centre is reduced, the potential for183
exploiting economies of scale is increased, which primarily benefits the pro-
ducers at the centre from where delivery to a larger area becomes profitable.
Equally important, and just as difficult, is the question what makes the pat-
tern of economic agglomeration established in a certain country or region effi-
cient. The theory of economic agglomeration suggests that there are generally
several ex ante feasible patterns of agglomeration, both for individual industries
and for the entire economy, which might be centred around different locations.
Which of these patterns ultimately emerges, is often decided by accidental his-
torical events. Historical events which take place early in the process of location
formation may, however, trigger patterns of regional allocation and agglom-
eration which turn out to be inefficient in the long term. Yet, even in these cases
it may be advantageous for the individual firm, and the individual worker, to lo-
cate in whatever centres emerge, because only there will it be possible to reap
the full benefits of positive external effects emanating from the contempo-
raneous economic activities of other firms and individuals. The possible long-
term inefficiency of an emerging pattern of agglomeration, to which the in-
dividual's location decision contributes, does not enter the individual's decision
calculus provided he has a sufficiently high rate of time preference. Thus, even
rational expectations based on perfect information cannot deter the individual
from joining an inefficient pattern of agglomeration if he cannot coordinate his
decision with those of other firms and workers. In reality, of course, perfect in-
formation about all feasible future development paths does not prevail, because
the set of feasible paths depends partly on non-predictable parameters, like
future transport costs.
What makes these kinds of forecasting problems, due to economic complexity
and fundamental indeterminacy of non-stationary stochastic processes, espe-
cially serious for the design of industrial and technology policy is that multiple
equilibria seem to be by no means characteristic of spatial agglomerations only.
They rather seem to be a common feature of many models within new growth
theory which are of interest in the analysis and design of industrial policies.
This holds for models of hysteresis in open economies, either based on learning
by doing or on endogenous technical progress with nationally or regionally
bounded external effects, for models of the evolution of technology along certain
ex ante unpredictable trajectories,
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4 as well as for models of the sectoral allo-
cation of personal human capital (Murphy et al. 1991) (see the theoretical
analysis in Chapter Q.
In the design of industrial and technology policies it is important to be aware
that models of path-dependent allocation processes do not impart any way to
14
4 Cf. Rosenberg (1994) for the perspective of an economic historian on this hy-
pothesis.184
predict which equilibrium of an assumed multiplicity of long-term equilibria
will be selected by market forces. But if targeted industrial policy intervention
shall be used to influence the final outcome, the prospects of success will de-
pend crucially on the timing of intervention. Intervention will only be promising
as long as no 'irreversible' move
14
5 towards one particular equilibrium has oc-
curred, i.e. as long as the 'window of opportunity' has not been closed (Perez
and Soete 1988). Once an irreversible move has occurred, the attempt to change
the allocation towards a pattern belatedly recognized as more efficient in the
long term could be so costly that the benefits do not justify an intervention.
Thus, an efficient use of industrial policy instruments requires careful timing.
However, not all is lost when some particular opportunity is missed. In fact, in-
dustries undergoing rapid technological change will all the time open, and
close, 'windows' of ever new opportunities. Hence, any economy of sufficient
complexity will inevitably experience structural change and from time to time
give birth to entirely new industries, and thus have numerous opportunities to
embark on a new path of innovation and learning. In times of rapid change,
established patterns of allocation will sooner or later be destroyed and resources
set free, so that they can be redirected to new uses at comparatively low cost.
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The observance of 'historical opportunities' thus may appear as an important
condition for the cost-effective design of targeted industrial policies, but it
represents neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for attaining the goal of
raising the rate of long-term economic growth. The timely recognition of his-
torical cross-roads, which may open up new opportunities to influence the tech-
nological, spatial and structural development of an economy, is part of the in-
formational requirements for industrial policy. In practice though, historical op-
portunities are mostly missed, because they can normally be recognized only ex
post, when it is already too late to exploit them for policy purposes.
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This irreversibility refers to the influence of market participants' individual allo-
cation decisions as well as to accidental events. Hence, it does not exclude that gov-
ernment action, making a sufficiently great effort, may still overturn an
'irreversible' allocation pattern under particular circumstances. In any case, a be-
lated intervention would normally not be justified in terms of benefits and costs.
In the context of open economies, this suggests a theory of leapfrogging, like that
recently formalized by Brezis et al. (1993). An especially pronounced specialization
of a whole country in a particular area of high-technology, perhaps pushed by in-
dustrial policy to exploit technological hysteresis, will eventually reach its limits
whenever the country's supply of appropriately trained scientists and engineers is
less than perfectly elastic. From that point on, other countries would have oppor-
tunity to catch up in the same area of high-technology even without adopting tar-
geted industrial policies themselves.
1
4 As an example consider the erroneous decision of IBM not to prepare its marketing
organization full speed for the age of Personal Computers in the 1980s, and to keep
largely unchanged the scale of producing and marketing mainframe machines. Or185
For the informational requirements of industrial policy is further important
that stochastic processes of resource allocation seem to play a crucial role also
when one of several competing technologies is selected for adoption by market
participants, and in the selection of technological paradigms in the market place
of ideas.
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8 In these cases, it is practically impossible to predict the course of
technological change in the future. It thus becomes futile to extrapolate past
trends of technological change into the future, a practice which has hitherto
formed the informational basis for many industrial and technology policy pro-
grammes. Nobody can really predict over longer periods of time in which areas
there will be technological breakthroughs, in which direction technological
change will speed up or slow down, where new 'key' technologies will generate
particularly strong external effects, and whether these will, in a shrinking
world, be communicated on a regional, national or even on a world-wide scale.
It may indeed appear as if many small, and some not so small, historical
events determine the course of technological development, of spatial allocation,
of the sectoral specialization in open economies as well as of the sectoral allo-
cation of talent in the real world. And in some sense, these developments are, of
course, nothing else but the succession of historical events that occur more or
less at random. Yet, this view may just as well be a delusion about what really
drives economic development. Krugman (1991) discusses the possibility that
collective expectations, instead of historical events, determine the selection from
multiple long-term equilibria, when there is decentralized, yet through positive
feedbacks interdependent decision making in a market economy. This possibil-
ity has great relevance to the design of targeted industrial and technology pol-
icy, for basically two reasons: First, the impact of expectations can undermine
attempts to influence the outcome of allocation processes by manipulating the
think of the disastrous decision of the Polaroid company to develop a Polaroid
home-movie camera, with the ability of delivering instant pictures, at a time when
the technology of video cameras was already knocking at the door.
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8 To illustrate such cases, Arthur (1988) models competition, leading to
'technological exclusion', of the video systems Betamax versus VHS within the
framework of a path-dependent stochastic allocation process. David and Bunn
(1990) similarly interpret the competition of alternative technological paradigms
within the electrical industry, namely the choice for alternating versus direct current
in long-distance transmission at the turn of the century. In the same vein, he
discusses the selection of designs for nuclear power stations after World War II.
Today, there may again be a comparable situation in consumer electronics where
Philips and Sony have prepared their incompatible technologies of 'Digital Compact
Cassette' and 'Minidisc', respectively, to succeed the popular Compact Disc (CD)
for music recordings. To mention one more example, the technologies proposed for
the electric motoring of cars could soon enter into fierce competition, which might
finally lead to the exclusive adoption of one of these technologies, because here
again the rapid provision of complementary infrastructure, specific to a particular
technology, could be crucial.186
initial conditions originally set by history. Second, a cost-effective industrial
policy may take the form of directly influencing the expectations of market par-
ticipants, as far as this is at all feasible. Collective expectations might move
markets and become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Krugman (1991: 31), derives three conditions for collective expectations to
play a decisive role, in the sense of self-fulfilling prophecies, in the selection of
long-term equilibria in stochastic allocation processes: (i) The speed with which
resources can be reallocated must be high relative to the rate of time preference,
with which future income"differentials are discounted, so that the potential
future benefits of the best long-term allocation outweigh the benefits of what-
ever allocation may be initially realized. In other words the cost of reallocating
resources and the real rate of interest must be low. (ii) There must be increasing
returns to scale of sufficient strength, which operate at the level of individual
industries, or of the entire economy, and make one allocation better in the long
term, so that a redirection of resources to this allocation lets incomes rise
rapidly, (iii) The initial historical situation must not already be irreversibly
'locked' into an inferior pattern of allocation.
Under these conditions industrial policy might achieve cost-effective results
if it succeeds in directing the expectations of the numerous decentral decision
takers towards a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whether this strategy can succeed
probably does not only depend on economic context conditions, but also on so-
ciological and cultural factors. Japan and France, for example, have tradition-
ally placed more emphasis on central government control and guidance, and
people there may thus be more prepared to believe visions announced by the
government, and to act accordingly, than in, say, individualistic Britain or the
United States. There is anecdotal evidence that informal guidance has played a
more important role in Japan's industrial policy, attempting to influence the co-
ordination of industrial planning among the large firms, than direct subsidies or
trade policies have done. In Germany, by contrast, the government has, prob-
ably for good, lost much of its past credibility in this respect, through the ex-
perience of Nazi-rule.
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9 Studies in economic history suggest that more pro-
nounced industrial policy intervention was common in the Kaiserreich and in
the Weimar Republic than in the Federal Republic of Germany.
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0 To assess the
Hitler's government used industrial and technological targeting mainly to pursue its
ambitious military objectives. A prominent example is the founding of
'Volkswagen' as a state enterprise in 1938, which soon began to produce tanks for
the military.
1 But even in those former periods has German industry probably benefited more
from public efforts in education, e.g. the promotion and partial funding of technical
universities, and in infrastructure, e.g. the building of a dense nation-wide railway
system, than from targeted interventions. — An interesting example for the benefits187
prospects of success in any modern country today, it would be important to
establish whether the cultural preconditions for influencing collective expec-
tations through government initiative are at all fulfilled, apart from looking at
the economic parameters which may or may not give self-fulfilling prophecies a
chance. There are reasons to suppose that neither of these conditions are met in
Germany today, nor in many of the other leading industrialized countries.
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Nevertheless, innovation avenues, technological guideposts, focusing devices
or paradigms may actually continue to hold sway in technological development.
In this context, it is an interesting question to what extent technological para-
digms are necessarily spontaneous, emergent phenomena which would ulti-
mately elude any steering attempt by central government. The answer is likely
to be yes. However, assuming for the moment that the formation of techno-
logical paradigms could be manipulated by government and could be used as a
focusing device for private R&D investments, one may want to ask whether a
strong influence of technological paradigms would actually help, or rather hin-
der, the course of technological change to move in a desirable direction and at
an appropriate speed. Put differently: Is there a need for more concentration on
selected technological paradigms to help focus scarce resources into private
R&D on certain promising technologies, or is there already too much concen-
tration of R&D on too few paradigms?
The recent theory of endogenous technical change provides an analytical
framework which may help to answer this difficult question. As stated in Sec-
tion B.II.2, this theory has developed two prototype models of endogenous inno-
vation in growing economies, namely the model of increasing variety in hori-
zontally differentiated goods and the model of quality ladders with the dis-
placement of previous generations of (lower quality) goods. Remember that the
of self-fulfilling prophecies is provided by the success of the German apprenticeship
system. Both sides, the trainees as well as the training firms, reap part of the
benefits and seem to be fully aware of these. By contrast, in Britain and in the
United States most firms seem to stick to the expectation, based on individual
rationality, that teaching and training young workers more than absolutely necessary
for a particular job cannot be profitable, because the fully trained workers would be
enticed away by other, free-riding firms. It is hardly conceivable that these
entrenched attitudes and expectations, or the corresponding elements in the national
economic system, could be easily changed, let alone quickly.
1 The way in which the technology policies of the United States, Japan, France, the
United Kingdom and West Germany have been formed by the respective historical
experiences of these countries is vividly described by Nelson (1984). Ergas (1986)
develops, for the same group of countries, a useful typology of technology policy
regimes and institutions. He goes on to discuss a number of interesting hypotheses
about the origins of country-specific patterns of industrial innovation. He distin-
guishes between countries which tend to support the general diffusion of new
knowledge and those which tend to promote and pursue ambitious technological
'missions' in certain prestigious fields of technology.188
possibility of too intensive competition for innovation is, on theoretical grounds,
more likely to be relevant in the model of quality ladders. The promotion of
technological paradigms, in turn, is likely to concentratecthe R&D focus of pri-
vate firms even further on a small number of quality ladders — and quite
possibly to do so at the expense of enhancing variety. This danger may well be
exacerbated when certain technological paradigms become national priorities in
a world-wide contest for technological superiority among countries.
For example, consider the recent race between the United States, Japan and
the European Union to develop a universal technical standard for high-defini-
tion television (HDTV) to be introduced into networks world-wide. It seems
likely that the advantages of compatibility in a world-wide network render the
establishment of a single standard efficient; and it is at least possible that this
may be the only outcome that can prevail in the long term. Then, if this stan-
dard is proprietary, two of today's three contenders in HDTV development will
see much of their current R&D efforts.become obsolete at some point in the
future. An incentive problem arises because the system which wins the race to
technical maturity and market introduction may subsequently have the greatest
probability of becoming the world-wide standard and of returning export rev-
enue to its inventor country. It is therefore individually rational for each con-
tender to raise the stakes of his R&D investment whenever any of his com-
petitors does so, in order to reach the market sooner.
This situation is comparable to that of a group of fishermen who compete for
private gain over a limited number of fish in a public pond. The private incen-
tives are set inefficiently, so that over-fishing will be the likely outcome.
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However, while the problem of over-fishing can easily be solved by creating pri-
vate property rights for the fish in the pond, this solution is not available in the
case of patent races. Private property cannot be defined for non-existing knowl-
edge. Patents are only allocated after new technical knowledge has been found.
Technology policy thus faces some hard questions when it comes to justifying
the promotion of specific technological paradigms, especially when these are al-
ready in vogue in other countries.
To summarize this description of the informational problems in the design of
targeted industrial or technology policy programmes a questionnaire is offered
which may serve as a rough guide to some of the most important factual ques-
tions, suggested by new growth theory, that would have to be answered in a
given historical situation:
See the thorough analysis of the implications for innovations by Dasgupta and
Stiglitz(1980).189
What kind of market failure lies behind the perceived industrial or technological
development problem? Is there evidence of positive technological external ef-
fects? How large is their spatial range: regional, national or international?
What would be the most direct way to correct the market failure? Is this
feasible?
Is the industry's market small or large, shrinking or growing?
What is the objective with respect to technology: support for a newly emerging
technology or improvement of a mature one?
How large are the supply and demand elasticities for the typical products of the
industry under consideration? How large is the world market share of home
country exports from this industry?
Is the labour market of the industry integrated with the labour markets of other
industries, across regions, and across countries?
Is the personal human capital mobile across industries and across countries?
Is the supply of appropriately trained human capital for the industry elastic or
rather inelastic?
Are the rewards for the immobile factors of production higher or lower than in
other industries at home or abroad, which are comparable in terms of quality
demands?
How does the industry compare in terms of productivity across industries and
across countries?
Will the proposed industrial policy measures tend to support or hinder the
further specialization and differentiation of personal human capital in the in-
dustry, or in the economy as a whole?
Are the country's capital markets internally efficient, and is the external ex-
change of capital liberalized?
Is the technical knowledge, which is relevant to the industry, internationally as
mobile as within countries?
How does the technological standard of the industry compare across countries?
Is the home industry more of a technology laggard, or rather a technology leader
in the industry?
Is the economy's rate of growth reasonably high or disappointingly low, if com-
pared with similarly endowed economies?
Is the government share in GDP high or low?
Are industrial policy interventions the exception or the rule? Have they so far
been mostly temporary in effect so far, or have they already become permanent
features of the national economic system?
How common are government regulations of prices and quantities? Are more
price distortions to be expected as a result of the proposed measures?
How strong is the influence of industry lobbies?190
Is the same industry protected by industrial policies abroad? Is the related tech-
nology already heavily subsidized abroad, and thus not at risk of being under-
supplied in world markets?
Are strategic counter-measures to be expected in response to any home country
initiatives?
IV. Some Questions for Future Research
Some questions for further research were already suggested at various points in
the text, in particular at the end of the empirical Chapters D and E. One of these
questions concerns the level of aggregation at which path-dependence may be a
relevant feature of specialization dynamics. The theory does not make a precise
prediction, but it seems likely that path-dependence is more important at lower
levels of aggregation than that considered here (for reasons of data availability).
Future applications of the empirical methodology explored in Chapter E should
therefore use data at lower levels of aggregation over subindustries, say, at the
five-digit ISIC level. In similar vein, many of the large countries treated here as
uniform entities may in fact be heterogeneous enough to make the use of re-
gionally disaggregated data advisable; after all, the localized nature of exter-
nalities might imply that California and New York or Hamburg and Munich
have different specialization dynamics due to hysteresis, which could not be de-
tected using national data.
Neighbouring relations between economic activities, however, need not be
defined by geographical proximity, given the modern means of telecommuni-
cation and cheap transport. Instead, they might be defined by the intensity of
input-output-linkages, or by the extent to which different economic activities
share similar base technologies or similarly trained specialists. Recall from
Section B.V that empirical spill-over studies have already used specifications
which attempt to take account of neighbouring relations in dimensions other
than geographical space. Provided that enough disaggregated data can be made
available, such an attempt could also enrich the methodology of Markov chain
analysis explored in Chapter E.
Moreover, Markov chain analysis could be extended in other ways to test
specific hypotheses. For example, if several subgroups of regions could be
formed, according to some criterion of similarity within groups and differences
between groups, it might be feasible to estimate separate Markov transition
matrices for selected industries in each subgroup and to test for homogeneity
versus heterogeneity across these estimates. This might give more insight into191
regional or national idiosyncracies that potentially affect the specialization
dynamics in industries or technologies.
A further extension of the empirical research would ask whether a long-term
equilibrium relationship can be detected between industry- and country-indexed
technology input and value added output indicators. To simultaneously exploit
variation in the data across time and across countries (or regions), the new
methodology of cointegration in random fields, developed by Levin and Lin
(1992, 1993) as well as by Quah (1994), might be appropriate to investigate this
question.
An important question for theory might be whether the concept of a pro-
duction function can survive as a workhorse in the analysis of specialization in
open economies, given the apparent speed of technological change and the
growing influence of various kinds of external effects, including knowledge
spill-overs from R&D. Instead of maintaining rigid production functions at the
centre of analysis, the learning spill-over effects and the multi-dimensional
channels for technology transfers between decentralized economic activities
might be analyzed more directly, say, in terms of neural networks in which the
intensity of specific linkages and information exchange relations would be
modelled to grow or decline endogenously in the course of economic develop-
ment.
It may turn out, for example, that the concept of a production function need
not be abandoned altogether, but that it should be used in a more flexible way to
understand what appears to be the emergence of an information-intensive econ-
omy. One issue, for sure, would have to be resolved within the framework of
production functions, namely the question under what conditions technical pro-
gress tends to take the form of increasing variety, as suggested by the Dixit-
Stiglitz function, or the form of quality ladders, as suggested by Aghion and
Howitt (1992). Will it be possible to formulate a consistent general theory of
institutional factors that favour the one or the other of these prototypes of tech-
nical change?
In this context, theory should also ask whether the value of variety neces-
sarily increases in the course of economic development, or whether decreases in
the value of variety might also be compatible with economic growth — at least
temporarily. Furthermore, economic theory might attempt to prepare the ground
for a quantitative assessment of the value which certain types (or degrees) of
diversification in regional (or national) economic structure, or technology port-
folios for that matter, might have in terms of the prospects they give for future
productivity growth. A related policy question would be what a benevolent gov-
ernment could do to enhance the variety of technological knowledge available in
a given region or country, if that was found to be a bottleneck to innovation and
growth.192
Last, but not least, a highly topical question concerns the formulation of
technology policies in the European Union. Since EU member states have de-
veloped different, partly incompatible regimes of technology policy in the past,
the question arises what course a common European technology policy will (or
should) take in the future. Will the emerging European regime of technology
policy follow the French model of promoting specific and ambitious techno-
logical missions, often involving technologies of a very large scale, or will it
rather follow the German and Scandinavian line of supporting the diffusion of
new technologies in general", for instance by funding and promoting decentral-
ized technology transfer centres? Will it be at all necessary to choose between
these two models at the European level? Or would the continued coexistence of
different national technology policies still be a feasible alternative in the com-
mon market? And would that be desirable?193
G. Concluding Remarks: Has the Design
of Targeted Policies Got Any Easier?
This study has sought empirical evidence on the hypothesis that the dynamics of
technological and industrial specialization in open economies are characterized
by path-dependence or hysteresis. This hypothesis has often been interpreted to
imply that a benevolent government can — under certain well-defined
circumstances — use targeted industrial and technology policies to steer an
economy's evolving pattern of specialization onto a superior course, resulting in
faster overall productivity growth. Although this study has not been able to
either verify or reject this claim with finality, it has put forward new empirical
evidence which is predominantly negative on hysteresis.
Furthermore, the study has surveyed the informational requirements that
would have to be fulfilled to recommend any targeted industrial and technology
policies in an actual historical situation, in which hysteresis is thought to be
relevant for an economy's evolution of specialization. This synthesis has sug-
gested that the information problems remain insurmountable for the time being.
The study therefore closes on a sceptical note about the prospects of targeting
being beneficial in today's highly diversified industrial economies. The basic
message for policy is that it has not got any easier to design and implement tar-
geted policies which would enhance productivity and welfare in open econ-
omies. On the contrary, the study has pointed out a number of major difficulties,
which would inevitably get in the way of targeting and which cannot presently
be resolved, given the limitations of available data and empirical methodology
in economic research.
It would be easy to dismiss any proposal for targeted industrial and technol-
ogy policies by making a preconceived philosophical choice of treating free
markets as an end in themselves, instead of as a means to an end. This study, by
contrast, has implicitly treated the market mechanism of resource allocation
merely as a means, which will never cease to be subject to comparative evalua-
tion vis-a-vis alternative means, including targeted interventions in market-
based economies. In this view, the choice of a benevolent government for or
against targeted policies should be based on empirical research, and should be
re-evaluated whenever important new empirical evidence challenges the
wisdom of policies adopted in the past.
The demise of communism has made it fashionable today to call for more
entrepreneurial decision making at lower levels of economic organization. But194
an important question raised in parts of new growth theory asks whether some
entrepreneurial decisions rather should be made at higher levels of organization
than most firms have traditionally operated, if technological change is of an
essentially systemic nature. Indeed, one may wonder: Is it not part of healthy
locational competition when a local or national government makes an entre-
preneurial move to attract or to keep research and development on promising
technologies in its domain? To answer this, it would not suffice to say that
strategic action cannot do any good because it would evoke strategic counter-
action by foreign governments. A compelling answer will have to be based on a
more sophisticated analysis — one based on rigorous theory and thorough em-
pirical testing.
Such a more sophisticated analysis has in recent years been attempted in
parts of new growth theory, where models of endogenous technological change
suggest that positive external effects from private R&D may be a sine qua non
for sustaining long-run economic growth. These models, which were reviewed
in Chapter B, interpret product and process innovations as the result of purpose-
ful R&D investments made by private profit-seeking enterprises. Sustained
growth of per capita productivity is feasible whenever the private incentives to
accumulate technical knowledge are strong enough and do not weaken over
time. The models meet this condition by postulating that the creation of knowl-
edge through private R&D yields positive external effects: part of the new
knowledge adds to the public stock of technical knowledge and is accessible to
all firms doing R&D themselves. Without these positive externalities, which
have the effect of reducing every firm's costs of future R&D, the pioneers of a
new technology would be in a position to establish a permanent monopoly that
could be defended virtually without further R&D effort.
Using this theory to understand trade, growth and specialization in open
economies, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the cross-border
mobility of R&D output. One important assumption concerns the privately ap-
propriable part of R&D output. This may be either internationally tradeable, like
most other private inputs in production, or may be largely excluded from inter-
national trade, since it is often complementary to specific knowledge and skills,
available only in the firm or country that has done the R&D. The assumption of
international mobility of R&D output is supported by the observation of many
instances of technological imitation and of a widespread, and increasing, com-
mercial trade in patents and licences. On the other hand, the assumption of
limited international mobility of R&D output is supported by the fact that the
recipients of international technology transfers often cannot use the acquired
technology straight away, but rather have to invest in complementary knowl-
edge and skills and to literally re-search the acquired knowledge to understand
its tacit components. Hence, it is not surprising that a large, and apparently in-195
creasing, share of international technology transfers takes place within multi-
national companies, which are generally in a better position to move not just
pure technical knowledge but also complementary human capital resources
across borders.
To what extent the privately appropriable part of R&D output, itself an input
in other production, is internationally tradeable has interesting implications for
resource allocation and patterns of specialization within a theory of dynamic
comparative advantage. By extending the international division of labour, trade
in new technical knowledge — either through trade in patents and licences or
through technology transfers within multinational companies — can lead to a
more efficient use of resources in knowledge creation and so raise the rate of in-
novation and growth in the world economy. The crucial assumption, however,
which distinguishes the theory of dynamic comparative advantage from the
hysteretic theory of national technological accumulation, is that the speed,
strength and scope, with which the positive external effects of knowledge
creation through R&D spill over to other firms, are not reduced by international
borders, nor by geographical or cultural distance between industry locations.
Chapter D explored the empirical relevance of the concept of comparative
advantage and of the factor proportions theory of international trade and spe-
cialization for the distribution of R&D activities across seventeen industries in
fourteen OECD member countries over the period from 1970 to 1989. This
chapter first discussed bivariate correlations between countries' R&D intensities
across industries and industries' R&D intensities across countries which con-
firm that the average R&D intensity is a characteristic feature of individual in-
dustries as well as of individual countries. Using the analysis of variance tech-
nique, the chapter then showed that the type of industry and the country of its
location are significant determinants of the observed human capital intensity in
R&D, measured here either by the ratio of university graduates in R&D to other
R&D personnel or by the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D
personnel.
Chapter D, finally, reported multiple regression analysis to examine — sepa-
rately for each industry in the sample — the impact of a country's human capi-
tal endowment, production specialization, size and time on the degree to which
the country specializes in a particular industry's R&D activities. While the re-
sults of these regressions are generally not inconsistent with the factor propor-
tions theory, they do reveal strikingly distinct patterns of R&D specialization for
computers, electrical machinery and radio, television and communication
equipment, the industries most closely connected to the fast changing micro-
electronic technologies.
Chapter E looked at the empirical evolution of specialization in OECD
countries over time. According to the hypothesis of dynamic comparative ad-196
vantage, patterns of specialization in technology as well as in actual production
should — in the absence of adjustment and transaction costs — be quite mobile
over time and independent of each other as they respond to changes in the rela-
tive factor endowments of countries. Since the comparative advantages for pro-
duction and for R&D in an industry would be distinct and might be located in
different countries, not even the specialization patterns of those technologies
which are confined to single industries would need to evolve along the same
trends as the corresponding industries.
By contrast, the case for-historical events and path-dependence as the deter-
minant of sectoral patterns of technological specialization would imply that
patterns of specialization in technology as well as in production are much less
mobile, especially when a country's industrial structure is already heavily
skewed towards certain industries. If knowledge spill-overs from R&D diffused
faster within countries than across international boundaries, hysteresis could be
decisive in the sense that temporary events, like price shocks or industrial and
technology policies, can have lasting effects on a country's pattern of tech-
nological specialization and trade. Such lasting effects might be recognizable
through high persistence of specialization patterns in production and technology
despite changes in the relative factor abundance of countries. Persistence would
be expected to'be particularly pronounced in technological specialization where
the positive external effects in the form of knowledge spill-overs from R&D
would have their most direct and strongest impact. But in general, a close rela-
tionship would be expected between the dynamics of countries' specialization in
certain technologies and in the production in those industries whose products
make intensive use of these technologies.
An important practical question in this research was: How can sectoral spe-
cialization in industrial production be measured in a multi-country, multi-factor
world? To obtain a measure which is comparable across countries and across
industries it was suggested to compare the relative weight of a certain industry
in individual countries with the relative weight of this industry in total world
manufacturing. This indicator of specialization measures how many times
greater or smaller the ratio of a country's value added to the world's value
added is in a specific industry as compared with all of manufacturing. Dis-
cussing the determinants of specialization in terms of comparative advantage
versus hysteresis due to technological accumulation, it is natural to focus on the
specialization in those tradeables for which the hypotheses are primarily formu-
lated, namely manufactures. The limited availability of reliable data on value
added by industry, which was taken from the 1992 version of the OECD STAN
database, made it necessary to restrict the scope of the study to only 12 countries
— Australia, Canada, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-197
lands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States — and to
the 19 year period from 1970 through 1988.
For each year and for each industry in all sample countries, the indicator of
industry specialization and a conceptually similar indicator of technological
specialization were computed. These transformed data were then used to study
the evolution of their cross-section distribution — across industries, across
countries, or both. Since the time-series and cross-section dimensions of these
data are of similar magnitude — a structure known in probability theory as a
random field— conventional methods of either panel or pooled regressions
would not have been appropriate. These methods simply control for variation in
one dimension to estimate correlations in the other. An appropriate model in-
stead had to take both dimensions into account simultaneously. That is to say,
the model had to specify a stochastic process of the evolution of cross-section
distributions, which could be estimated so that the mobility of the specialization
indicator over time could be examined on the basis of the estimates. Such
modelling might take several forms. One approach chosen for estimation was in
terms of an approximation by a finite Markov chain for a discretized state space.
This assumes that the underlying stochastic process has the Markov property
that future patterns of specialization only depend on the present pattern and not
on the past.
The chosen discretizing grid has six states. The estimated transition matrix
therefore gives probabilities for each of these six states of specialization that an
industry will have moved there after one period of time, conditional on the in-
dustry's initial state of specialization. An empirical estimate of such a transition
matrix can give useful information on the intra-distributional mobility of in-
dividual industries between different degrees of specialization over time, and
can also be used to calculate long-run stationary distributions of the speciali-
zation indicator — provided they exist — by matrix multiplication according to
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.
A bimodal long-run stationary distribution, where the probability of an in-
dustry being either very strong or very weak in its country of location is much
higher than it being close to the mean of specialization, combined with high
persistence in terms of large entries on the main diagonal — especially at the
ends — of the estimated transition matrix would point to hysteresis, whereas
low persistence in the transitions matrix combined with a uniform or unimodal
long-run stationary distribution of the specialization indicator would appear to
contradict the hypothesis of hysteresis.
The main shortcoming of this analysis summarized so far is its lack of ac-
counting for relative factor endowments in the sample countries and changes
thereof during the sample period. If factor endowments had any impact at all on
the international allocation of sectoral economic activities, they might — in the198
case of monotonic time trends in the underlying dynamic comparative ad-
vantages of countries — even be responsible for patterns of specialization dy-
namics which point to a bimodal stationary distribution, just like hysteresis
would. It is therefore important to control for the influence of changes in the
relative factor supplies of countries when analyzing the dynamics of speciali-
zation with a view to testing hysteresis, although this is — admittedly — a very
difficult task.
A first attempt was made by simply regressing the familiar value added
indicator of an industry's specialization in the sample countries on conceptually
similar indicators of countries' relative factor endowments, and by subsequently
estimating Markov chain transition matrices on the residuals. Provided all rele-
vant endowments are appropriately considered, this procedure eliminates that
part of the specialization dynamics which can be 'accounted for' by the dy-
namics of comparative advantages.
The factor endowments considered for each of the twelve countries were:
Physical capital, R & D capital, the number of R & D scientists and engineers in
the business enterprise sector, the labour force, and the years of schooling in the
labour force. A general tendency of divergence in the autocorrelated residuals
away from their theoretical mean of zero could be interpreted as evidence in
support of hysteresis, whereas substantial non-monotonic mobility of the re-
siduals, or even convergence to the mean, would lend support to the alternative
hypothesis of dynamic comparative advantages as an adequate explanation of
industrial specialization dynamics.
The evidence — in brief — from 12 OECD member countries' time series of
value added in 17 manufacturing industries and from corresponding patent
count data does not support the hypothesis of hysteresis based on nationally re-
stricted knowledge spill-overs from industrial research and development ac-
tivities. On the contrary, there seems to be generally lower persistence in pat-
terns of technological specialization than in the corresponding production spe-
cialization. Moreover, high persistence in some parts of manufacturing mostly
disappears when taking into account changes in countries' relative factor en-
dowments, which form the basis of dynamic comparative advantages. These
findings cast doubt on the popular belief that a government can — by making
cleverly designed and appropriately timed industrial policy interventions —
secure a permanently larger share of certain industries for the national economy
which are supposed to lock in first-mover advantages in terms of particularly
high rates of technological innovation and productivity growth.
Chapter F then turned to a discussion of the information problem any
benevolent government would face that did not take the empirical results of the
preceding chapters as the final verdict on the merits and demerits of targeted
industrial and technology policies in practice. The main conclusion from this199
analysis is the recognition that most methods so far used to measure the strength
and range of positive external effects from new knowledge (or newly introduced
products) are too crude, and therefore fail, to distinguish properly between dif-
ferent kinds of external effects, which may have quite different theoretical im-
plications for industrial and technology policy. Here, empirical research in-
evitably faces serious identification problems, say, when technological exter-
nalities are hardly distinguishable from pecuniary externalities in high-tech-
nology markets.
For example, while the introduction of a new computer software often comes
with a negative pecuniary externality for the direct competitors, it may also give
rise to a positive technological external effect, when the new software reveals
new technical possibilities which the competitors can freely incorporate in the
next generation of their own products. On the other hand, also pecuniary exter-
nalities can be positive, so for instance, when the increase in demand for spe-
cialized software programming tools due to the expansion of a particular con-
sumer software company induces a differentiation of the pertinent supply, which
in turn benefits other software companies as well as the originally expanding
one.
Much of the existing literature on industrial and technology policy, being
focused on comparing the strength of positive external effects from investments
in different industries so as to identify the most promising industries for tar-
geted subsidies, has neglected the equally important question how a reliable
distinction can be made between the relative strength and direction of different
kinds of pecuniary and technological externalities. This distinction would be
important for an efficient choice of policy instruments because direct R&D sub-
sidies would be wasteful if the relevant positive externalities were primarily of
the pecuniary kind and linked to the intensity of interfirm transactions, while
subsidies targeted at specific types of transactions — say, by subsidizing the ac-
quisition and installation of certain types of machinery — would be wasteful in
the case of true technological knowledge spill-over effects.
Whatever microeconomic nature of the external effects from knowledge
creation is dominant in reality, the new theory of endogenous technological
change seems right in emphasizing the importance of external learning by
doing from private R&D. But, as the models typically exhibit multiple equilibria
with the implication of different self-reinforcing patterns of specialization in
open economies, they have fuelled worries about national lock-out from promis-
ing technologies which are apparently unwarranted in the case of industrialized
countries, as the empirical results of the present study indicate.
The theory of endogenous technological change and learning by doing, which
is to some extent localized, might still be compatible with these findings,
though. Yet, to prevent once-established patterns of specialization from persist-200
ing through time may even under the hypothesis of localized learning not ac-
tually require strategically targeted industrial and technology policies in open
economies when these have a rather diverse industrial structure to begin with.
In such a situation, it may suffice that the economy is fully integrated into the
international division of labour and occasionally affected by terms-of-trade
shocks of sufficient magnitude to cause substantial sectoral reallocations of re-
sources despite some degree of path-dependence, or hysteresis. Workers and
entrepreneurs thus pulled into new activities by unexpectedly changing com-
parative advantage would be given a new start at learning on a different path.
The examples of Finland and Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s have shown that
even small countries and latecomers are not generally prevented from sub-
stantially improving their export base in high-technologies (OECD 1994b: 19).201
Appendix
Sources and Methods for Chapter D
The data set covers the fourteen following countries: Australia (AUS), Belgium
(BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), West
Germany (DEU), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), the Netherlands (NL), Norway
(NOR), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US),
and the twenty-year period from 1970 through 1989 — as far as possible. Data
gaps are mentioned in the descriptions of the variables below.
The table below comprises all industries, their ISIC codes,
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responding abbreviations used in the tables of Chapter D.
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International Standard Industrial Classification (see United Nations 1968).202
Data on average years of schooling in the adult population are from Barro
and Lee (1993: 26-29 [Table A.2]). Adults are defined as people older than 25
years of age. For Figure Al, panel b, only the data referring to the years 1975
and 1985 have been taken; they are used as an approximation of the averages
for the respective decades. The data source provides these data only at five-year
intervals. See Barro and Lee (1993) for their method of estimation.
Data on value added by industry are from the OECD STAN Database for
Industrial Analysis (OECD 1992a; OECD 1994a). These yearly data are
estimated by the OECD, instead of being a mere compilation of OECD member
countries' official data. The estimates are geared towards compatibility with
national accounts and towards international comparability. Data for the fol-
lowing cases are missing in the data source (partly because some of the in-
dustries have not existed in some of the countries for all or part of the time): in
Belgium for MACH, COMP, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC and OTRA
throughout, in Canada for PROF throughout, in Denmark for MACH and
COMP from 1970 to 1979 and for MOTV and OTRA throughout, in Finland
for AIRC and OTRA from 1970 to 1979, in Italy for CHEM, DRUG, MACH,
COMP, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC and OTRA in 1988 and from 1989 as well as for
ELMA and RTVC in 1989, in the Netherlands for MACH and COMP in 1989,
and in the United States for AIRC and OTRA in 1970 and from 1971. Value
added for the total manufacturing sector is used as a scale variable. This is done
because the manufacturing sector is largely identical with the tradeable sector,
the sector for which the question of international specialization is relevant.
All other data are from the OECD Science and Technology Statistics on
magnetic tape (OECD 1992b). Here is a list of the other variables and missing
data:
Data on Total Intramural Business Expenditures on R&D by Industry are
from group 25 of the OECD Science and Technology Statistics. Data for the
following cases are missing in the data source (partly because some of the
industries have not existed in some of the countries for all or part of the time):
in Australia for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980,
1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, and for CHEM and DRUG in 1971, RAP,
FABM and SCG in 1973, COMP in 1971, 1973, 1988, AIRC in 1971, 1973,
1981, 1988, for IRON, NFM, MACH, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP, MOTV, OTRA
and PROF in 1971 and 1973; in Belgium for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974,
1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1989, and for COMP from 1970 to 1980; in
Canada for all industries in 1970, for MACH, COMP, ELMA and RTVC in
1971, and for SHIP, MOTV and OTRA throughout; in Denmark for all
industries in 1971,1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, for FABM
and COMP from 1970 to 1978, and for IRON, NFM, MOTV and AIRC203
throughout; in Finland for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980,
1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for CHEM, DRUG, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP and OTRA
from 1985 to 1989, for COMP from 1970 to 1978 and from 1985 to 1989, for
AIRC in 1971 and from 1985 to 1989, and for MOTV throughout; in France for
ELMA and RTVC from 1970 to 1973; in West Germany for all industries in
1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for OTRA in
1973, and for DRUG, COMP, ELMA and RTVC throughout; in Italy for AIRC
from 1970 to 1974 and from 1976 to 1977, and for FABM, COMP, SHIP,
MOTV and OTRA from 1970 to 1977; in Japan for SHIP and AIRC from 1970
to 1978, and for COMP throughout; in the Netherlands for DRUG from 1970 to
1972 and for FOOD, CHEM, IRON, NFM, FABM, MACH, COMP, ELMA,
RTVC, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC, OTRA and PROF throughout; in Norway for all
industries in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1986, 1988, for DRUG and OTRA from
1970 to 1971, for NFM from 1973 to 1976, for ELMA, RTVC and SHIP from
1970 to 1971 and from 1973 to 1976, for MOTV from 1970 to 1978, and for
AIRC from 1970 to 1988; in Sweden for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974,
1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for FABM in 1971, for COMP,
ELMA and MOTV from 1970 to 1982, and for AIRC from 1970 to 1982 and
from 1984 to 1989; in the UK for all industries in 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974,
1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984, and for OTRA from 1973 to 1989; in the
US for CHEM, DRUG and MACH from 1981 to 1985, for FOOD from 1981 to
1986 and from 1988 to 1989, for RAP from 1981 to 1989, for SCG from 1981
to 1985 and from 1988 to 1989, for IRON from 1981 to 1987 and in 1989, for
NFM from 1981 to 1983 and in 1987 and 1989, for COMP from 1970 to 1971
and from 1981 to 1989, for ELMA and RTVC from 1981 to 1986, for MOTV
from 1970 to 1971 and from 1986 to 1989, for OTRA from 1970 to 1971 and
from 1981 to 1989, and for SHIP throughout.
Data on Total R&D Personnel by Industry are from group 29 of the OECD
Science and Technology Statistics. Data for the following cases are missing in
the data source (partly because some of the industries have not existed in some
of the countries for all or part of the time): in Australia for all industries from
1969 to 1975, in 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, for RAP,
ELMA, RTVC and OTRA in 1978, for IRON in 1978, 1984, 1986, for NFM in
1984, 1986, for SHIP and AIRC from 1976 to 1984, and for COMP throughout;
in Belgium for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982,
1984, 1988, 1989, for OTRA in 1971, and for COMP from 1969 to 1980; in
Canada for all industries in 1970, 1989, for COMP, ELMA and RTVC in 1969,
1971, and for SHIP, MOTV and OTRA throughout; in Denmark for all
industries in 1969, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986,
1988, and for IRON, NFM, FABM, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC throughout; in
Finland for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984,204
1986, 1988, for CHEM, DRUG, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP and OTRA from 1985 to
1989, for AIRC in 1969,1971 and from 1985 to 1989, for COMP from 1969 to
1977 and 1985 to 1987, and for MOTV throughout; in France for all industries
in 1969 and 1984, for SCG in 1976, 1978, for IRON from 1970 to 1974 and in
1976, 1978, 1980, for NFM from 1970 to 1974 and in 1976, 1978, for FABM,
ELMA, RTVC from 1970 to 1974, for SHIP in 1976, 1978, 1980, for OTRA
from 1970 to 1973 and in 1976, 1978, and for PROF from 1970 to 1979; in
West Germany for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982,
1984,1986,1988, for DRUG, COMP, ELMA and RTVC from 1969 to 1987; in
Italy for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1978, for AIRC from 1969 to 1973
and in 1977, for SHIP and MOTV from 1969 to 1977, for FABM and OTRA
from 1969 to 1981; in Japan for all industries in 1982, for COMP from 1986 to
1989, for SHIP and AIRC from 1969 to 1978; in the Netherlands for DRUG
from 1969 to 1986, and for CHEM, IRON, NFM, FABM, MACH, COMP,
ELMA, RTVC, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC, OTRA and PROF throughout; in Norway
for all industries in 1973, 1976, 1978,1980, 1986, 1988, for PROF and MACH
in 1969, for DRUG, SHIP, OTRA from 1969 to 1971, for NFM in 1969, 1974,
1975, for COMP and MOTV from 1969 to 1977, for ELMA and RTVC from
1969 to 1971 and from 1974 to 1975, and for AIRC from 1969 to 1987; in
Sweden for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984,
1986, 1988, for NFM in 1969, 1971, for COMP, ELMA, RTVC and MOTV
from 1969 to 1981, and for AIRC throughout; in the UK for all industries in
1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986,
1987,1988, and for OTRA throughout; in the US for all industries in all years.
The total R&D personnel for each country's total manufacturing sector is used
as a scale variable. This is done because the manufacturing sector is largely
identical with the tradeable sector, the sector for which the question of
international specialization is relevant.
Data on R&D Scientists and Engineers by Industry are from group 26 of the
OECD Science and Technology Statistics (1992b). Data for the following
cases
15
4 are missing in the data source (partly because some of the industries
have not existed in some of the countries for all or part of the time): in Australia
for all industries from 1969 to 1975 and in 1977, 1979,1980, 1982, 1983, 1985,
1987, 1989, for RAP, ELMA, RTVC and MOTV in 1978, for IRON in 1978,
1984,1986, for NFM in 1984,1986, for SHIP and AIRC from 1976 to 1984, for
OTRA in 1978 and 1984, and for COMP throughout; in Belgium for all
industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976 and from 1978 to 1989, for OTRA in
1971, and for COMP throughout; in Canada for all industries in 1970, 1989, for
15
4 Missing cases refer to the ratios of R&D scientists and engineers to total R&D
personnel, as used in this study.205
COMP, ELMA, RTVC from 1969 to 1971, and for SHIP, MOTV and OTRA
throughout; in Denmark for all industries in 1969, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976,
1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for IRON, NFM, FABM, MOTV and
AIRC throughout; in Finland for all industries in 1970, 1972,1974,1976, 1978
and from 1980 to 1989, for COMP from 1969 to 1977, for AIRC from 1969 to
1971, and for MOTV throughout; in France for all industries in 1970 and 1984,
for CHEM, DRUG, MACH, COMP, MOTV from 1969 to 1973, for RAP,
FABM, ELMA and RTV from 1969 to 1974, for SCG, NFM and OTRA from
1969 to 1974 and in-1976, 1978, for IRON and SHIP from 1969 to 1974 and in
1976, 1978, 1980, and for PROF from 1969 to 1979; in West Germany for all
industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for
DRUG, COMP, ELMA, RTVC from 1969 to 1987, in Italy for all industries in
1970, 1972, 1974, 1978, for IRON in 1984, 1986, for FABM and OTRA from
1969 to 1981, for COMP, SHIP and MOTV from 1969 to 1977, for AIRC from
1969 to 1973 and in 1977; in Japan for all industries in 1982, for COMP from
1981 to 1989, for SHIP and AIRC from 1969 to 1977; in the Netherlands for all
industries from 1969 to 1978 and in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for DRUG
from 1969 to 1985, and for CHEM, IRON, NFM, FABM, MACH, COMP,
ELMA, RTVC, SHIP, MOTV, AIRC, OTRA and PROF throughout; in Norway
for all industries in 1973,1976, 1978 and from 1980 to 1989, for DRUG, SHIP
and OTRA from 1969 to 1971, for NFM in 1969, 1974, 1975, for MACH in
1969, for COMP and MOTV from 1969 to 1977, for ELMA and RTVC from
1969 to 1971 and from 1974 to 1975, for PROF in 1969, 1971, and for AIRC
throughout; in Sweden for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980,
1982 and from 1984 to 1989, for NFM in 1969, 1971, for COMP, ELMA,
RTVC and MOTV from 1969 to 1981, for AIRC throughout; in the UK for all
industries in 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983,
1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, for SCG in 1969, for SHIP in 1985, 1989, for OTRA
throughout; in the US for all industries in all years.
The source for Countries' Endowments with R&D Scientists and Engineers
(all fields of science) is group 15 of the OECD Science and Technology
Statistics (1992b). Missing data have been filled in from linear trend regressions
in the case of Canada (1970, 1972-1976), the Netherlands (1970, 1972, 1974,
1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988), Norway (1971, 1973, 1976, 1986,
1988) and Sweden (1970, 1972, 1976, 1978,1980, 1982,1984,1986, 1988), by
interpolation in the case of Australia (1970-1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1980,
1982, 1983, 1989), West Germany (1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988)
and France (1978, 1980). For Belgium (1970-1979) and Finland (1970, 1972-
1982, 1984-1989), data on university graduates of science and engineering
studies employed in R&D have been used, filling in missing data with fitted206
values from a linear trend regression.
15
5 In the case of the United Kingdom
(1970-1984, 1989), a trend has been extracted from figures on R&D scientists
and engineers employed by industry as well as by governments, published by the
National Science Board (1991: 301) of the United States in its annual Science
and Engineering Indicators.
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Data on University Graduates in R&D by Industry are from group 30 of the
OECD Science and Technology Statistics (1992b). Data for the following
cases
15
7 are missing in the data source (partly because some of the industries
have not existed in some of the countries for all or part of the time): in Australia
for all industries in all years; in Belgium for all industries in 1970, 1972, 1974,
1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1988, 1989~for OTRA in 1971, and for COMP
from 1969 to 1979 and in 1983; in Canada for all industries in all years; in
Denmark for all industries in 1969, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and from
1980 to 1989, for IRON, NFM, FABM, MOTV and AIRC throughout; in
Finland for all industries from 1969 to 1978 and in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986,
1988, for CHEM, DRUG, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP, AIRC, OTRA from 1985 to
1989, for COMP from 1985 to 1987, and for NFM and MOTV throughout; in
France for all industries in all years, except for NFM, in which case biannual
data from 1979 to 1989 are available; in West Germany for all industries from
1969 to 1978 and in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for DRUG, COMP, ELMA
and RTVC from 1979 to 1987; in Italy for all industries from 1969 to 1978, for
FABM and OTRA from 1969 to 1981, and for NFM throughout; in Japan for all
industries in all years; in the Netherlands for RAP and SCG from 1970 to 1972,
for CHEM, IRON, NFM, FABM, MACH, COMP, ELMA, RTVC, SHIP,
MOTV, AIRC, OTRA and PROF throughout; in Norway for all industries in
1973,1976,1978,1980, 1986, 1988, for DRUG, SHIP and OTRA from 1969 to
1971, for NFM from 1969 to 1975, for MACH in 1969, for COMP and MOTV
from 1969 to 1977, for ELMA and RTVC from 1969 to 1971 and from 1974 to
1975, for AIRC from 1969 to 1987; in Sweden for all industries in 1970, 1972,
1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, for NFM from 1969 to 1979
and from 1983 to 1989, for COMP, ELMA, RTVC and MOTV from 1969 to
1981, and for AIRC throughout; in the UK for all industries from 1969 to 1980
15
5 For Finland, the regression with logarithmic data (from seven observations) has
yielded a slope coefficient of 278.28 (50.80), a constant of -543,851 ( 878.98) and
an R
2 of 0.86 (standard errors in parentheses).
15(* The estimated trend regression with logarithmic data (from eleven observations) has
a slope coefficient of 2365,138 (192.75), a constant of -4,594,550 (4,620.77) and an
R
2 of 0.94 (standard errors in parentheses).
Missing cases refer to the ratios of university graduates to total R&D personnel.207
and from 1982 to 1989, for NFM and OTRA throughout; in the US for all
industries in all years.
Data on countries' labour forces, nominal gross domestic products (GDP),
purchasing power parities and GDP price indices are from the economic
indicator series — group 94 — of the OECD Science and Technology Statistics
(1992b).
II. Sources and Methods for Chapter E
Data on sectoral value added for the industry specialization indicator has been
taken from the 1992 version of the OECD STAN Database for Industrial
Analysis, an estimated database, not composed of OECD member countries'
official data, but geared towards compatibility with national accounts and
towards international comparability. This database covers the twelve countries
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States for the years
1970-1988 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 1991). For these countries, data
on patents granted by the US patent office, by date of application, is available
from the Office of Technology Assessment and Forecasting at the US Depart-
ment of Commerce, for the years 1972-1989. The data used are reclassified
according to the US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) according to a
concordance between the US Patent Classification System (USPCS) and 55
product fields based on the SIC. The data are so-called fractional counts, which
eliminate multiple counting by dividing each patent count by the number of
product fields to which it is assigned and adding the resulting fraction to each
assigned product field.
Time series on countries' relative factor endowments have been obtained
from various sources: Capital stocks are computed, for the beginning of each
period, on the basis of annual investment data in Summers and Heston (1991),
using the perpetual inventory method, assuming a rate of depreciation of 13.3
per cent as would be implied by an average asset life of 15 years. R&D capital
stocks are taken from Coe and Helpman (1993), who have used R&D ex-
penditure data from the OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
Their computations are again based on a perpetual inventory model, with the
assumption of a 5 per cent rate of depreciation or obsolescence. For further
details see the appendix in Coe and Helpman (1993). Data on the size of labour
forces and on national employment of research scientists and engineers (in the
business enterprise sector) are taken from the OECD Science and Technology208
Statistics (1992b). Missing figures for research scientists and engineers have
been filled in from linear trend regressions in the case of Canada, the Nether-
lands, Norway and Sweden, by interpolation in the case of Australia, Germany
and France. For Finland, a trend regression on university graduates of science
and engineering studies in the business enterprise sector has been used. In the
case of the United Kingdom, a trend has been extracted from figures on
scientists and engineers employed by industry as well as by government,
published by the National Science Board (1991: 301) in its annual Science and
Engineering Indicators. Figures on years of schooling in the labour force are
based on linear trend regressions for the five-yearly data on average years of
schooling attained by adults over 25 years of age, which have recently been
compiled by Barro and Lee (1993).
To normalize relative factor endowments, the different shares of each country
in the total factor endowments of all twelve countries have been divided by the
country's share in the sum of all countries' gross domestic product (GDP). A
logarithmic transformation has then been made to assure symmetry of the factor
endowment indicators. GDP figures are from the chain index series of per capita
GDP in constant dollars at 1985 international prices in Summers and Heston
(1991). Purchasing power parities are from the OECD Science and Technology
Statistics (1992b).
The table below lists the seventeen industries included in the study and
indicates how patent data, based on the concordance between the US patent
classes and product fields of the US standard industrial classification, have been
assigned to the International Standard Industrial Classification of the United
Nations (ISIC), on which the OECD STAN data on industries' value added is
based. An adjustment to the source data has been made when patent count data
for a small country was zero in a particular industry for one or several
consecutive years. In these cases, the sum of patented applications recorded for
the preceding and subsequent year has been evenly distributed across the years.
The purpose of this is to avoid realizations at minus infinity in the logarithmic
transformation of the technology specialization indicator.
Missing values for the Netherlands' value added in NFM in 1988 and for
Italy's value added in the DRUG, COMP, SHIP and AIRC industries in 1988
have been added from extrapolations by the author. In a number of cases, time
series of individual industries' value added are not reported at all in the 1992
OECD STAN database. These cases are therefore omitted from the analysis:
MACH, COMP, ELMA and RTVC in France, AIRC in the Netherlands, OTRA
in the United Kingdom and PROF in Canada.209
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PROFIII. Figures and Tables
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Table Al —Average R&D Intensities of Industries in Various Countries in the 1970s and the 1980s
a
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Table A2 —Rankings of Average R&D Intensities across Countries in the 1970s and the 1980s
a
Food, beverages, tobacco
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(1)Table A3 —Rankings of Average R&D Intensities across Industries in the 1970s and the 1980s
a
Food, beverages, tobacco
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Table A4 —Average Ratios of R&D Scientists and Engineers to Other R&D Personnel in the 1970s and the 1980s
Food, beverages, tobacco
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Table A5 —Rankings of the Average Ratios of R&D Scientists and Engineers to Other R&D Personnel across
Countries in the 1970s and the 1980s
a
Food, beverages, tobacco
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(4)Table A6 —Rankings of the Average Ratios of R&D Scientists and Engineers to Other R&D Personnel across
Industries in the 1970s and the 198Os
a
Food, beverages, tobacco
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Note: Value added denotes the industry's shares of countries' total







relative to the labour force, RGDP the countries' real GDP at purchasing power
parities, Time the calendar time in years, and R&D-Pers, the dependent, industry's
shares of countries' total R&D personnel in manufacturing.221
Table A8 —Six-State Markov Chain Estimates for the Industry and Technology
Specialization Indicators of Individual Industries


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: For the abbreviations of the industries' names see Appendix II.



















-Fractile Markov Chain Estimates for the Specialization Indicators
of Individual Industries
1. First-order, time-stationary estimates of the five-year transition probabilities
Transition end state (quantile)























CHEM: value added specialization
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0.278Figure Al — OECD Countries' Endowment with Human Capital





Average for the 1970s Average for the 1980s
US JAP DBJ UK AUS SWE NOR NIL FRA CAN FIN BEL
Panel b: Average Years of Schooling in the Adult Population
DK ITA
BEL DK ITA
aPercentage shares of employed R&D scientists and engineers in total labour force. Averages for all countries combined: 0.45 per
cent in the 1970s and 0.58 per cent in the 1980s. Data Source: OECD (1992 b), partly based on own estimates. —
 bAdult
population comprises people older than 25 years. Data Source: Barro and Lee (1993).236
Figure A2 — R&D Intensities for Major Industries
1
1 Relative to the Industry
Average over All Countries in the 1970s and the 1980s
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PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Belgium (12th in 1970s, 8th in 1980s)
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ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Canada (10th in 1970s, 9th in 1980s)
rra l~k
ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Denmark (13th in 1970s, 13th in 1980s)
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ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Finland (11th in 1970s, 12th in 1980s)
ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
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Figure A2 continued
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ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Italy (14th in 1970s, 14th in 1980s)
ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
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ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Norway (7th in 1970s, 5th in l
l>KOs)
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ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OIKA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH HRUG SCG RAP AIRC
Sweden (Olli in 10 70s. -tlh in 1980s)
ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC238
Figure A2 continued




ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC




ELMA COMP SHIP FOOD OTRA NFM CHEM IRON MOTV
PROF RTVC FABM MACH DRUG SCG RAP AIRC
aOn the horizontal axis, industries are ranked by their average ratios of R&D scientists and engineers to
other R&D personnel in the 1970s. After countries' names, the rankings of countries by their overall
relative endowments with R&D scientists and engineers in the 1970s and 1980s are given in parentheses.
— For abbreviations of industries' names see Appendix I.239
Figure A3 — R&D Intensities for OECD Countries
3 Relative to the Country
Average over All Industries in the 1970s and the 1980s
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CHEM (13th in 1970s, 12lh in 1980s)
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DRUG (10th in 1970s, 9th in 1980s)
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US JAP DEU UK AUS SWE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
SCG (12th in 1970s, 13lh in 1980s)
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IRON (15th in 1970s, 15th in 1980s)
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Figure A3 continued
NFM (11th in 1970s, 11th in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS 3AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BB_ DK ITA






US JAP DEU UK AUS SWE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
MACII (8th in 1970s, 6th in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS SWE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
COMP (3th in 1970s, 2nd in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS SAAE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
ELMA (1st in 1970s, 1st in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS S\AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
RTVC (4th in 1970s, 4th in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS S\AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA241
Figure A3 continued
SHIP (5th in 1970s, 3rd in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS SWE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
MOTV (17th in 1970s, 17th in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS S\AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
AIRC (16th in 1970s, 16th in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS SAE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
OTRA (9th in 1970s, 14tli in 1980s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS S\AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
PROF (2nd in 1970s, 5th in 19S0s)
US JAP DEU UK AUS S\AE NOR NL FRA CAN FIN BEL DK ITA
aOn the horizontal axis, countries are ranked by their relative endowments with R&D scientists and
engineers in the 1970s. After the industries' names, the rankings of industries by their average ratios of
R&D scientists and engineers to other R&D personnel in the 1970s and 1980s are given in parentheses.
— For abbreviations of industries' names see Appendix I.242
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